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The research problem for this dissertation was to
determine the affects of President Nixon's New Federalism
in four Pacific Northwest cities.

More specifically, the

dissertation sought to determine and explain the effects of
the State and Local.Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, a basic
component of the
land and Eugene.

N~w

Federalism, in Seattle, Tacoma, Port-

The central goal of revenue sharing and

the Neill Federalism is to decentralize government in tL::
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American federal system.

The central fear of those who

oppose the effects of such decentralization is that the
poor and minority groups of America may be discriminated
against by local special interest groups.

The purpose of

the dissertation was to see the extent to which the goals
of the proponents and the fears of the opponents have so
far been realized in the revenue sharing experience of
four cities.

A comparative case study approach was used

whereby the General Revenue Sharing experience of each
city was described and analyzed in terms of the goals of
the New Federalism and the fears of its opponents.
The data used for this investigation was obtained
from taped interviews with city officials in each of the
four cities.

A questionnaire was prepared for the inter-

views which included questions pertaining to federalstate-city relations in terms of grants-in-aid, the fiscal
condition of the city, the decision-making process used in
the city for allocating revenue sharing funds, who participated in the decision-making process, who benefitted
from revenue sharing in the city and the overall satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the concept of the New
Federalism and revenue sharing.
In addition to the data collected from city officials who were directly involved in the city revenue sharing process, additional data was obtained from those in-

'.
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terviewed showing how the revenue sharing money was dealt
with.

It should be noted that these city officials were

administrative personnel as well as elected officials.
The results of the dissertation showed that the decentralization of American government sought by the Nixon
Administration has so far not been obtained through General Revenue Sharing insofar as these four cities are concerned.

The money from General Revenue Sharing was not

adequate for these cities to meaningfully gain increased
power and independence from either their states or the
federal government.

The fiscal requirements of these

cities due to inflation, labor costs, demands to compensate for cutback categorical grants of the federal government and inadequate urban tax bases made the infusion
of General Revenue Sharing money too small to allow the
cities to undertake dramatic "new" departures because of
these funds.

Seattle and Eugene did undertake housing

programs and Portland saw revenue sharing funds as "freeing up" other monies so the city could undertake a new
neighborhood participation program, but as a rule these
cities found the demands from traditional city services
plus the increased burden of having to fund cutback federal categorical grant programs as using up all their funds
including revenue sharing.
The dissertation laid particular emphasis on the

4

question of whether local poor people and minorities were
deliberately included in the decision-making processes
over revenue sharing and in the programs funded with revenue sharing funds.

It was found that Tacoma especially

sought to develop a decision-making process that was inclusive of representatives from all segments of the city
and that Seattle had perhaps the least inclusive decisionmaking process.

But there was not a direct correlation

between degree of citizen-wide participation and benefits
from revenue sharing going to all citizens equally.
Although General Revenue Sharing is only one part
of the New Federalism it appears that for the decentrali~
zation of American government to be meaningful, General
Revenue Sharing will have to be dramatically increased in
funding and supplemented with Special Revenue Sharing to
take up the slack from cutback federal categorical grants
intended for the human and community services areas.
If the major goal of the New Federalism, decentralization, has not been accomplished so far, then the major
fear of opponents has not been realized either.

The dis-

sertation demonstrates a commitment on the part of the
City Council majorities in each city to preserve the progress made in recent years to improve the lot of America's
poor and minority citizens.

These groups, while sometimes

having not been greatly involved in the revenue sharing

5
decision-making processes, were recognized as deserving a
part of the revenue sharing funds.

The fear that without

the federal government's specific prodding local special
interests woumd act to ignore the interests of local minorities and the poor was not confirmed by this study.

~-.-.~---.

PREFACE

Most of the data collected for this study was obtained through taped interviews of city officials
in Seattle, Tacoma, Portland and Eugene.
terviews took place in the summer of 1973.

The inEach

subject was asked for permission to tape the interview and all consented. Whe~ the author was asked
not to include some material, the request was, of
course, honored.

Thus, no "off the record" infor-

mation is included in this study.

,---
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I

INTRODUCTION
When the history of the Nixon Administration is
written, it will be filled with Richard Nixon's accomplishments in the foreign policy area and the desperate
trauma of the Watergate Affair.

His Administration is not

noted for either its emphasis on, or accomplishments in,
domestic affairs, yet President Nixon has set goals for
his Administration in the domestic area that are of the
utmost significance.

Starting with election slogans in

the 1968 campaign and carrying through to his 1974 State
of the Union address, President Nixon has set forth as
the major goal of his domestic policy the balancing of
the distribution of power among the levels of government
in the American federal system.

His goal has been noth-

ing less than the decentralization of the American po1itical system.

This, of course, is a huge undertaking.

In spite of the pronouncements of the 1974 State of the
Union message that the corner had been turned in returning power, funds and responsibilities to the states and
communities of America from Washington, D.C., this study
will indicate that little real decentralization has taken
place so far.
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It is no secret that the national government in our
system has become immensely more powerful in the federal
structure since the inception of the income tax and the
dynamic policies of the New Deal.

To substantially shift

power back to the states and cities would take strong
leadership from a determined President and the utmost
cooperation from Congress, as well as the support of the
nation's governors and mayors.

Those in positions of

social and economic power at all levels of the system
would also have to commit themselves to the effort for
it to succeed.

Power tends to entrench itself in politi-

cal, social and economic institutions.

If the current

balance of power among the levels of the federal system
is benefitting certain interests, and it is, it can be
expected that these interests will try to keep the balance
the way it is.

Hence, a meaningful reversal of that power

balance would take a sincere commitment on the part of
many individuals, groups and institutions.

An historical

accounting of the Nixon Administration's domestic policy
may show that it was unable to muster the force, influence
or cooperation necessary to carry out its basic domestic
goal, the decentralization of the American federal system.
That conclusion may be premature.

After all, rev-

enue sharing, a basic tool used by the Nixon Administration in the implementation of its domestic policy, has
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only been in operation for about two years.

Furthermore,

the Administration has three more years in which to
achieve its goals.

Even if the President should not serve

out his term, there is no

indic~tion

that the basic out-

lines of his domestic power redistribution goal would not
be shared by Vice-President Ford.

Because the goal of

the Administration is nothing short of trying to reshape
the power balance of the federal system, it is important
to make some analysis of what progress has been made in
that effort so far.

Such an analysis is the purpose of

this paper.
The city will serve as the unit of direct analysis
in this paper.

This may seem a bit strange, since most

interpretations of American federalism indicate a po1itical system divided between the national government and
the states.

The United States Constitution does not men-

tion the urban area as having any legal being, rights or
obligations in the federal system.

Judge Dillon made the

point very clear when he proclaimed that cities " ••• owe
their origins to, and derive their powers from, the
(state) legis1atures_"1 Dillon's word on the subject has
lThis is the famous "Dillon Rule."
It is discussed
at length and contrasted with the opinion of Judge Cooley,
who felt cities had an inherent sovereignty of their own,
in Anwar Syed, The Political Theory of American Local
Government,(New York: Random House, 1968), p. 68.
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become the legal "rule" that has firmly established cities
as the legal subjects of their state governments.

Yet, as

we shall see later, events have driven cities to the necessity of dealing directly with the federal government.
The need for money and expertise to help the city deal
with its pressing needs has established a political, social and economic relationship between the cities and the
federal government that can allow one to consider the urban area as a distinct element in the federal system.
This simply means that Washington, D.C., deals not just
with the government of the State of Oregon, for example,
but i t may have independent relations with the City of
Portland as well.

President Nixon recognized this devel-

opment within American federalism when he proposed the decentralization of the system and revenue sharing.

When

speaking on the subject, he mentions the need to return
power, funds and responsibility to the states and also to
the cities.

Consequently, it is within this special fed-

eral context that we study revenue sharing and how i t has
affected the balance of power in the American federal systern.
The task of this paper is to describe and explain
how four cities have dealt with General Revenue Sharing
through use of a comparative approach.

General Revenue

Sharing was created through the passage of the State and

5

Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972.

It is the keystone

of the Nixon Administration's plan for a "New

Federa1ism,~

the term given for the effort to divert more "funds, power
and responsibility" to the "states, communities and
of America in a decentralization effort.

peop1~'

A fuller de-

scription of the General Revenue Sharing Act and a detailed description of the New Federalism will be taken up
in Chapter II and Chapter III of this study.

For now, it

is important to point out that in the past two years,
states, cities and counties allover this nation have been
receiving General Revenue Sharing checks.

Consequently,

it is possible for us to study what effect General Revenue
Sharing has had so far.
this study.

Four cities have been chosen for

They are Seattle and Tacoma, in the State of

Washington, and Portland and Eugene,in the State of Oregon.
~'fuy

study cities instead of states or counties?

why these

cities?
America is an urban society and has been for over
a hundred years.

The basic political, social and economic

issues of the day are manifested most dramatically in urban areas.

Questions of race relations, poverty, inf1a-

tion, crime and transportation are daily addressed by urban governments and by other public and private urban institutions.
story.

The economic plight of our cities is an old

As Americans have flocked to the city, the city
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has found itself in dire financial distress trying to meet
the demands for services by all its new inhabitants.

De-

mand for services combined with high wage demands on the
part of city employees and inflation have added to the
fiscal woes of cities.

f

~
l!

The political institutions of the

city have also been under fire in terms of whether or not
they are representative of, and responsive to, all the

r.

citizens of the city.

,

the great social, economic and political issues of the

\

day meet.

I

In other words, the city is where

Therefore, it is fitting that the city be the

focus of a study that seeks to examine how the Nixon Ad-

I
I
I

ministration's plans to meet these issues through a decentralization of government are working.
Seattle, Portland, Tacoma and Eugene are part of
what can be called the "development belt" of the Pacific
Northwest.

Moving north from California and west from

the rest of the nation"

thousands of Americans in recent

years have discovered the Pacific Northwest.

Its com-

fortable (if damp) climate together with its relatively
unpolluted environment have beckoned many.

One feature

that certainly has appealed to some is how uncrowded the
region is.

Washington and Oregon together contain only

about five million people.

Especially since dorld Nar II,

the economic climate of the region has been generally
healthy, offering job opportunities to those who might
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want to move there.

Each of the four cities in this study

are located along Interstate Highway Five, the main land
transportation arterial going north and south on the west
coast.

Most of the population and most of the non-agri-

cultural industry of the Pacific Northwest are located in
the greater metropolitan areas of these four cities.

They

do have significant differences, however.
Seattle is by far the largest of the four cities.
Its population as of the 1970 census was about 531,000
people.

The population is very heterogenous, as it is

made up of persons from many races and socioeconomic backgrounds.

The Boeing Company makes its home in Seattle and

dominates the economic scene, not only of Seattle, but of
much of Washington and the rest of the Pacific Northwest.
At times, the Boeing Company has employed well over a hundred thousand people in its Seattle area plants.

Seattle

and other towns in the Pacific Northwest are the home of
many other businesses, large and small, which supply the
Boeing Company with materials needed in the aerospace industry.

As many of those interviewed in this study indi-

cated, as Boeing goes, so goes the economic climate of the
entire Pacific Northwest.

In the late 1960's the Boeing

Company laid off thousands of employees because Congress
decided not to fund the further development of the Supersonic Transport plane.

Seattle began to suffer a severe

~-.-

!I
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economic recession and the reverberations were felt
throughout the Pacific Northwest.

Seattle, then is an

important city in our study of General Revenue Sharing and
the New Federalism

because it is the economic heart of the

region and because it is a large city with a heterogenous
population with all the usual challenges and problems

i

t

l
t

I
[

faced by big American cities.
Tacoma, Washington, is located about thirty-five
miles south of Seattle along Interstate Five.
a population of 154,000 in 1970.

I
\

I
f
f

t

r~;

Tacoma had

Although considerably

smaller than Seattle, Tacoma has quite a large minority
population.

This is because the city has two large Armed

Services bases and many of the personnel associated with
these bases are of minority races, especially Blacks.
Tacoma lives in the shadow of Seattle and has throughout
its history.

Seattle's port facilities and general en-

vironmental location seem to have given it advantages over

[;

t

!

Tacoma.

The larger minority population of Tacoma is an

important reason for including the city in our study.
Another is that the town's size puts it into a population
category quite separate from the other three cities.

It

therefore allows us to study General Revenue Sharing in
several different sized cities.
Portland, Oregon, is the second largest city to be
studied.

As the largest city in Oregon, it is still quite

9

a bit smaller than Seattle.
380,000.

Its population in 1970 was

Portland has a very diversified economy and

therefore, unlike Seattle, is not dependent upon one large
industry for its economic prosperity.

Those interviewed

in Portland for this study, however, indicated that during
the Boeing recession of the late 1960's, Portland, too,
felt the effects.

Portland's population offers us another

size variation for studying the effects of General Revenue
Sharing in urban America.
Eugene, Oregon, is the smallest city to be studied.
As of 1970, Eugene had a population of about 78,000.

At

the foot of the "development belt," Eugene is the home of
the University of Oregon and several medium-sized businesses and industries.

Agriculture and wood products in-

dustries are especially prominent.

About three hundred

miles south of Seattle along Interstate Five, and about
one hundred miles south of Portland along the same route,
Eugene offers still another population variation for our
study.
This study will try to make' a genuine effort to
compare the experiences these four cities have had with
General Revenue Sharing.

It will not only describe the

political experiences of these cities with General Revenue Sharing, but also explain the differences and similarities in their experiences.

A simple description of

r'·
"

\

~

10
what went on without identifying or explaining the similarities or differences of these cities' experience would
not really contribute to an explanation of politics and
t

l

public affairs or an understanding of the progress of the

L

~

New Federalism.

~

part of explanation.

I'
t

t

tI,

Comparison, in other words, is a vital
The cities studied in this paper of-

r

fer enough variation in their socioeconomic and political

I

environments that through comparing their General Revenue

[
I

~
[r
I
,~,
!

t

J

Sharing experiences, we may come to some explanation about
the effect of General Revenue Sharing in urban America.
A major public policy program like revenue sharing
is bound to have significant economic, social and political ramifications for every city receiving the funds.

It

l

is very important to emphasize that this study will be

t

primarily interested in the politics of General Revenue

r

Sharing.

t

Sharing with regard to these four cities will be largely

The conclusions we will reach on General Revenue

I

based on the responses given by City Hall officials inter-

f

viewed in each city.

\

administrators, but they were asked questions having pri-

Some are politicians and some are

i

!

I

marily to do with the political decision-making process

!

used in each city as it decided how to allocate General

!;

Revenue Sharing funds.

Also, they were asked whether they

felt the political power balance was being affected by
the Nixon revenue sharing program.

Although political

11

aspects of the revenue sharing experiences of these cities are emphasized in this study, social and economic aspects are not ignored.
As we shall see, Nixon's New Federalism promises to
return "funds, power and responsibility" to the states,
cities and "people" of America.

Who are the "people"'?

We will be concerned in this study with the social consequences of General Revenue Sharing in terms of which people in these cities participated in deciding where the
revenue sharing money should go and which people in the
city seem to be benefitting from the allocation of General
Revenue Sharing funds.

These are political questions.

They are also social questions in terms of the inclusion
or exclusion of some social groups in the revenue sharing
experience.
The economic aspects of General Revenue Sharing will
also be examined.

It is too early in the revenue sharing

experience to make a thorough-going evaluation of the real
economic impact of revenue sharing on the fiscal problems
of city government and the distribution of income within
the city's population.

Therefore, this study limits it-

self to how City Hall officials interviewed feel about the
economic condition of their city and the impact they feel
General Revenue Sharing has and will have on that condition.

Also, we will examine how each city has allocated
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its General Revenue Sharing funds within its current general fund budget.

Examining where the General Revenue

Sharing funds were allocated and in what amounts should
tell us something about the economic impact of General
Revenue Sharing in each city.
The political, social and economic conclusions arrived at in this study, then, will be based on the opinions
of City Hall officials interviewed in each city plus an
analysis of the decision-making and budget data given the
author pertaining to the city's experience with General
Revenue Sharing.

Because of the dramatic significance of

President Nixon's goal to shift the drift of power back to
the states and cities away from Washington, D.C., the importance of a study which seeks to evaluate the progress
of such a program is clear, but it must be acknowledged
that the conclusions summarized and evaluated in the last
chapter of this study should be taken in proper perspective.

As mentioned earlier, this analysis of General Rev-

enue Sharing is an early one.
new.

The program itself is very

For the conclusions in this study to have added

meaning they should be evaluated and compared with similar
studies in other cities in other parts of the country.
Also, if this study were followed up by a lnter study, in
three years, for example, when the Revenue Sharing Act expires, a more thorough evaluation of the progress of the
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Nixon Administration's efforts at decentralization might
be made.

The Congress, however, has called for data from

which it can decide whether to expand or eliminate federal revenue sharing and a study of this sort can supply
some data.

Also, as indicated above, the significance of

the Nixon effort in itself requires a study evaluating its
effect.
We have seen that it is the politics of revenue
sharing that will be emphasized in this study.

This will

be done through evaluating the General Revenue 3haring experiences of each of these four cities in terms of the
goals set forth by the Nixon Administration for the New
Federalism and the fears held by opponents of the New
Federalism.

The goals and fears of the New Federalism

will provide us with a theoretical framework with which
to describe and explain the General Revenue Sharing experiences of Seattle, Tacoma, Portland, and Eugene.
The goals of the Nixon Administration as it pursues
the New Federalism and the fears held by those who oppose
that program have very significant economic and social dimensions to be sure, and they will be examined, but our
emphasis is political because what President Nixon is especially attempting is a political decentralization of
power in Americao
of revenue sharing.

His major tool is the economic device
Nixon realizes that it is the econo-
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mic situation of cities and states which has weakened
them.

The fact that they do not have the money to handle

their social and economic problems has made them continually turn to Washington, D.C., for help.

Washington of-

ten grants the money, but with strings attached.

This has

further made the cities and states beholden to the national
government, so at the heart of any political decentralization effort must be a program to give the cities and
states adequate funds whereby they can deal with their
problems with less dependence on the federal government.
Hence, we have the Nixon Administration's program of revenue sharing.
To set the stage for an evaluation of General Revenue Sharing in these four cities, therefore, Chapter II
of this study will examine some of the financial difficulties the cities are having and the programs developed by
the national government to aid them, with a special emphasis on categorical grants-in-aid.

At various times,

the national government has also given block grants,
grants with few, if any, strings attached, to cities and
states.

The State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of

1972 (General Revenue Sharing Act) is such a grant.

Chap-

terII will also examine block grants and look at some detail at the General Revenue Sharing Act itself.
Chapter III will develop the conceptual framework
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for our evaluation of General Revenue Sharing by explaining the goals of the New Federalism and the fears held by
its critics.

Chapters IV through VII will contain the

case studies of each of the four cities.

At the end of

each case study will be a "Sub-Conclusions" section where
that particular city's General Revenue Sharing experience
will be summed up and evaluated in terms of the conceptual
framework of Chapter III.
Chapter VIII will pull together the experiences of
all four cities and analyze these in terms of the goals of

I

the Nixon Administration for the New Federalism and the

I.

fears of those who dread the accomplishment of those goals.

!

We will see the extent to which Nixonts goals seem to have

!
t

been reached and why and/or the extent to which the fears

t

of the critics have been realized and why.

[
I

~

,i
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If the author has one distinct bias, it is concern
for the fate of the disadvantaged in America as the New
Federalism takes effect.

In recent years important

strides have been taken in this country to insure civil
rights for all citizens and to try and develop programs to
help the poor.

~e

these advances to be supported and

strengthened under the New Federalism or are they to be
abandoned and left to recede?

Throughout this paper, a

special effort is made to pay particular attention to
this issue.

16
We now move to a look at the fiscal plight of urban
America and the device of categorical and block grants used
by the national government to aid the cities.

CHAPTER II
THE FINANCIAL PLIGHT OF URBAN AMERICA:
THE FEDERAL RESPONSE
I. FROM RURAL TO URBAN AMERICA

Thomas Jefferson hoped that the United States would
remain largely a rural society.

He felt Americans had the

best chance of establishing a strong democracy if the people remained the virtuous creatures rural life allowed
them to be.

While there is no underestimating the impor-

tance of rural life and the development of agriculture in
contributing to the basic strength of America, the nation
is definitely urban.

By 1920, more Americans were living

in towns and cities of over 2,500 population than in the
countryside.

Since that time, economic depression, the

mechanization of farms and the tremendous growth of urbanbased businesses and industries has accelerated the movement of people from the countryside to the urban area.
The Great Depression, together with the great droughts of
the 1930's in the mid-west, drove many farmers off the
land.

Either they could not afford to keep up paymellts

on their farms or the top soils eroded or blew away, making it impossible to continue farming.

Where could they
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The answer was the city.

Some went clear across the

country to California, while some just went to the nearest
city, but the city offered a chance to perhaps get a job
and start a new life.

For some it simply offered a chance

for survival.

The depression was raging in the cities,

too, however.

The influx of rural Americans into urban

centers only exacerbated an already difficult situation,
but in spite of the hardship, many former rural dwellers
stayed in the city as they had nowhere else to go.
The mechanization of American farms meant that ma-··
chines began to do the work that many individuals were
formerly needed to perform.

Therefore, men who only knew

how to perform low-skill farm jobs went to the city to
try to make a living.

The cities were confronted with

the problem of how to employ, house and educate these peopIe.
Among things Americans are best known for is their
industrial capacity as a nation.

Businesses and indus-

tries drew huge numbers of people to the cities in which
they were located.

Some men left the farm and came to the

city even if they were not driven off by the Depression
or mechanization.

Some simply wanted more money and the

jobs in the new factories and business of the city seemed
to promise greater wealth.

For these reasons and others,

then, Americans have flocked to the cities to such an ex-
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tent that by 1960 the U.S. Census Bureau classified seven
out of every ten Americans as city dwellers.

The same

source predicts that by 1980 perhaps ninety percent of
America's population will be living in urban areas.
As the cities of America have grown they have found
that their populations have grown more heterogenous.
This can be explained in terms of three migrations that
have occurred to the cities •. The first and oldest migration was by white families who moved, as we have seen,
from the farm to the small town and then from the small
towns to the larger cities.

M.ore recently, these "ori-

ginal" white urban settlers have made up the middle and
upper-middle classes of American society.

As members of

these groups, many are finding life uncomfortable in the
core of large cities and are moving in great numbers to
the suburbs.

One reason they are moving, it seems, is

because of the other groups of people who moved into the
city behind them.
The second migration to the cities involved large
numbers of immigrants primarily from the rural areas of
Europe.

They came to the "promised land" of America seek-

ing jobs and political freedom.

They were "different"

from those already settled in the cities in that they were
foreigners and often Catholic.

This "difference" caused

them great hardships due to discrimination on the part of

I
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the established "WASP'S:' Over time, however, most of these
peoples have integrated into the social, economic and political structure of America.

One reason they were able

to become integrated into the system was the demand on the
part of business and industry for low-skill labor at the
same time these people were coming to this country.

Thus,

the new arrivals made some money, found adequate housing
and educated their children.

This afforded many the mobil-

ity they sought into the "establishment."
The third and most recent group to migrate to the
cities is the twentieth century movement of Blacks, as
well as Puerto Ricans, Mexican-Americans and whites from
depressed areas such as Appalachia.

By the time these

people began to arrive in urban areas, the businesses and
industries that used to absorb newcomers now found it difficult to employ these latest arrivals.

Certainly part of

the reason was outright discrimination against people of
a different color, but in addition, America had become
technologically sophisticated and no longer required the
same large numbers of low-skilled employees.

~hat

were

needed were highly skilled men and women who could work at
jobs that often required many years of specialized and expensive training.

The Blacks and others who now came to

the city did not have such training and thus found themselves relegated to lives of unemployment or underemploy;;:
I'

I

1

1

,
~
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Of course, many were able to find jobs and inte-

grate into the mainstream of the American system, but many
others found themselves living in the discarded housing of
better off citizens who had moved to wealthier neighborhoods or to the suburbs to get away from the industrial
and increasingly blighted core of town.

The vehicles of

mobility which enabled members of the second migration to
integrate into the society and live the good life, then,
were not and still are not available to large numbers of
persons who made up the third migration into America's
cities.
II.

THE COSTS OF GRmvTH

T.hese migration patterns are directly related to the.
fiscal plight of America's cities.

Niddle class and up-

per-class citizens who have left the core of the city and
moved to the sUburb have taken with them two important
things.

First, they have taken the dollars that would

accrue to the city through the property tax it would collect if the core of the city still had well-maintained
and high-value homes.

The tax base of the city has shrunk

because the poor now live in the core and their property
tax payments are lower because their property's assessed
value is less, largely because the homes are in such disrepair.

A primary source of income to the city is thus
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diminished once those with wealth leave the city.

Also,

these same persons are likely to be socially and politically concerned citizens.

If they would stay in the city

they could use these abilities to help solve the city's
problems.

Also, some are specialists in social work and

could significantly help the poor of the city core.

The

loss of money and expertise when middle-class and uppermiddle-class citizens move out of the heart of the city
has meant, therefore, that the city has had to find other
ways of getting these resources.

With the latest migra-

tion to the city, accompanied by the loss of other citizens to the suburbs, the financial needs of the city have
increased dramatically.

As might be expected, the poor

are very needy and can't afford to pay for much themselves.

Therefore, they have a great need for public,

that is, city services.
vide those services.

It is an expensive matter to pro-

The poor are often in need of pub-

licly supported health care programs, day-care programs,
pre-school programs and particularly good regular school
programs to enable their children to "catch up" with children from wealthier families who have been going to better
schools in better neighborhoods all their lives.

The poor

often need more police patrols and more fire protection
due to the high crime rate in urban cores and the poor
quality of dwellings in core areas.

The poor are simply
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more needy in every way and to provide for them is an increasingly difficult challenge for urban government.
At one time, one could argue that the only function
of city government was to provide for the basic protection
of the lives and property of its citizens.

Today's cities,

however, find themselves being called upon to do more, and
not just for the less well-off elements of the urban population.

Wealthier persons want the city to furnish and

maintain parks and recreation programs.

They want the

city to support the arts and help clean up the air and
water.

They want the city to provide good public trans-

portation systems and provide an economic incentive for
business and industrial growth by keeping the property
tax low.

They also want the city to be representative of

their needs and perform its functions efficiently.

This

often calls for a large bureaucracy which is very expensive.
Two other factors have tremendous impact on the fiscal plight of cities.
labor costs.

One is inflation.

The other is

As we will see in the case studies which

follow, inflation and particularly the increased wage demands of city employees are a sUbstantial drain on the
city treasury.

Thus, from all segments of the urban pop-

ulation come demands that require a great deal of money
to meet.

To examine more thoroughly the expenses of
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cities it might be useful to distinguish between two broad
categories of expenditures: current operations and capital
outlays.

The first refers to the cost of running the var-

ious departments and agencies and providing services to
the citizens.

The second includes appropriations for the

acquisition or construction of public buildings, parks,
sewers and other facilities and for the purchase of major
items of equipment such as fire trucks.
Figure 1 below shows the average distribution of
current operations expenditures in the thirty-eight most
populous urban areas of the United States during fiscal
1966.

Education dominates the spending pattern, with

Category
Education
Health and Welfare
Police and Fire
General Administration
Streets and Roads
Sewage and Sanitation
Parks and Recreation
Debt Service
Other

Percent of Expenditures
43.5
17.3
10.8

4.4
3.9

3.8
2.5
4.5
9.3

Figure 1. Percentage distribution, by function,
of current expenditures of local governments in
large SMSA's. SOURCE: "Local Government Finance
in Selected ~etropolitan Areas, 1965-1966,"
U.S. Bureau of the Census.
health and welfare a poor second.

Police and fire pro-

tection run third with about eleven percent.

Bollens and

Schmandt in their work, The Metropolis, indicate that
these proportions tend to vary with the population of a
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city.

The greater the size of an urban area, the greater

percentage of the budget is spent on health and welfare,
police and fire protection, waste disposal and parks.

In

smaller urban areas, however, there is less money spent on
such services and often education runs as high as sixtyfive percent of total current operation out1ays.l
As America has become more an urban society over
the years, the expenditures for current operations have,
of course, increased dramatically.

This growth has also

required cities to enlarge their physical plants, that is,
increase their capital outlays.
more policemen,

Along with the demand for

firemen, teachers and other workers has

also been the need for additional classrooms, police and

I

fire stations, roads and parks.

•I

I

t

report, in 1967, local expenditures for capital outlays,

t

including publicly owned utilities, total almost $13 bil-

As Bollens and Schmandt

lion, over one-third more than in 1962.

Educational fac-

i1ities led the expenditures, taking about one-third of
the

tota1~

The next greatest expense was locally operated

utilities, and third was streets and roads.

Table 1 shows

1967 urban area expenditures for capital outlays.

Because

this data is somewhat dated, it does not reflect what
probably has become in very recent years a major

c~pital

IJohn C. Bollens and J.J. $chmandt, The Metropolis,
(New York: Harper and Row, 1970>, p. 268.

r

l
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expense for cities: environmental projects.

The recent

movement to clean up the air and water has brought demands
to the City Council to do their share.

Hence, sUbstantial

sums have doubtless been spent in this area.
TABLE I
LOCAL GOVERNI'-lENTAL EXPENDITURES
FOR CAPITAL OUTLAY
1967
Function
Education
Streets and Roads
Local Utilities
Health and Hospitals
Sewerage
Housing, Urban Renewal
Parks, Recreation,
Natural Resources
Airports and Harbors
All Other
TOTAL

Amount (millions)
$
4,313
1,888
2,044
299
1,093
966

$

664
361
1,334
12,962

% of Total
33.3
14.5
15.8
2.3
8.4
7.5

5.1
2.8
10.3
100.0

SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Governmental
Finances in 1966-1967, (Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1968).
Capital requirements will vary from city to city
and also from central city to the suburban areas.

In the

core area, for example, it is likely that the major physical needs will be for renewal of blighted areas, replacement of worn-out public structures and utilities and modernization of the transportation system.

In the suburbs,

capital outlays are mainly for new school buildings,
streets and roads and park and recreation lands. 2

2 Ibid ., pp. 271-2.
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According to B6llens and Schmandt, capital indebtedness of state and local governments combined has grown
at a rate of over six percent annually while the national
debt has been increasing by less than two percent.

"On

a per capita basis, the accumulated debt of the two lower
levels in 1967 was $544 for every person in the country,
while the similar figure for the national government was
$1649.

During the ten year period from 1957 to 1967, the

outstanding long-term obligations of local units more than
doubled (from $37.3 billion to $76.4 bi1lion)."3

It is

clear, then that running a city is a very expensive business and becoming more so as time goes on.

If cities had

no trouble raising the revenue to pay for these

inc~eased

expenses, there would be little to worry about, but as we
have just seen, the indebtedness of cities in the capital
outlay area alone, is increasing dramatically.

Now that

we know that the demand for city resources is very great
and growing, it is necessary to examine where cities obtain the revenue they need to provide the services demanded by their citizens.

It will become clear that obtaining

enough money to support city expenses is the number one
problem of local government.

As we will see in the case

studies that follow, just balancing the budget is a major
fiscal difficulty.
3Ibid ., p. 273.
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As Bollens and Schmandt suggest in The Metropolis,
in a real sense, national, state and local governments are
competitors for the tax dollar.

Each level has to try to

draw more from existing revenue sources and impose new
taxes to meet new responsibilities.

In this competition,

a kind of division of revenue sources has developed among
these three levels of government in the federal system.
Most of the federal funds are derived from income taxes
on individuals and corporations, states depend heavily on
sales and gross receipt taxes and, since about 1900, the
general property tax has been acknowledged as the almost
exclusive domain of local government.

It is important to

note, also, that other units of government such as county
government and special districts such as school districts
4
are also competing for the citizen's tax dollar.
Since colonial times, the general property tax has
provided the historical base of support for local government.

Prior to 1932, the property tax was providing

almost three-fourths of the general revenue of local governments.

In recent decades its importance has somewhat

declined due to increased state and federal aid to cities
as well as other forms of taxation now used by cities.
Today it is estimated that the property tax finances only
about forty-three percent of the aggregate budget of local
4 Ibid ., p. 255.
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governments.
After

5
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War II, cities found that mounting needs,

along with rising costs and protests by property owners
over the prospect of their property taxes increasing, led
local officials to try to find other source of local revenue.

Among the newer sources of local government revenue

are taxes on utility and business gross receipts, gasoline
and other motor fuels, motor vehicles, cigarettes, alcoholic beverages, income and retail sales.

The last two

have provided sUbstantial sums to large central cities.
In addition to taxes, local governments receive
funds from fees, permits and user charges of various kinds.
Some cities, for example, provide sewage and water service
to their citizens, who pay the city a fee based on the
use of the service.

Local taxes and fees, however, do

not seem to provide enough revenue for cities to keep up
with increasing costs and demands.

Cities have had to

turn to state and federal governments for fiscal assistance.
III. FEDERAL AID TO CITIES
The states and the federal government have financial difficulties of their own.

Nevertheless, they have

repeatedly come to the aid of cities.

In the competition
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for the citizen's tax dollar the state and federal governments get a large enough share and collect it in an
efficient enough manner that they have seen it as their
responsibility to help cities meet their financial burdens.

Since the early 1930's, the states and federal gov-

ernment have slowly but steadily helped finance, or have
financed completely, many programs at the local level.
In 1942, local government received a total of $1.8 billion
in state and federal aid.

By 1967, the amount had in-

creased to over $22 billion, enough to provide more than
one-third of the total general revenue of local governments. 6

Table II is a summary of municipal government

finances from 1957-1967.

It shows municipal, state and

federal sources of income for the city.
In every category in Table II, the rate of increase
was enormous for the ten year period.

Total revenue for

municipalities doubled between 1957 and 1967, the federal
contribution by a factor of nearly five-fold.

Yet, in

spite of the federal contribution, the cities of America
still face a severe financial crisis.

The added revenue

from increased populations within the cities and the revenue from the federal government cannot keep pace with
expenditures.

In a book by the National Urban Coalition

entitled Counterbudget, the gravity of the fiscal crisis
6 Ibid ., p. 263.
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TABLE II
SUMMARY OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT FINANCES
1957-1967
(in millions of $'s)
1967
1962
1957

62-67 57-67
% inc. % inc.

Revenue Total

24096

16794

12047

43

39

General Revenue

19283

13127

9285

47

41

5081
4001

2668
2128

1756
1489

90
88

52
43

Gen'l Rev, own sources 14202

10459

7529

36

39

10507
7351

7940
5812

5908
4297

32
26

34
35

1645
977
669

1303
866
437

934
602
332

26
13
53

40
14
32

1511

824

676

83

22

Charges and rv:isc.

3695

2519

1621

47

55

Utility Revenue
Water Supply
Electric Power
Gas Supply
Transit

4043
1807
1467
228
542

3136
1453
1114
170
399

2378
1079
810
114
375

29
24
32
34
36

32
35
38
49
6

Intergov'ta1 Revenue
(from State on1y)--

Taxes
Property
Sales and
Gross Receipts
General
Selective
Other

SOURCE: 1967 Census of Governments, Vol. 4, No.4,
"Finances of M.unicipa1ities and Township Governments,"
(~ashington:
u.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), p.11.
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was summarized:
••• To help meet this recurring crisis, federal
and state aid to cities increased by more than
400 percent between 1955 and 1968, yet such aid
still amounted to only 23% of city revenues in
1968, compared to 15% in 1955 •••
Assuming that the present level of federal
grants-in-aid to states and localities is maintained ($30 billion), we estimate that the statelocal revenu, gap in 1975 will be approximately
$67 billion.
The importance of state and federal aid to the city
cannot be underestimated, but even though that aid has increased dramatically over the years it does not seem to be
enough to rescue the city from severe fiscal troubles.
The dependence of urban America on federal aid especially
is evident from a careful

look at Table II and the above

statement from the National Urban Coalition.

Realizing

how much cities, and states, too, need federal aid to meet
their needs, the federal government has developed two
basic types of aid programs: categorical grants-in-aid
and block grants.

Although our primary interest is in

block grants because General Revenue Sharing is of that
type, it is also important to understand categorical
grants.

The New Federalism and the revenue sharing pro-

gram of the Nixon Administration is in part a reply to
those who have criticized categorical grants to states and
cities.
7Robert S. Benson and Harold Wolman, eds., Counterbudget: A Blueprint for Changing National Priorities, 19711976,(New York: Praeger Publishing, 1971), pp. 121-123.
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Categorical Grants-in-Aid
The basic issue involved in a state or city receiving categorical grants-in-aid from the federal government
is not just that federal money is coming in, but also federa1 controls.

In the last twenty years or so, grant-in-

aid programs have become a most important source of federal influence over state and local po1icy.8 Approximately
one-sixth of all state and local government revenues are
from federal grants of this type. 9

The money is paid

through a great number and variety of programs.
are several hundred programs in existence today.

There
A state

or locality could apply for money for anything from vocational training programs to a program for mine drainage
and solid waste disposal.

A major problem faced by both

cities and states is keeping up with available programs
and determining their purposes and requirements.

And, a1-

though there are a great number of categorical grants
available, most grants of this sort go to states and cities for welfare and highways.

The amount of money taken

in by states and communities in categorical grants has increased rapidly over the years and so has dependence of
lO
states and communities on those federal funds.
8Thomas R. Dye, Politics in States and Communities,
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1973) p. 53.
9 Ibid •
lOIbid., pp. 53-55.
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As we have seen, the financial crunch of state and

r,

r."

local government is one important reason there has been a
growth in federal aid to these levels of government.
are other reasons as well, however.

There

Some who argue in fa-

vor of categorical grants-in-aid center their arguments
around the greater progressivity of the federal tax structure.

Programs that are funded by state or local funds

are funded on a tax structure that is regressive or only
mildly progressive, but if the money is funded through a
federal program it is funded on a more progressive basis.
This may explain, in part, why many "liberal" Congressmen favor federal grants-in-aid to states and communities.
Another argument in favor of such an aid program
suggests that it provides the national government with an
opportunity to try to provide a uniform level of public
service throughout the nation at a minimum or basic level.
For example, a categorical grant could be established to
provide a minimum level of existence for the poverty
stricken regardless of where they live.

Or, a program

could try to establish equality in educational opportunity throughout the nation.
The mere availability of categorical grant funds
would allow the national government to have great influence, even control, over state and local government, but
categorical grants have specific guidelines attached to
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them that make the "control" aspect of such grants more
direct.

Thus, when the national government decides i t

has a particular interest (for example, highway construction, poverty or urban renewal) it can make funds available for those programs and then require the states and
localities to strictly follow federal guidelines in order
to keep the funds or get more of them.

In effect, cate-

gorical grants permit the national government to set national goals and priorities in all levels of government
without formally altering the federal structure.

The ac-

ceptance of these federal funds, then, means that state
and local officials are left with less freedom of choice
than they would have had otherwise.

Thomas Dye sums up

the situation this way:
In short, through the power to tax and spend for
the general welfare, and "conditions" attached to
federal grants-in-aid, the national government has
come to exercise great powers in many areas originally "reserved" to the states -- highways, welfare, education, housing, natural resources, employment, health and so on. ll
Of course, categorical grants have enabled cities
and states to provide many services to their citizens that
they would not have otherwise been able to afford.

One of

the most important of these is the development of regional
planning and regional councils of government.

In order to

get some categorical grants, local government had to demIIIbid., p. 58.
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onstrate they were engaged in planning for their future
development.

Yet this extensive grants-in-aid program has

helped create a centralization of power in Washington that
has created much controversy.

For example, federal grant

programs have frequently been seen as working at crosspurposes with one another.
programs have tried to

The federal public housing

provid~

low-rent housing for the

poor, but federally funded urban renewal programs have
often torn down low-rent housing 1

Another criticism of

this sort of grant programs is that it tends to create an
administrative quagmire in Washington and in the states
and cities.

A great deal of time and money is spent at

the local level in applying for and administering grants
and the result is much inefficiency on the part of many
bureaucrats.

An effort to deal with this problem has

been the development of integrated grant accounting.

A

city will make a broad request for aid to the federal government and the government will transfer requests for
specific programs to the government agency responsible
for that program.

Hopefully, this will alleviate the ex-

treme fragmentation of categorical grants now plagueing
local government.
Finally, and most critically for our purposes, the
categorical grant-in-aid system assumes that federal officials are better judges of goals and priorities at all
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levels of government than state or local officials.

As

Thomas Dye has put it, "State and local officials do not
determine what activities in their states and communities
will receive federal money, federal officials determine
these prioritiese,,12 This notion of federalism may be exaggerated.

Certainly many major public policy decisions

are made at the state and city levels.
an important one.

Yet Dye's point is

Even if some decisions are made at the

state and local level, most major ones, he is suggesting,
are made at the federal government level.

Dye continues

by suggesting that whether federal officials or state and
local officials are better judges of public goals and priorities is a "political question."

That is, of course,

very true and the controversial nature of that political
question is demonstrated by America's experience with a
series of categorical grant-in-aid programs all committed
to a \lIar on Poverty.
The Lyndon

John~on

Administration took the political

position that a top priority of American public policy
should be the elimination of poverty in the United States.
with this goal in mind, the Administration finally got
through Congress the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964.
The Act authorized a number of antipoverty programs and
gave the Office of Economic Opportunity great flexibility
12 Ibid ., p. 59.
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in dealing with state, local or private organizations.
The Act's most distinctive creation was the "Community
Action Agency" a nonprofit agency and independent of local
government, designed to coordinate a locality's social
service resources related to the poverty question and to
utilize them in a Community Action Program to alleviate
poverty.

The Community Action Program was to be developed

and administered with the "maximum feasible participation"
of the residents in the local area.

The point was to

enlist those who knew most about the plight of the poor,
the poor themselves, to establish meaningful ways to deal
with the poverty problem in their area.

Perhaps the most

controversial aspect of the Act was that grants were made
directly to the Community Action Agencies.

A state

governor could veto a contract between a Community Action
Agency and Washington, but that veto could be overridden
by the Office of Economic Opportunity director in Washington, D.C.

In essentially bypassing local government and

local elites and giving great amounts of federal aid to
local service agencies, War on Poverty categorical grants
alienated the local power structure.

Control over

financial resources is an important element of political
power, and no local government official or local elite
is going to appreciate the loss over the local disbursement of federal categorical grants.
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The War on Poverty categorical grants were distinctive, then, because they were grants directly to social
service agencies and not to state and local governments.
Not only had the Johnson Administration decided that the
national government had the right to decide that it ought
to be national policy to eliminate poverty, it also decided that state and local governments were not the best
administrators of such a policy.

The job was to be done

by local social agencies with the participation of the
poor themselves.
In the early 1970's, the Green Amendment to an
appropriations bill for the Office of Economic Opportunity
enabled local government to take over Community Action
Agencies unilaterally.

In spite of this development,

local political leaders were wary of the possibility of
being bypassed in future federal programs that seek to
deal with local problems.
The controversial goals and design of the War on
Poverty categorical grants combined with observations as
to whether the programs were doing much Dr the poor afterall, led some to question the whole system of categorical
grants as a means of helping local government address its
fiscal difficulties.

We have seen that other objections

to categorical grants already existed.

They tended to

create a giant bureaucracy in Washington ?nd also in the
states and cities.

L

State and local governments were
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drowning in governmental red tape.

Many objected to

the national control over local policy that categorical
grants gave the federal government.

Some also objected

to the idea that the national government was the best
judge of what needed to be done at the state and local
level.

These objections to categorical grants led some

politicians to search for another means by which the
federal government could aid the financially pressed
states and localities.

By the time of the Presidential

campaign of 1968, serious alternatives to categorical
grants were in the works by all major candidates.

Richard

Nixon, who, of course, was to win that Presidential
election, advocated a system of block grants that would
supplement and then later replace most categorical grants.
The block grant itself was not a new idea, but dissatisfaction with categorical grants was so widespread that
it appeared the time had come for a further look at block
grants as a way for the federal government to help states
and cities.
Block Grants
Generally, a block grant is federal funds made
available to a city or a state with few if any guidelines
directing how the money is spent.

States and localities

would be free, with such a grant, to use the money accord-
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ing to their own estimates of their needs.

In recent

years the principal use of block grants has been in the
Model Cities program, where the grants go directly to
cities to again deal with the poverty problem, and in the
law enforcement grants under the Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, where the grants are channelled
primarily to the states.

As will be discussed more fully

later, opponents of block grants contend that state and
local governments are not adequately staffed to assume
the huge bureaucratic responsibility of deciding where
block grants should go and then administering the allocation.

Critics of block grants also fear that some cities

and states might not deal fairly with minority interests
without the
them.

watchf~l

eye of the federal government upon

We saw earlier that categorical grants are a prime

means whereby the federal government can establish national priorities and enforce them throughout the country.
Those critical of block grants fear for the interests of
the disadvantaged once the federal government gives up
the categorical grant tool of looking out for their interests.

Another common argument against block grants is

that a governmental entity should have wide latitude in
spending only those monies they have been able to raise
themselves.

Only in fuis way will they act responsibly

in allocating the funds.

The accumulated opposition to
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block grants historically has been substantial enough to
restrict that sort of federal aid to local government to
a relatively low level.

The Bureau of the Budget esti-

mated that block grants would amount in fiscal 1969 to
$249.4 million, out of a total grants-in-aid of $20.3
billion.

13

Revenue sharing, a type of block grant and

the type which concerns us in this study, has a long
history among American federal aid schemes.
The first major

federa~

revenue sharing program

was in 1836 when the federal government split most of the
surplus in the Treasury among the states.

But revenue

sharing, until recently, never really caught on, probably
because there were few federal Treasury surpluses and
national politicians and bureaucrats were reluctant to
relinquish large amounts of money and the attached political power to other levels of government.

Since 1958,

however, several revenue sharing proposals have been made
in and out of government.

As

3u~gested

tion with categorical grants and the

above, dissatisfac-

ov~rall

financial

crisis of state and local government drove politicians
and fiscal experts to seek a new means of aiding local
government.

The revenue sharing plans that have been

offered in Congress since 1958 have provided for an autol3Congressional Quar~erlY, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Service, Spring, 1970), p. 118.
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matic distribution of a portion of federal tax revenues
to the states and local government, with few, if any,
strings attached.

The Congressional Quarterly suggests

that their research shows Republicans have generally
favored replacing categorical grants entirely with funds
from revenue sharing, while Democrats have most often
seen revenue sharing as only a supplement to existing
14
categorical 9rant programs.
Former Representative Melvin Laird (R, Wisconsin),
now Special Assistant to President Nixon, has been credited with having introduced in 1958 the first bill which
embodied many of the features now considered to be essential aspects of revenue sharing.

Laird's bill provided

for the automatic return of a portion of federal revenues
to the states with only a few conditions attached.
Laird's bill did not get far in Congress, but the
concept was picked up again by Walter W. Heller in 1960.
From 1961-4 he was chairman of the Council of Economic
Advisors.

As Carr, Bernstein, Murphy and Danielson sug-

gest:
(Heller) was seeking a means of relieving the
fiscal pressures on the states and localities,
of increasing their fiscal independence, of
supplementing programatic grants with unconditional assistance, and of insuring that more

l
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of the annual increments of federal income
taxes produced by the growth in GNP was
spent for domestic public sector needs. 15
Under the Heller plan, one percent of federal income tax
collections would be placed in a trust fund to be distributed to the states primarily on the basis of population for their unconditional use.

Heller believed the

plan was a good one because it would not only aid state
government financially, but it would relieve the "fiscal
drag" on the economy resulting from a higher growth rate
of federal tax revenues than of federal expenditures. 16
Initially President Johnson endorsed the plan in
1964 but backed off when protests from liberals, labor
and urban interests objected to unconditional grants to
state governments and insisted that federal assistance
continue to use federal resources according to national
priorities and national standards.

Instead, Johnson

embarked on his "creative federalism" scheme to consolidate and streamline categorical grants and to seek greater
consultation with local and state officials in the development and administration of federal grants.

Two major

block grants did corne out of Johnson's Administration!
15

Robert R. Carr,et al., Essentials of American
Democracy, 6th ed. (New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston,
1971), pp. 88-9.
16Congressional Quarterly, Spring, 1970.
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the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968
and the Model Cities Program, but these are not revenue
sharing block grants.
Creative federalism did not seem to satisfy the
advocates of revenue sharing.

Their ranks grew in the

1960's as is witnessed by the National Governor's Conference endorsement of revenue sharing in 1965.

In 1967

one fifth of the members of the Ninetieth Congress cosponsored revenue sharing bills and a Gallup Poll reported
that 70 percent of the American people favored the concept. 17

As the 1968 Presidential campaign progressed,

both candidates endorsed revenue sharing concepts.

Final-

ly in 1969, President Nixon proposed to distribute $500
million in additional federal aid to the states, with the
allotment for general revenue sharing rising to about $5
billion by 1976.

Revenue sharing fit well into President

Nixon's conception of a "New Federalism" that would reduce
Washington's direct involvement in domestic programs.

At

first the President met with resistance from the cities
because he proposed that revenue sharing funds be funneled
through state capitals.

Urban interests refused to

support the program until the Administration agreed that
a sizeable proportion of the shared revenues would be
17Carr et a1., Essentials of American Democracy,
p. 89.
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earmarked for direct delivery to counties and cities.
A revived administration revenue sharing bill included
that provision.
The Nixon Administration, in its belief that state
and local governments have the real responsibility for
the detailed policy development and administration of
many functions that the federal government has taken
upon itself since the New Deal, has set about to design
a comprehensive revenue sharing program.

The Administra-

tion, therefore, has proposed that Congress pass General
Revenue Sharing and Special Revenue Sharing packages.
General Revenue Sharing became law in 1972 and Special
Revenue Sharing is still being debated in Congress.
In 1971 the Administration presented its revenue
sharing package to Congress.

The Administration's plan

called for sharing $16 billion in federal revenues.

The

amount would include $5 billion in "new money" in the
form of General Revenue Sharing carrying virtually no
restrictions, and $11 billion for Special Revenue Sharing.
The latter would be financed by dismantling some 100
existing grant programs with narrow purposes, and replacing them with some six broad categories of existing
grants-in-aid, urban development, rural development,
education, transportation, manpower training and law
enforcement.

The money would be allocated to the states
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on the basis of population and tax effort, and they would
divide up the funds so that one-third went to the state
government and two-thirds would be divided among the
local governments (cities and counties, also on the basis
of population and tax effort).

States and local govern-

ments would be free to spend the funds as they chose in
each category (as it turned out, General Revenue Sharing
established very broad categories as does the proposed
Special Revenue Sharing>, subject only to the requirements of federal civil rights laws.
As stated above, General Revenue Sharing was
supposed to be "new money" in state and local treasuries.
It was not supposed to replace presently established
categorical grants.

Its intention was simply to help out

the financially hard pressed state and local governments
by using the superior taxing ability of the federal
government to raise funds to be distributed and finally
spent at the state and local level.

Because this was the

stated purpose of General Revenue Sharing and because so
much pressure from governors and mayors around the country
was put on Congress to give them this aid, the program
got through Congress without much trouble.

Congressman

Wilbur Mills (0, Arkansas), Chairman of the House Ways
and Means Committee, had long opposed the concept of
giving money to spend to units of government that had not
raised the money, but he, too, finally agreed to support
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the Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, which is the
formal name for the General Revenue Sharing Act.

Special

Revenue Sharing is another story.
Those interviewed for this study suggest President
Nixon has not been able to get a Special Revenue Sharing
package out of Congress partially because \vatergate and
related difficulties have substantially weakened his influence over Congress.

Congressmen, especially Democrats

who have felt ignored and even insulted by the President
as he carries out an essentially "Executive Branch"
foreign policy with little regard for Congress, now see
him weakened by scandal and see holding up his legislative
program as one way to "get back at him."

Even if the

President were not weakened by Watergate problems, he
would find it difficult to get Special Revenue Sharing
out of Congress.

The reason is simply that Special

Revenue Sharing was specifically designed to eliminate
some Great Society programs that liberal Congressmen
worked long and hard to see actualized in federal legislation.

Such established programs as grants for elementary

and secondary education, model cities, a host of antipoverty programs and urban renewal, would be transferred
to states, counties and cities.

In the minds of many

Senators and Congressmen, these programs were established
in the first place because states and cities were not
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doing their share to rebuild the cities or help the poor
and the minorities to achieve an equal opportunity.

It

is true, local government did not have the money to do
the services required of them and so the categorical
grants were instituted.

But did local government and

local elites really want to address the problems of the
less fortunate in their communities?
grams are

0

Antipoverty pro-

· t eres t s. 18
ft en oppose d b y power f u 1 1 oca 1 ~n

President Nixon said in his August, 1971 New
Federalism speech that the purpose of revenue sharing
was to return "power to the people," but the question is,
which people?

National elites who worked hard for Great

Society programs and racial minorities and the poor fear
that the beneficiaries of existing categorical programs
will obtain fewer funds or be bypassed entirely under
the revenue sharing program.

Although Congress passed

General Revenue Sharing, it may not pass Special Revenue
Sharing because it seeks to eliminate certain pieces of
sacred liberal legislation.

No one can argue with the

fact that many Great Society and War on Poverty programs
have not worked as they were supposed to, or at least in
the way that President Johnson led the disadvantaged to
18

Edward Hayes, Power Structure and Urban Policy,
Who Rules in Oakland?, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1972).
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believe they would work.

Much of the money seems to have

gotten into the hands of social administrators who have
not distributed it or used it to help the needy.

But to

dismantle the program entirely, including its more
successful programs such as Head Start and Model Cities,
would and has brought great opposition from liberal
Congressmen.
The 1974 Nixon Administration budget in its termination statement on a variety of categorical grant programs indicated that the Administration expects cities
and states to continue the programs with revenue sharing
funds, both General and Special.

If Special Revenue

Sharing does not become law soon, it can be assumed that
local government will have tremendous demand from social
service agencies for the cities' limited General Revenue
Sharing funds.

The National League of Cities and

the~J,

S.

Conference of Mayors on February 3, 1973, said the "magnitude of program cuts in the budget will leave local government far behind their position last year, before Genera1 Revenue Sharing was enacted.

"19

Implicit in all this is perhaps the most important
factor that distinguishes categorical grants from block
grants such as revenue sharing.

By distributing federal

19Conqressiona1 Quarterly, February, 1973, p. 223.
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funds among states and cities with little or no restrictions, the federal government and powerful national
interests would forfeit any opportunity to use federal
grants as an instrument for achieving national purposes,
motivating local tax reform, or encouraging constructive
change.

Such a policy is essentially a forfeiture of

political power from national power centers to local
political power centers.
The enactment of General Revenue Sharing, then, is
an important public policy issue and one deserving of
study.

Before examining the theories that will be used

to analyze General Revenue Sharing as it has been used
in Seattle, Tacoma, Portland and Eugene, and before looking at the four case studies themselves, it is necessary
to describe in detail the Revenue Sharing Act itself.
The State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972
In 1971 when President Nixon offered his revenue
sharing package to Congress, that body had for quite some
time been debating the merits of such a federal aid
scheme.

When Secretary George Schultz came before the

Senate Finance Committee, as its first witness to testify
on the President's bill and the revenue sharing bill
already passed by the House, he proceeded to answer some
of the "most frequently made" objections to revenue
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sharing.

It is useful to look briefly at these objec-

tions and Schultz's answers because they typify the entire
Congressional debate that resulted in the process by which
the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972 finally
became law.

The following comes from Schultz's Congres-

sional testimony:
1. How can we share revenues when the Federal
Budget is in a deficit? The basic reform and revitalization of our federal system is a No. 1 priority in the nation. The malaise and frustration
of the American public require that we redefine
our approach to assisting states and local governments, now, today. Tomorrow is too late.
2. Won't revenue sharing actually increase the
control of the federal government over the states
and localities rather than decrease it? ••• The
concept of General Revenue Sharing has developed
out of a growing concern that the traditional forms
of federal aid involve too much federal control.
we believe that this less conditional form of
fiscal assistance will result in a reduction of
federal control and will serve to revitalize the
decision-making capacity of state and local government.
3. Doesn't revenue sharing violate a time-honored principle of public finance by divorcing
taxing responsibility from spending responsibility?
••• (I)t should be recognized that our categorical
grants-in-aid programs have in fact done this for
some time. Despite the federal controls, the
spending under these programs ••• has been by state
and local governments ••• Congress is making the
overall spending decisions by inaugurating the
revenue sharing program. Should it find that the
goals of revenue sharing are not being achieved,
the Congress can change the program or change it
as it sees fit.
4. Why not provide a federal tax credit for
state and local income taxes? It is our view that
the tax credit is an inferior device for fiscal
reform and fiscal relief. The beneficiaries of
the credit would be, at the outset, local citizens.
There would be no fiscal relief to localities, because few have local income taxes. There would
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be no fiscal relief to state government. In addition, the tax credit would provide a permanent
advantage to high-income states. Others have suggested that instead of revenue sharing, we ought
to increase further our reliance on federal categorical grants to states and localities. I cannot imagine a less productive alternative. We do
not need more of the same. We do need a basic
reform in t~o way we provide aid to the states and
licalities.
Schultz goes on to outline the Administration's
basic proposal for General Revenue Sharing and at the
same time he notes what the House actually did in passing
the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972.
1. The President proposed that specified amounts
of funds be returned to states and localities each
year. In order to assure that these units of government would have an opportunity to order their
own priorities and plan their spending, the Administration proposal would have tied the amount to
the individual income tax base ••• The amounts to
be distributed (under the House Bill) are not tied
to the tax base, but are specified in the statute •••
The total (revenue sharing money disbursed) over
the five years of the program is $29.8 billion virtually identical to the five year total under
the President's proposal.
2. The President proposed that the funds be distributed to the states and localities on a fair and
equitable basis. Specifically, the portion going
to the states would have been determined by population adjusted for revenue effort. The portion
going to the localities would have been distributed
on the basis of local revenue raised relative to
the total of all revenues raised in the state. (The
House Bill) distributes $1.8 billion directly to
the state governments. Of this total $900 million
would be distributed on the basis of general tax

20George P. Schultz, Secretary of the Treasury, Testimony, Hearings of the Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate,
92nd Congress, 2nd Session, (Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1972), pp. 78-79.
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effort in the state and the remaining $900 million
on the extent to which the state relies on the individual income tax.
3. The President proposed that the use of the
funds by the states ~nd localities be unrestricted,
except that they would have to be expended legally
and without discrimination. (The House Bill) includes a nondiscrimination provision and attaches
no strings to the use of the $1.8 billion which goes
to the state governments. Local units would, however, have to use the $3.5 billion allocated them
for priority purposes. They can spend the funds for
public safety, environmental protection and public
transportation programs. Allowable capital expenditures items are: sewage collection and treatment,
refuse disposal systems and public transportation.
4. The President proposed that funds within
each state be distributed on the basis of relative
local revenues. The House Bill contains a series
of complex formulas that distribute funds on the
basis of population, urbanized population and population weighted inversely by per capita income.
5. Under both the President's proposal and the 21
House Bill, the financial reporting will be simple.
Secretary Schultz finally suggested to the Senate Committee that the Administration would prefer that the Senate make some changes in the House Bill and bring it more
closely into conformity with the Administration's original
revenue sharing proposal.

Specifically, the secretary

asked the Senate to consider replacing the House emphasis
on state income taxes as the basis for distributing funds
among the states with a provision that would give more
money to states with a better overall state and local tax
effort.

Also, Schultz asked that the Senate consider re-

moving the House restrictions on local uses of revenue
sharing funds.

The "high priority categories", he felt,

2l Ibid ., p. 80.
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should be removed.

~vhi1e

making some other suggestions

to amend the House Bill, the Secretary indicated the above
recommendations were particularly significant and conc1uded his testimony by saying that the House Bill "bears
an essential similarity to the President's proposal" and
that he endorsed it but at the same time would like to
work with the Senate to improve upon it. 22
A long parade of mayors, Congressmen, Senators and
representatives from labor and other special interests,
especially urban, carne before the Senate Finance Committee to comment on the concept of revenue sharing and sometimes to offer their own amendments to the House Bill.
Senator Howard Baker (R - Tennessee) testified in a vein
typical of many others.
The fiscal needs of our state and city and county
governments are both urgent and widely known. The
steady flow of fiscal resources away from state and
local government and toward the central government
since the adoption of the 16th Amendment is well
known. The exhaustion or near-exhaustion of available revenue bases at the state and local level is
well known, as is citizen exhaustion with rising
taxes, especially the property tax. Revenue sharing is not a panacea for all of these ills, but it 23
is a very major step indeed in the right direction.
Wes Uhlman, Mayor of Seattle, also testified before
the Senate Finance Committee and his remarks are worth
22 Ibid ., p. 81.
23Senator Howard Baker, Testimony, Hearings of the
Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate, 92nd Congress, 2nd
Session, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1972), p. 107.

56

quoting because they are fairly typical of the arguments
in favor of revenue sharing offered by the many mayors
who testified as well as those offered by urban interest
groups.
Existing methods of financing (Seattle's) operations are not able to meet rising demands for
services and rising costs of existing services.
The City Of Seattle is almost totally dependent
on the State of Washington for our revenues. The
State, in turn, relies heavily upon two of the
most unfair and regressive taxes used today, the
sales tax and the property tax.
These taxes have been utilized to their limits.
For us to raise them any further in our city
would be to drive out forever the middle-class
homeowner, the businessman ,and corporations and
industries. A resident of our state pays an average of forty percent of his income in one form of
taxes or another. Tax reform is desperately needed, and we welcome the provisions of the revenue
sharing bill which encourage reform. But it must
be remembered that the cities of poorer states
have as many needs as the cities of wealthier
states. Only the federal government has the resources, the tax structures, the flexibility and
the magnitude to perform the kind of tax reform
that is necessary.
Seattle contributes in excess of half a billion
dollars each year to the federal government in income taxes alone. We are now asking that a small
portion of that money be returned to us to save us
from financial starvation. The $10.6 million
which we would receive under (the House Bill) will
not be a panacea for us. It will not trigger any
dramatic transformations. Seattle icannot become a
Shangri-La on ten million dollars a year. That is
less than a sixth of the money we need to repair
our bridges alone.
vvhat this money will do is enable us to survive
at minimal levels without further decreasing services to our citizens. We may even be able to rise
above the bare essentials and in some places actually display the creativity, diversity and pro-
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gressive thinking which comprise the key to the
future of urban America. 24
A reading of the Congressional proceedings dealing
with revenue sharing gives one the impression that the
fiscal needs of state and local governments were so great
and so real that no Congressional opposition would be
significant enough to outlast the numerous supporters
of the concept.

In October of 1972 the President signed

into law the first maj:.)r piece of legislation in his New
Federalism program, the State and Local Fiscal Assistance
Act of 1972.
at the Act.

It is necessary now to take a detailed look
\.Je

will be able to see that it is substan-

tially like the House version outlined above with a few
variations.
Specific Provisions of the Act
The Act authorizes $30.2 billion to be obtained from
individual federal income taxes that is to be disbursed
to more than 38,000 states and communities throughout the
United Stales over a five year period.

Approximately

half of the 1972 payment of $5.3 billion was disbursed in
the fall of that year with the remaining part of the 1972
entitlement being mailed out in January of 1973.

This

amount is to increase in annual increments for each of the
24Wes Uhlman, Mayor of Seattle, Washington, Testimony, Hearings of the Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate,
92nd Congress, 2nd Session, (Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1972), p. 302.
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four remaining years.

Therefore, the life of the Act

runs five years beginning January 1, 1972.

"A total of

$5.64 billion will be paid in fiscal year 1973 in addition
to the $2.6 billion mentioned above; $6.05 billion in
fiscal year 1974; $6.20 billion in fiscal year 1975; $6.35
billion in fiscal year 1976 and $3.325 billion for JulyDecember, 1976.,,25
The state governments shall receive one-third of
the state's allocation •. The remaining two-thirds of the
state's allocation shall be divided among the various
units of local government.

"The money will be apportioned

to counties, cities, and towns using a formula based on
population, the general tax effort factor, and the relative income of these units."

The Act allocates monies

to States under one of two formulas.

Computers have been

used to take and apply both formulas for each state and
the higher amount will be allocated.
One formula is a three factor formula--the
amount received bears the same ratio to $5
billion as the population of the state multiplied by the relative income factor of that
state, multiplied by the general tax effort
factor of the state bears to the sum of these
products for all states. The other is a five
25These and the following facts and figures on the
State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972 come from
"Detailed Fact Sheet on Revenue Sharing," Part I, Department of the Treasury, (Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1973) or from the "State and Local Fiscal
Assistance Act of 1972," itself.
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factor formula which is based on general population, urban population, per capita income,
state income tax collection, and the general
tax effort of the state.
The law requires "expenditure and obligation reports."

The entitlement reports must be published in

general circulation within the geographical areas of each
state and local government.

The reports are also to be

circulated to the communication media such as radio and
television.

The point, the Act says, is to provide citi-

zens with information regarding the use of revenue sharing money.
The Act also requires that each unit of government
receiving revenue sharing funds submit a report at the
end of each entitlement period to the Secretary of the
Treasury "setting forth the amounts and purposes for
which funds received during such period have been spent
or obligated."

Also, the Act requires that each level

of government that plans to receive revenue sharing funds
after January 1, 1973, "shall submit a report to the
Secretary (of the Treasury) setting forth the amounts and
purposes for which it plans to spend or obligate the
funds which it expects to receive during such period.,,26
26"State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972,"
Administrative Provisions, Section 121 (a) and (b),
68 Stat. 931.
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A specific restriction in the Act is the provision
that revenue sharing funds may not be used by state or
local government as matching funds for federal programs.
Also governments below the state level may not use the
funds for education.

Also, state and local governments

are required to place revenue sharing monies into trust
funds and account for them separately from other funds.
This is to make it easier for the Treasury Department to
make "compliance studies" to assist Congress in assessing
the program itself at the end of the five year period.
Another fundamental restriction stipulated in the Act is
that "no person shall on the ground of race, color,
national origin, or sex be excluded from participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under a program or activity funded in whole or in part
with revenue sharing funds."
It will be remembered that the House version of the
revenue sharing bill made the provision that local governments could only spend their funds for "priority expenditures."

This stipulation remains in the final Act, in-

spite of Administration objections.

Nixon wanted no re-

strictions on any level of government.

Priority expendi-

tures mean:
(1)

Ordinary and necessary maintenance and operating expenses for:
(a) Public safety (including law enforcement, fire protection, and building
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(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(2)

code enforcement);
Environmental protection (including
sewage disposal, sanitation and pollution aba temen t) ;
Public transportation (including transit systems and streets and roads);
Health;
Recreation;
Libraries;
Social services for the poor and aged;
Financial administration; and

Ordinary and necessary capital expenditures
authorized by law. No unit of local government may use entitlement funds for nonpriority expenditires which are defined as
any expenditures other than those included
in (1) and (2) above. The chief executive
officer of each unit of local government
must certify to the Secretary that entitlement funds received by it have been used
only for pr~9rity expenditures as required
by the Act.

The Act further stipulates that prevailing wage
rates must be paid to persons employed in projects in
part or fully funded with revenue sharing funds.

Also,

the federal government can withhold funds to states or
localities if they are found in violation of any provision
of the Act.
An important part of the Treasury Department's
interim guidelines is in Subpart E - "Fiscal Procedures
and Auditing."

Section (b)

says that a unit of govern-

ment must use or appropriate its revenue sharing funds
within 24 months from the date of the receipt of the
27 "F ac t Sheet,"

p. 4.
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federal check or seek an extension form the Secretary of
the Treasury.

A more important provision is in Section

(b) which says "A recipient government which receives entitlement funds under the Act shall provide for the
expenditure of entitlement funds in accordance with the
laws and procedures applicable to the expenditure of its
own resources."

28

This means that units of government

receiving revenue sharing funds need use only their regular budget decision-making procedures in deciding who
should participate in deciding where revenue sharing funds
should go in the final allocations.
The Office of Revenue Sharing of the Department of
the Treasury furnishes a document entitled "Questions
and Answers Relating to State and Local Fiscal Assistance
Act of 1972."

The document offers further elaboration

as to the precise intent of the Revenue Sharing Act where
the Act itself remains ambiguous.

One question the

document raises is "will any programs be terminated because General Revenue Sharing has begun?"
"no."

The answer:

It adds, "Revenue sharing does not mandate any cuts

in existing programs.

The purpose of the Revenue Sharing

28"Title 31 - Money and Finance," Part 51, Subpart
E, Sections (b) and (c). Department of the Treasury,
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972).
The document's introductory statement by Secretary Schultz
states the doctrine is the "interim regulations" governing the Revenue Sharing Act.
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law is to allocate funds to state and local governments
to augment existing programs and aid certain capital
expenditures. ,,29

The important word here is "mandate."

The Act may not mandate any cuts in existing programs,
but it does not preclude those cuts.

As we shall see,

this is a very critical point in the minds of city
officials.
The document also raises and answers another important question much in the minds of local governmental
officials.
taxes'?"

"May revenue sharing funds be used to reduce

Answer:

"yes."

"Whether local governments use

the funds for this purpose is a judgment which each
government must make, based on its evaluation of local
30
needs."
It is significant that the Treasury Department
makes this point because a great deal of the Administration's rationale for the Act was that its monies might be
used to lessen the tax burden of the local citizens, but
the Act itself does not expressly mention whether the
revenue sharing funds can or cannot be used for that
purpose.
29"Questions and Answers Relating to State and Local
Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972," Office of Revenue Sharing,
Department of the Treasury, (Washington: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1973), p. 9.
30 Ibid ., p. 13.
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We now have some notion of the financial plight
of urban America:and the forms of federal aid that have
been developed to lessen the urban fiscal crisis.
Revenue Sharing is the latest form of such aid.

General
Before

examining how Seattle, Tacoma, Portland and Eugene have
dealt with revenue sharing, it is necessary to develop
theoretical frames of reference which, hopefully, will
help us to assess the significance of revenue sharing to
the American federal system.

CHAPTER III
THE NEW FEDERALISM: HOPES AND FEARS
CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION
I. THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER
IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
The United States was designed by its founders to be
a federal republic.

This meant that while there was to be

a strong central government, there were also to be strong
states with the power to determine certain local priorities
and policies independently from the national government.
Some have suggested that the American federal system resembles a layer cake with local governments as the base,
state governments in the middle and the national government at the top.

This view implies that the state and 10-

cal governments are "closer to the people" than the na-ei
tional government.

Associated with this viewpoint is the

idea that governmental activities in the United States
are parceled out to either the states, the communities
or to the national government.

The layer cake theory

also suggests that there is only so much power government can exercise, and that it is held in various
amounts by various levels of the federal system.

The

theory approaches the zero-sum game idea, that if the
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national government has a great amount of power, the
state and local governments necessarilY:1have less.

As

we will see, there are important elements of the layer
cake theory of federalism in President Nixon's notions
in the New Federalism.
T The layer cake theory with its idea of

s~paration

of national, state and local powers has been popular,
but there is evidence that it has never been a very
accurate model of American federalism.

Thomas Dye

suggests that:
American federalism has been characterized
by far more cooperation, coodination and sharing of responsibilities than by separation •••
At all times in our history, the national
1
government and the states have shared powers.
Dye continues to say that in almost every area of government responsibility, the various units of the federal
system have coordinated and cooperated and in fact,
no function seems to be exclusively the province of
one unit or another.

And even in terms of "closeness

to the people," the federal government has offices in
every part of the nation to deal directly with citizens
in virtually all functional areas of governmental
responsibility.

Dye concludes by saying, "In practice

then, federalism has come to mean the sharing of power
lThomas R. Dye, _P-::o=-l...i_t_~_·c.; ;. . -.s___i~ni'-S_t~a-:ot..-e..-s--=a'='"n~d~C
___o~m-:m~u~n:-~i"-·.-t.-i..-e....
s,
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1969)
p.SO.
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between the nation and the states, rather than a sharp
separation between national and state responsibilities."2
This viewpoint of American federalism has been called by
Morton Grodzins, the marble cake theory.

He explains:

The American form of gov.ernment is often, but
erroneously, symbolized by a three layer cake.
A far more accurate image is the rainbow or
marble cake, characterized by an inseparable
mingling of differently colored ingredients,
the colors appearing in vertical and diagonal
strands and unexpected whorls. The colors are
mixed in the marble cake, so function~ are
mixed in the American federal system.
We will see in the course of this study that the
marble cake theory of American federalism will be useful
in describing aspects of the New Federalism.

This

author agrees with Thomas Dye that the marble cake
theory is the most accurate in viewing the distribution
of power and responsibility in the American system.

It

seems clear that there is no fixed amount of political
power to be distributed among the units of the federal
system.

Instead there is competition among those units

for political power in general with each hoping to have
influence in determining public policy in various areas
of functional responsibility.

Whereas today it would be

2 Ibid •
3Morton Grodzins, "The Federal System in American
Assembly," Goals for Americans, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice Hall, 1960), p. 265.

68

accurate to say that all units of government in America
have more power than they once had, the national government has far more power than any other unit. 4
Why has the national government obtained so much
more power than the other units of the federal system?
As we saw in the last chapter, a major reason is the
financial power gained by the federal government through
the revenues accumulated by the federal income tax.

In

terms of the concerns of this study, it is this increased
fiscal power of the national government and the increased
need for funds by cities that is the most important
explanation for the increase in the power of the national
government.

But it should be noted that there are other

reasons for the growth in the power of the national
government.
For example, over time, the United States Supreme
Court has made landmark decisions that have required
certain actions to be taken by state and local governments.

If state and local governments do not take these

actions, it becomes the responsibility of the executive
branch of the national government to enforce the Supreme
Court decision.
A familiar example is the 1954 Supreme Court deci4Dye , Politics in States and Communities, pp. 50-1.
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sionof Brown v. The Board of Education.

In that deci-

sion, the Court ruled that segregation in public schooling was discrimination and, thus, unconstitutional.

It

ordered southern schools to desegregate with "all deliberate speed." Although some southern school districts have
complied voluntarily, others have not and the national
government has sometimes used various instruments-ofcoercion, including the U.S. Army, to force compliance.
Another reason the national government has gained
power is the accumulation of expertise in its bureaucracy.
State and local governments simply do not have access to
all information on the complex problems that face them
and have had to rely on the national government to send
experts in to help.

Such dependence on the part of the

states and cities has meant a further leverage point
whereby the national government can exercise power over
the other units in the federal system.
A further factor is the power that has evolved in
the American Presidency.

The national government is led

at a particular time by an administration in control of
the executive branch.

Even without control of both

houses of Congress, a President and his political party
can exercise great power in national affairs.

If the

President has the support of the Congress on most issues
and the Supreme Court does not oppose him, his administra-

··F

V,:
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tion can be extremely powerful in its ability to set
national priorities and policy trends.

In recent history,

Franklin Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson had this much power
during most of their Presidential careers.

No single

state or community can match the power of such a national
administration.

By nature and by design, the states do

not speak with a single national voice.

Occasionally

resolutions will emerge from National Governors

confer~r:

ences suggesting how the states stand on an issue,or a
region of the nation will speak with one voice on an
issue, as the South has many times.

But, in neither case

do the states, individually or as 'regions, have the com•
mand over the allocation of resources (power) that a
national administration can muster at a given time.
Our main interest, however, is the fiscal power
of the federal government.

And as we saw in our dis,

cussion of categorical grants and block grants, this
power of the national government has allowed it to make
national policy in areas such as civil rights, ecology,
and planning, and to require the other regimes in ehe
federal system to follow those national priorities if
they want the federal aid they so desperately need to run
their local governments.
The Controversy Over National Priorities
The setting of these national priorities by the
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national government has been controversial for many reasons.

Sometimes individual citizens and officials at

"lower" levels of government simply do not agree with
the policy set by the national government.

They may

oppose the idea of a minimum wage or the concept that
there should be federal aid to local education.

They

may oppose the integration of public schools or the
development of Model Cities communities in their state
or town.

But the argument against the national

govern~

ment setting and enforcing national priorities may
emerge for other reasons.
Many Americans, using the layer cake analogy, do
not feel it is the province of the national government
to determine what a city or state should do, especially in
certain areas that over time they have come to feel are
strictly of local concern.

In support of this view of

American federalism, it is argued that in order to get
the states to ratify the Constitution, it was clear to
the writers of the document that large areas of responsibility would have to go to the states.

Hence, the Tenth

Amendment and the implicit notion in the Constitution
itself that the states were to retain power of control
over their highways, education, banking, taxation, divorce,
liquor laws and their own civil and criminal codes.

The

states, in other words, were intended by the Constitution
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to have considerable self government in determining some
policies and priorities for their citizens.

In some re-

spects the states and localities do exercise considerable
control in these areas.

But as we have seen, much of that

control is now either shared with, or has been aodicated
to, the national government.

A major reason, again, is

the financial inability of the states and localities to
deal with these areas alone and thus, the need to apply
for federal funds with their attendant guidelines intended
to establish the priorities of a national administration
on a nationwide basis.
Since the New Deal, the national government has
considerably widened its activities at the state and
local level in the areas of civil rights and programs for
minorities and the disadvantaged.

It is particularly

upsetting to some Americans that national standards
should be established for dealing with the poor and
minority groups in their areas.

One need only look at

the controversy over the enforcement of the Brown v. The
Board of Education decision to see how violently citizens
can respond to the imposition of national standards at
local level when local residents consider the issue involved strictly a local concern.

The tremendous contro-

versy surrounding President Johnson's War on Poverty is
another example.

As those interviewed for this study
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testify, many local citizens were upset over the giving
of federal funds directly to local social service agencies so that those agencies, independent of local government, might address the needs of the local poor.

This

aspect of the War on Poverty threatened local leaders
and the local bureaucrats who felt that through this type
of federal program, power and control was slipping from
their hands.
By the late 1960's then, the national government
had long been establishing priorities and setting policies intended to make state and local governments conform to national standards.

The national priorities

reached to virtually every area of concern in the society.
Even areas previously "reserved" to the states, such as
education and law enforcement, were largely influenced
by federal regulations accompanying the federal aid
sought by states and cities, giving substance to the
marble cake theory of federalism.
Although leaders in states and communities agreed
they needed the federal funds to carryon services to
their citizens, they did not all agree that those funds
should be used as a tool for establishing national policy
at the state and local level.

By the time Richard Nixon

ran for President in 1968, there was considerable disenchantment nationally with "big government" and the
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liberal argument that with its money and ideas, Washington,
D.C., can solve all the nation's problems.

The chaos of

the War on Poverty, the campus riots over Vietnam, the
rising crime rate and the general inefficiency and ineffectiveness of big government developed a national mood
that seemed to some Americans to call for a return to
basics.

A return to a more balanced federal system where

the states and cities would regain a broader measure of
power and responsibility.

Some citizens hoped that with

more power, state and local governments might be able
to deal more successfully with the issues the federal
government had been trying to deal with for so long with
little success.
A Response to the Controversy:

The New Federalism

Richard Nixon is a man well aware of political
trends.

It is not surprising that his basically conser-

vative background combined with his instinct for politics
led him to propose as a basic element in his Presidential
campaign platform, a "New Federalism."

The theory of the

New Federalism is that American government has become
too highly centralized in Washington, D.C.

What is

needed is to bring government closer to the people.

The

President seemed to be arguing in terms of the layer cake
theory; that is, if more power was given to states and
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communities, government would be closer to the people
than it would be with so much power concentrated in
"remote" Washington, D.C.

More specifically, human ser-

vice programs and community service programs were to
become policy areas of state and local government responsibility.

They would be funded with no-strings-attached

federal funds.

The revenue sharing program was to be

the cornerstone of the New Federalism program.
Nixon's answer to those who have

criti~ized

It was

the weak-

ness of state and local government and the inefficient
and highly centralized government in Washington, D.C.
After five years of the Nixon Administration and
about two years of General Revenue Sharing, what has
happened?

The purpose of this study is to evaluate the

New Federalism and General Revenue Sharing in terms of
the effect they have had on four cities.

The purpose

of this chapter is to set forth the specific criteria
that will be used in that evaluation.

The New Federalism

and General Revenue Sharing in Seattle, Tacoma, Portland
and Eugene will be evaluated in terms of the political
hopes or goals the Nixon Administration has for the
program and, just as importantly, the fears held by
critics of the program.

The political goals of the

Nixon Administration and the New Federalism are decentralization of government, more financial independence
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and decision-making by state and local government, more
control at that level over human and community services,
and a return of government "to the people."
These goals have been countered by others who
deeply fear what such a program might actually accomplish.
Some fear that decentralized government may mean)_still
more inefficient government in terms of neglecting the
needs of some citizens.

Some fear that stronger cities

and states may only strengthen local interest groups
who will bargain away any chance for justice for all
Americans.

Some fear that returning:-Tgovernment "to the

people" may mean just certain people.

They fear that

only state and local special interests will be strengthened and the priorities and policies they set may be
counter to the needs of local minorities and the disadvantaged.

They fear, in other words, that the progress

made in recent years in civil rights and legislation to
help the poor may be compromised or wiped out by giving
new power and responsibility to state and local government in the human and community service areas.
We now move to an elaboration on the meaning of the
New Federalism and its goals and fears of those who are
critical of it.

Within this chapter, these goals will

be clearly specified to be used as criteria in an evaluation of how the New Federalism and General Revenue
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Sharing have been working in four cities.

Also, at the

end of the chapter, specific points comprising the fears
held by critics of the New Federalism will be enumerated.
These points will also be used as criteria to see if the
New Federalism is mmving in directions feared by its
opponents.
II. THE NEW FEDERALISM
GOALS OF THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION
It is difficult to precisely define the New
Federalism.

President Nixon and members of his Adminis-

tration have spoken about the concept at various times,
and from their statements it is possible to identify
what appear to be the central themes of the New Federalism
idea.

These themes of the New Federalism also comprise

the hopes or goals of the Administration with regard to
its federal program.
Return Power, Funds and Responsibility to the States
and to the People
In analyzing information on the New Federalism,
Richard Nixon's own statements on the subject are useful.
As his statement below attests, he is interested in redistributing power.

The President's goal of returning

"power, funds and responsibility to the states and localities" appears to be a notion derived from the layer cake
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theory of federalism.

The idea is that the top layer of

the cake has become too powerful and overburdened and
it is time to strengthen the middle and bottom layers.
The President's own remarks affirm his allegiance to the
layer cake concept.
Nixon usee the term "New Federalism" first in a
speech on August 8, 1969, when he said:
After a third of a century of power flowing
from the people and states to Washington, it
is time for a New Federalism in which power,
funds and respmnsibility will flow from Washington to the states and to the people •••
Washington has taken for its own, the best
sources of revenue •••
We intend to reverse this tide, and to turn
back to the states a greater measure of responsibility -- not as a way of avoiding prob- S
lems, but as a better way of solving problems.
Nixon amplified this theme in his 1971 State of the
Union message.
The time has come for a new partnership between
the Federal Government and the States and localities -- a partnership in which we entrust the ~
States and localities with a larger share of the
Nation's responsibilities, and in which we share
our Federal revenues with them so that they can
meet those responsibilities.
The President was proposing, he said, a "New American
Revolution."
5"Transcript of Richard Nixon's Address to the
Nation, Outline Proposals for Welfare Reform," New York
Times, 9 August 1969, p. 10.
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••• a peaceful revelution in which power will
be turned back to the people -- in which government at all levels will be refreshed, renewed
and made truly responsive. This can be'a
revolution as profound, as far reaching, as
exciting, ~s that first revolution almost 200
years ago.
As we saw earlier in this paper, a welfare program
and a manpower training program were to accompany the
revenue sharing program as the policy components of
President Nixon's New Federalism package.

The evaluation

of the progress of the New Federalism in the four cities
studied in this dissertation is a partial one in that
only General Revenue Sharing is being considered.

Yet,

revenue sharing is the heart of the New Federalism because it gives the basic wherewithal..by which the_:states
and localities are to assume more power and responsibility
and government is to be brought closer to the people of
this nation.

The President's remarks confirm the im-

portance of revenue sharing to the New Federalism scheme.
In his layer cake notion, it is to be the central vehicle
for reversing the trend of more and more power flowing
from the States and communities to Washington.
Decentralization: Different Levels of Government Have
Different Functional Responsibilities
In a recent conference on the New Federalism, Mr.
6Richard Nixon, State of the Union Message, 1971,
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971),
p. 3.
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Richard P. Nathan, a former Assistant Director of the
Federal Office of Management and Budget in the Nixon
Administration, and a leading figure in the Administration's New Federalism initiatives, explained what he
believed to be the central theme of the concept.

He

suggested that a major problem in America today is that:
We have evolved tow~rd a governmental system
in which every layer of government -- federal,
state and local -- is responsible for every
program area, and it is therefore very difficult to determine who ~s accountable for any
specific program area.
He interprets the central theme of the New Federalism to be a sorting out, a rationalizing of what sorts of
functions each unit of government in the federal system
ought to provide.

Once this has been

determin~d,

the

Administration would seek to "assign" functions to the
proper level of government.

He believes the Nixon

Administration is now moving in directions that suggest
the New Federalism is to mean the following framework
for assignment of essential governmental responsibilities:
1. Income maintenance or welfare programs: to
be a federal responsibility.
2. Human service programs(education, health,
manpower):
to be a state and local responsibility.
3. Community service programs (urban develop7Josepq Foote, ed., The New Federalism: A Confer(Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars, May, 1973), p. 38.

~
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ment, police and fire protection, etc.): to
be a state and local responsibility.
4. Environmental programs (air and water pollution): to be a federal responsibility.
5. Research and development programs: to be
a federal responsibility.
6. Institution building grants: to be a fed~ responsibility.
(this) framework., in general rests on the principle that problems that have a spillover effect
and that are truly national in character and
beyond the reach of the states should be under
the mantle of the federal government. 8
Mr. Nathan concluded his remarks at the Conference by
saying:
To summarize, I think whatiis important in the
New Federalism is not just the revolution of the
functions of domestic government away from
Washington and back to the states and localities.
Rather, it is the basic premise that we need to
devise a politically rational and reasona~ly
clear policy framework that sorts out the program areas in which we should enhan§e state and
local efforts and responsibilities.
Mr. Nathan's views on the goals of the New Federalism support the notion that the Nixon Administration sees
American federalism in terms of the layer cake theory.
Nathan seems to be saying that we have drifted from layer
cake federalism in America to marble cake federalism and
it is time to get back to the layer cake distribution of
power and responsibility.
8 Ibid ., p •.

s.

9 Ibid ., p. 40.

Certainly this is suggested
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when he calls for the assigning 6f specific functions to
specific "layers" of the federal system.

He sees the

marble cake notion of shared functions among units of
government as an inefficient means of solving national
problems.
Mr. Nathan's contribution to the meaning as well as
the goals of the New Federalism is very significant.

He

becomes more specific where the President was general.
Nathan is saying the basic purpose of the New Federalism
is not just to decentralize the American government.

In

addition, the concept seeks to "devise a politically
rational and reasonably clear policy framework" that
decides which functions of government are to be the responsibilities of which levels of the federal system.
He feels the Nixon Administration is moving in a direction
that s9-¥s human services and community services are to
be the responsibility of state and local government.
Those interviewed in this study would probably
agree.

As we shall see, however, most of them do not

like the means by which Nathan and President Nixon are
making their point.

Most of the city officials inter-

viewed feel human services and community services previously funded and administered by the federal government are coming to be state and local responsibilities
by default.

As Nixon cuts back categorical grants in
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those areas, and only replaces those federal funds with
the General Revenue Sharing block grants, the states
and cities have little choice but to fund, as best they
can, community and human service programs they feel are
worthwhile.

In fairness it must be said that Special

Revenue Shar.ing was designed by the Administration to be
a block grant ',.t9 be used by states and cities to pick up
human services and community services previously funded
with federal categorical grants.

But Special Revenue

Sharing is stuck in Congress, and the categorical cutbacks continue.

Whereas many of those interviewed do

not object to assuming some human and community service
responsibilities at the local level of government, in
accord with Nathan's assignment of functional responsibilities, they do object to the current means of assignment.
There is no::question that revenue sharing is central
to the New Federalism concept.

Money means power and

local government can only assume the functions outlined
by Mr. Nathan if it:,gets substantial federal aid.

It

must be unrestricted aid, too, if the autonomy suggested
by Nixon and Nathan in local decision-making is to be a
real component of the New Federalism.
Returning Government to the People
As we have seen, President Nixon's call for a New
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Federalism suggests that COO much power has drifted to
the "top layer" of the cake and some must now be transferred back down to the "lower" layers.

This seems to

haveY·been the President's meaning when he suggested that
"power, funds and responsibility" should be returned to
the "states and localities."
to the people."
meant

noth~ng

But he also added " ••• and

The President, of course, may have

more than through returning power to the

governments of states and localities, power would also
be flowing to the citizens of these communities.

But

the President's statement is vague and, hence, open to
various interpretations.

The various interpretations of

what Richard Nixon meant by returning power to "the
people" have tremendous significance for how Americans
understand the goals of the program and who is to

part~

cipate in their realization.
What

th~

President probably meant by returning

power to "the people" was returning revenue sharing money
to states and communities for their governments to use
on behalf of their citizens.
of the late 1960's, however,

In the political turmoil
~another

interpretation was

possible.
Throughout the 1960's, Black Americans and poor
Americans were activated as individuals and as groups.
Through their own initiatives and through government

""'i':'""'"

•
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sponsored programs, such as the War on Poverty, Black and
poor Americans began to participate in programs that
were designed to better their lot.

More than bettering

their material situation, these programs suggested that
disadvantaged Americans had too long been left out of
the decision-making processes affecting their lives.

The

civil rights movement and the War on Poverty provided
an opportunity for the disadvantaged to speak up and to
participate in the formulation and enactment of programs
important to their lives.

Some "power" had returned to

"the people."
The real accomplishments of the civil rights
movement and the War on Poverty in terms of success are
debateable.

But one thing seemed clear by the end of

the 1960's -- many Americans who previously thought there
was no hope for them to participate in making political
decisions now felt there was hope.

The door was opened

in the 1960's for Black's and the poor to get involved
in politics and, of course, they would want it to stay
open.

Therefore, it would not be surprising if Nixon's

call for returning government to "the people" was interpreted by American Blacks and the poor as meaning they
should be given an added chance through revenue sharing
to participate in making public policy.
It is a major theme of this study that Nixon's New

L.
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Federalism can be seen to have within its rhetoric a
strong encouragement for individual participation in
the making of public policy.

As we shall see in the

following case studies, the New Federalism was so interpreted by many city officials.

Whether the President

intended this interpretation or not, it would probably
be fair to surmise that his use of the term "the people"
may have been in response to the call for "power to the
people" of the 1960's.

Yet there has always been the

notion that individual citizens should have the opportunity to participate in the making of local policy within
the various units of the federal system.

As we will see

shortly, the political thought of Jefferson and Madison
suggested that citizens acting individually or as members of interest groups should participate in policy
making.

Madison was worried that anyone group might be-

come too powerful, but he understood that Americans as
citizens of their

communitie~

and as citizens of their

states, and as citizens of the United States, should
have the opportunity for political participation in each
of these units of the federal system.

There is, there-

fore, a strong element of individualism in terms of the
notion of individual

partic~pation

in the federalism

aspect of American political thought.
The 1960's saw a reawakening of the notion of the

87

possibility of individual political efficacy.

In addition,

Thomas Jefferson and James Madison contributed the

ideo~

logical rationale for Americans to use in explaining why
returning government to "the people" should be interpreted
to mean citizen participation in the making of public
policy.

The civil rights movement and the War on Poverty

gave many previously nonparticipating citizens the chance
to participate and implanted in their minds the notion
that this should be a permanent state of affairs.

But

did the Nixon Administration see things this way?
Before looking at how Jefferson, Madison and the
War on Poverty have inspired many Americans to feel the
individual should play a role in determining local policy
under the New Federalism, it is important to see how a
member of President Nixon's White House staff interprets
the returning government "to the peop.1e" aspect of the
New Federalism.
Kenneth R. Cole, Jr. succeeded John D. Ehr1ichman
as Director of the Domestic Council in December, 1972.

In

this position as an assistant to the President, Cole is
responsible for coordinating intergovernmental activities
between the federal government and state and local governments.

He contributes to an understanding of the New

~

Federalism and its goals by emphasizing the fact that a
central purpose of the concept is to make officials in
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local government more accountable to the people.

He ex-

plains:
As we look out at the way the federal government does business, the way it works with state
and local governments, we believe the government officials who are closer to the people
are better able to solve the people's problems,
and are better able to solve those problems on
the basis of priorities that exist in their
communities, as opposed to priorities that some
federal bureaucrat may decide for himself are
the critical priorities. So we think lo 1
officials will be made more accountable.

la

Mr. Cole elaborates on this aspect of the New
Federalism by suggesting that now many mayors go after
the federal dollar and spend that money on all kinds of
programs that may not be truly responsive to the needs of
the city's citizens.

The General Revenue Sharing aspect

of the New Federalism, he feels, solves this problem by
granting money todties in block form and calling upon
the city and its citizens to decide how the money is to
be spent.

"That gets the citizen in'bhe community back

into the game.

They are not in the game now."ll

We

have seen, however, that the State and Local Fiscal
Assistance Act of 1972 does not require citizen participation.

The only requirement is that, at a minimum,

10Kenneth R. Cole, Jr., "Conversational Contact,"
Evaluation vol. 1, (November 2, 1973), pO:- 7.
11 Ibid ., p. 12.
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regular budget procedures be used in the allocation process.

The extent of

citizen~participation,

that Cole

seems to feel will be quite extensive, is a very vague
aspect of both New Federalism's theory and the Revenue
Sharing Act itself.
Mr. Cole goes on to suggest that not just local
officials will be accountable to the people in a more
meaningful fashion under the New Federalism, but also
governmental programs.

Because local decisions will be

determining how much revenue sharing money is spent on
what programs, local citizens, he feels, will want to
continue those programs that are clearly useful and drop
those that are not.

In Mr.

Cole~s

opinion, then, the

New Federalism is an effort to bring both money and power
to decide to the local level.

It is an effort to bring

government closer to the people so that they can evaluate
both programs and officials by retaining those that are
useful and throwing out those that are not.

It is to be

a process of decentralization.
Returning Government to the People:
Federal Context

Individualism in the

The goal of bringing government in. the United States
closer to the people is a very important, yet vague goal.
It is critical to an understanding and an evaluation of
the New Federalism that the meaning of "returning govern-

',".
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ment to the people" be made as clear as possible.

Mr.

Cole is as specific as any Administration spokesman in
suggesting that returning government to the people means
local citizens are to participate in making local policy
decisions by endorsing or throwing out local officials
and programs that do not meet the citizensJ needs.

This

implies that through the vote the citizen is to participate in the New Federalism.

Cole is vague on whether the

citizen is supposed to also be given an opportunity to
participate in local decisions regarding the allocation
of General Revenue Sharing funds.

It seems that it is

up to the individual state, county or city to make that
decision for itself.

These units of government must

decide who "the people" are that will participate in and
benefit from the New Federalism.

The "spirit" of the New

Federalism and the "letter" of the Revenue Sharing Act
stipulate that state and local governments are to be
strengthened through the New Federalism.
ments do not work in a vacuum.

But govern-

The data from this study

shows that there are individual citizens at the local
level who still believe in the theory of Jeffersonian
individualism and feel that the individual at the city
level should participate in local policy making activities.

They see the occurrence of General Revenue Sharing

in their area as an opportunity for such individual parti-
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pation.

There are also citizens who were politicized by

the War on Poverty programs and who now feel their input
should be given in any General Revenue Sharing deliberations.

They participated in War on Poverty and Model

Cities programs and do not want to be excluded now.
Jeffersonian Individualism
Thomas Jefferson believed that the individual citizen was sovereign in America.

In matters of public policy

at the local level, the individual citizen should be
heard.

Jefferson was an avid student of John Locke's

Second Treatise on Civil Government.

In that work, Locke

states that the individual is sovereign and he leaves a
state of nature and moves into society.

By means of

committing himself to a social contract, he moves from
society to a system of government.

That contract says

that the government created by individual citizens
exists to ensure their natural rights that belong to each
of them.

These are life, liberty and property.

If a

government is unable to ensure these rights, men are
rightly entitled to replace that government with another,
the central point being that the individual citizen is
sovereign.

The government exists to serve him.

Jefferson

agreed with Locke and believed that government was most
manageable and democracy most possible in small "ward
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republics."

In these small communities, the individual

citizen was supreme.

He agreed that some responsibilities

of government might best be performed by larger units of
government, such as county, state or national government,
but only those duties that cannot be performed at the
local level.

Jefferson said:

In government, as well as in every other business of life, it is by division and sub-division of duties alone, that all matters great
and small, can be managed to perfection ••• And
the whole is cemented by giving to every citizen, personally, a par in the administration
of the public affairs.

12

Jefferson believed in a republican form of governmente

His definition of a republican government was gov-

ernment by the citizens "acting directly and personally."
He felt that a government is more or less republican as
it has more or less of this "ingredient of the direct
action of the citizens."

This could be best accomplished

in a rural township or New England community of his time,
he felt.

He further argued that where direct and personal

citizen participation cannot be obtained, resort must be
made to representatives. 13
Thomas Jefferson was interested in creating an
12

The Works of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Paul L. Ford,
vol. XI (New York: G.P. Putnam and Sons, 1965), p~ 347.
l3 Ibid ., p. 529.
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environment whereby the individual could live in maximum
freedom.

Government was a necessary evil.

It existed to

carry out those responsibilities that individuals cannot
alone perform.
vidual~s

Government existed to protect the

rights to life, liberty and property.

indi~

Such a

government, Jefferson felt, should be limited by a
Constitution and governed as directly as possible, and
certainly at the local level, by the active participation of individual citizens.

Jefferson obviously had

great faith in thei.wisdom and intelligence of individuals
and he relied on that faith in their abilities to ensmre
a democratic government in their communities.

Again, it

must be emphasized that Jefferson was talking about the
individual directly governing a small, often rural community.

Critics of his time, and today as well, argue that

such reliance on the abilities of the individual to govern
himself wisely cannot hold for larger communities and
especially in technocratic societies like modern America.
There are simply too many individuals for everyone to
have his say, even at the local level, even if he is only
directing an elected representative.

The issues are too

complex for each individual to participate intelligently
in the policy-making process.

But Jefferson was hoping

America would remain basically rural and agricultural,
hence, democratic and virtuous.
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Jeffersonian political theory and its belief in
the individual as the most basic unit of society gains
support from the writings of Alexis de Tocquevil1e.

In

his great work, Democracy in America, de Tocqueville begins his description of American government and politics
by saying that "wnehever the political laws of the United
States are to be discussed, it is with the doctrine of
. ty

sovere~n

0

f th e peop 1 e th a t we mus t b
· ••• "]4
eg~n

It has become the governing principle of the American
polity.

He went on to observe that the doctrine of the

sovereignty of the people really meant the sovereignty of
the individual.
In the nations by which the sovereignty of the
people is recognized, every individual has an
equal share of power and participation equally
in government of the state ••• Every individual
is always supposed to be as well informed as
virtuous, and as strong as any of his fellow
citizens. He obeys society ••• because he acknowl~dges3the unity of an associationoof fellow
men and knows that no such association can
exist without a regulating force ••• This doctrine i
universal1y admitted in the United
States. t5
Thomas Jefferson, then, believed strongly in the
doctrine of local autonomy.

And the individual is the

central concern of that doctrine, for it aims at preserving
14Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America,
Phillips Bradley, ed., (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953),
Chapter 4, p. 1.
15 Ibid ., pp. 64-5
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his inherent and sovereign right to govern himself.

He

feared government of any type, but especially highly
centralized government on a national scale as it might
inhibit the individual "who is sublime." As Anwar Syed
put it in The Political Theory of American Local Govern~,

to Jefferson, sovereignty resides ultimately in the

individual, that his personal supervision and direction
of government constitute the height of democratic virtue, and the smaller the locality, the more likely it is
to be democratic.

16

Vincent Ostrom's Interpretation of "The People" in The
Federalist
Thomas Jefferson represents one way to define what
is meant by "the people."

To Jefferson, individuals made

up "the people" and they were sovereign, the most important "unit" in the making of public policy.

Political Sci-

entist Vincent Ostrom has done a detailed study of the
most basic document in early American history, The
Federalist, by Madison, Jay and Hamilton.

In his work,

The Political Theory of a Compound Republic, Ostrom seems
to feel that collectives play the central role in

~

l6Anwar Syed, The Political Theory of American
Local Government, (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 4.

L
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Federalist, and the individual is important in terms of
being part of a group.17
Ostrom explains that in their effort to design a
form of government that could deal effectively with
states' interests and national problems and still address
itself to the needs of individuals, the Founders developed
Ene scheme of federalism.

As an organization of govern-

ment, federalism is a compromise between an extreme
concentration of power in a national government, and a
loose confederation of virtually independent states such
as existed in America under the Articles of Confederation.

Federalism is a system of government in which

power is divided between a central government and a regional or subdivisional government.

Ostrom refers to

this form of government as a compound republic of concurrent regimes.

It is a republic because citizens

elect representatives to governmental office to make
public policy on behalf of the people.

It is a compound

republic because there is the national government and
the regimes of the several states and the counties and
cities of America.

All these regimes are working con-

currently for the cause of the individual at the same '.::'
17Vincent Ostrom, The Political Theory of a Compound Republic, (Blacksburg, Virginia: Public Choice
Press, 1971).
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time.

18
Ostrom interprets The Federalist as arguing for the.

establishment of a system of concurrent regimes in the
United States to he]pprevent what he refers to as "the
republican disease."

What is this disease?

He argues

that the Founders firmly believed in mankind's ability to
govern himself.

They also knew, however, that men can

be selfish and power hungry.

It is possible that through

the majority vote process, majority factions could develop
that might tyrannize minorities.
disease.

That is the republican

A compound republic on concurrent regimes can

prevent this from happening due to their being, in such
a system, so many "independent" governmental structures
each electing their own officials that the chance of one
tyrannical majority controlling all regimes, frDm top to
bottom, would be unlikely.

Federalism, as a compound

republic with concurrent regimes, is the "republican
remedy" for. the "republican disease.,,19
Ostrom is suggesting, then, that the authors of
The Federalist intended people in the United States to
govern themselves by electing representatives and, thus,
forming a republican government.

18 Ibid ., p. 21.
19 Ibid., p. 53.

Republicanism is to
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operate

concur~ently

country.

in the systems of all regimes in the

If a citizen cannot find redress for a grievance

from one level of government, he has others he can appeal
to.

The theory suggests that if a citizen finds a major-

ity at one level of government, let us say his home town,
is against him on an issue to such an extent his freedom
of expression is abrogated, it is unlikely that the same
majority will oppose him at both the state level and the
national level, that is, at every regime in the compound
republic.

An American citizen, by participating in con-

current regimes, is likely to find a hearing at one
level or another and, thus, escape being a victim of the
republican disease.
James Madison:

A Further Emphasis on Groups

Vincent Ostrom's interpretation of The Federalist
suggests what to some is meant in American political
thought by "the people."

This interpretation says that

"the people" means citizens organized in "groups" or
communities.

James MadisQn, in his writings in The

Federalist, was interested in "factions."

He saw poli-

tics as a struggle among groups, not individuals.

Madison

saw the realities of the American scene differently from
Jefferson.

Madison saw man as sometimes a rational crea-

ture of good will, but he also saw him as selfish and
power hungry on occasion.

Because of these things,
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Madison's "unit" of concern was different from Jefferson's.
As Anwar Syed has put it:
Whereas Jefferson founded his theory on the
'people' -- conceived in the abstract as consisting of individuals, each of whom was
rational, virtuous, kind, considerate, reasonable -- Madison took the 'faction' as his
.
point of departure. In ~he Federalist No. 10,
he defined 'faction' as a 'number of citizens,
whether amounting to a majority or a minority
of the whole, who are united and actuated by
some common impulse of passions, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens,
or to the permanen~Oand aggregate interests
of the community.'
In The Federalist No. 10, Madison denounced local
democracy and lamented the "notorious factions and
oppressions" which take place in corporate towns.

Reali-

zing that "the people" are going to organize in factions
to exercise political power, Madison sought a system of
government whereby faction 'would balance faction.

He

was very concerned with the republican disease articulated
earlier by Ostrom.

Madison believed that the federal

system, along with the three branches of the federal government checking and balancing each other, would form
centers of countervailing power that could check the
selfish power-seeking ambitions of any single faction.
This again is a republican remedy to the republican disease.
What is significant, however, is that Madison never did
20Syed , The Political Theory of American Local
Government, p. 125.

100
consider the individual as the basic unit of concern in
American politics.
groups.

He looked at America in terms of

By "the people" he means groups of people.

The

political scientist Samuel P. Huntington contrasted the
Jeffersonian and Madisonian positions this way:
The Jeffersonian ideal of grass roots democracy
stands in direct contrast to the Madisonian
concept of extensive republicanism. To Jefferson
the ward republics embodied the republican ideal
in its purest form. To Madison, the ward republics embodied the evils of factionalism in their
worst form. To Jefferson, the principal threat
to republicanism was the tyranny of arbitrary
centralized autocracy. To Madison, the principal threat to republicanism was the tyranny of
arbitrary local minorities. To Jefferson, a
republic was a system of government which provided for the participation of the people. For
Madison, a republic was a system of government
which separated the people from government by
means of representation. To Jefferson, direct
democracy was the epitome of republicanism
and representation a dilution of it. To Madison,
representation was the essence of republic~~ism
and direct democracy the antithesis of it.
Of course, Jefferson has had his followers, even
to this day, but there is little doubt that most American
political thinkers have tended to reject the important
elements of his theory - natural rights, social contract,
sovereignty of the individual and popular democracy as realistic concepts for describing and analyzing modern
21Samuel P. Huntington, "The Founding Fathers on
the Division of Powers," in Area and Power, Anwar Maass,
ed., (Alencoe: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 189-90.
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America.

Instead, the Madisonian concept of factions or

groups has become the most popular tool for dealing with
American politics.

In his book, Pluralist Democracy in

the United States: Conflict and Consent, Robert Dahl
develops a pluralist theory of American politics that
largely follows the basic constructs of Madison.

Dahl

explains:
The theory and practice of American pluralism
tends to assume, as I see it, that the existence
of multiple centers of power, none of which is
wholly sovereign, will help (may indeed be necessary) to tame power, to secure the c02~ent of all,
and to settle conflicts peacefully •••
Strictly speaking, Dahl's pluralist theory is far
more complex than the suggestion that America is made up
of groups of persons organized into various associations
that must be balanced off, one against the other, in order
to maintain order in this society.

In his study of poli-

tical power configurations in New Haven, Who Governs?,
Dahl develops quite an elaborate and controversial interpretation of pluralist theory.23

Group theory and

pluralist theory were developed by political thinkers,
from Madison on, because they saw little reality to the
22Robert Dahl, Pluralist Democracy in the United
States: Conflict and Consent, (Chicago: Rand McNally and
Co., 1967), p. 24.
23Robert Dahl, Who Governs?,(New Haven,Connecticut:
Yale University Press, 1961).
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Jeffersonian idea that the individual really ruled this
country.

As time went on, the rationality of man came

into question and the average citizen was not seen as all
that preoccupied with participating in politics. 24 Yet individualism is not dead.
Modern Jeffersonian Individualism
Jefferson argues that the individual should make
public policy at the local level.
Jeffersonian ideal is alive.

He should rule.

This does not mean the ideal

is practiced by a majority of the American people.
studies demonstrate that it is not.
ally apathetic.

The

Most

The masses are usu-

The theme of Dye and Ziegler's, The Irony

of Democracy,is that apathetic masses in fact allow the
elites of America to insure the survival of democratic
25
values in this nation.
Nevertheless, all people are not
apathetic all the time, and when a President calls for returning power to the people, enough people still believe
in their right to participate in local decision-making
that they expect to be allowed to participate.
24For an interesting and informative description
and analysis of group theory, plural elite theory and
single elite theory, see David Ricci, Community Power
and Democratic Theory: The L0 iC of Political Analysis,
(New York: Random House, 1971 •

1

25Thomas Dye and Harmon Ziegler, The Irony of
Democracy, Second Edition, (Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 1972).
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The concept of individual sovereignty was strengthened in America by Lyndon Johnson's War on Poverty.

In

an effort to reduce poverty and involve the poor in the
effort, the Johnson Administration pushed through Congress
the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964.

It is important

that we examine the Act and some of its effects because
it has a profound influence on both local government and
poor citizens at the local level.

Thus, it has had a ma-

jor impact on how broadly or narrowly local government
has seen fit to interpret the New Federalism's goa1sof returning government to "the people."
The War on Poverty and Jeffersonian Individualism
The War on Poverty reinforced the belief in the
American myth of the efficacy of the individual.

This is

a very significant factor in explaining how a city may
interpret the New Federalism goal of returning power to
"the people."

Both individual citizens and groups they

may belong to which were activated by the War on Poverty
may expect to participate in the General Revenue Sharing
of the New Federalism.

Lyndon Johnson enabled many poor

and minorities to participate in making decisions affecting their lives and chances are they will want to continue
to do so under the Nixon Administration.
Passed during the Johnson Administration, the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 was the cornerstone of
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President Johnson's War on Poverty.

While not trying to

establish Jeffersonian democracy in America, Johnson's
War on Poverty programs were intended to include citizens
in the making of public policy in their local towns and
neighborhoods.

Title II-A, Section 202(a)(3), of the Act

authorized the creation of Community Action

P~ograms

which were to be developed and administered with the "maximum feasible participation" of residents of the areas
served.

The literature of the Community Action Programs

and the War on Poverty is vast, and the questions raised
in that literature range from asking about Johnson's real
motive for creating those programs to the effectiveness
and durability of the programs themselves.

For our pur-

poses, however, the significance of the War on Poverty
programs is the emphasis put on involving the individual
citizen in the local policy-making process.
Federal funds were sent directly to local social
service agencies and they were called upon to go out into
their neighborhoods and gather up citizens to come to
neighborhood meetings and together decide how to spend
federal money to solve their problems.

The individual

citizen was the heart of the program.

Local government

was by-passed as an instrument of public policy formation.
The fact that local government did not dole out the federal funds, of course, also upset many local politicians
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and bureaucrats.

So, in spite of the reduction in the

number of individuals participating in public policy decision-making in this country since the nation's earliest
days,

President Johnson was now trying to include poor

individuals in the local policy-making process.

In a true

Jeffersonian sense, the local poor person was considered
best able to know his situation and what to do about it.
At least this was the rhetoric of the War on Poverty.
There were, however, elements of Madison in the War
on Poverty program.
all, groups.

Social service agencies were, after

The Community Action Programs were groups.

While the intention of the War on Poverty seemed to be to
include the citizen more completely in the local policymaking process, it certainly was calling for him to be
organized into, and be represented by, groups in the local
area.

But the emphasis was on citizens, whether as indi-

viduals or groups.

They were to participate to the max-

imum extent in making policy that would alleviate their
condition of poverty.
In his work, Participation of the Poor, Ralph M.
Kramer suggests that "it was ••• the inclusion of the concept of 'maximum feasible participation' of the poor that
lifted the CAP out of the tradition category of grant-inaid or technical assistance program and introduced a new
set of political and social issues that may have an impact
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on local communities for many years.,,26 Kramer also quotes
page seven of the CAP Guide as saying:
The long range objective of every community action
program is to effect a permanent increase in the
capacity of individuals, groups and communities
afflicted by poverty to deal effectively with their
own P29blems so that they need no further assistance.
The Johnson Administration appeared to want to bring
government closer to a particular segment of the American
people.

The Administration seemed to want poor Americans,

as individuals and as groups, to come together in their
neighborhoods to seek solutions to their problems.

Fed-

eral money was given directly to them to help them organize, develop and administer programs.

The Johnson Admin-

istration appeared to be quite specific by what it meant
by "the people."
groups.

It meant poor people as individuals and

The War on Poverty sought to help them and in-

clude the poor themselves in the effort as much as possible.

And, as Kramer suggests, a goal was to keep them

involved for a long period so that their needs would long
be apparent to local interests, whether in or out of government.

26Ralph M. Kramer, Participation of the Poor .
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1969~, p. 2.
27 Ibid., p. 10.
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The War on Poverty and the New Federalism:
Keeping Individualism Alive
The fact that many of the poor were inspired by the
War on Poverty and that many organizations of poor were
formed to participate in making public policy at the local
level has significance for the New Federalism.

So does

the fact that some of the poor did not participate and
that many War on Poverty programs did not work.
on Poverty did not eliminate poverty in America.

The War
Leaders

of some Community Action Programs and social service agencies did not represent well the interests of the poor in
their areas.

The local officials interviewed for this

study substantiate this.

They also substantiate the fact

that local government and local special interests were upset over being by-passed in the disbursing of federal
funds under the War on Poverty.
The War on Poverty made allot of people mad, but it
also gave real hope to others.

Some programs originated

during the Johnson years, such as Head Start and Model
Cities, have worked well in some cities.

Allover America

the disadvantaged and the minorities were given hope that
the War on Poverty might give them a chance to have a say
about what bothered them and what should be done about it.
In other words, the Great Society programs did politicize
many poor Americans.

Many of

~.~the"

people" Johnson was

aiming to activate did become active.

Many of them want
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to continue to be active, but as we saw earlier in this
paper, the Nixon

Administ~ation

has cut back or eliminated

many of the programs originated under the War on Poverty.
The categorical grants for these programs are drying up.
As we shall see in the case studies which follow, many of
those politicized under the War on Poverty are still active and are now lobbying City Hall for General Revenue
Sharing funds to replace the lost categorical monies.
Because of Johnson's War on Poverty programs, when
Richard Nixon tells the country that he wants to return
funds, power and responsibility to the states, localities
and the people, it is not surprising that many poor Americans feel they are justified in believing the President
means to include them.

But what does President Nixon mean

when he says the New Federalism seeks to return the government to "the people"'?

An important goal of this study

of revenue sharing and the New Federalism in four cities
is an effort to see how "the people" has translated itself
in the practice of the New Federalism.

Because the Presi-

dent's meaning is not specifically clear, it is up to the
local area concerned to decide who "the people" are that
benefit from revenue sharing and the New Federalism.

The

people who benefit can be seen as those who participate
in the decision-making process of government in

d~ciding

where the General Revenue Sharing funds are to go.

Also,
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the people who seem to be benefitting from the allocations
of General Revenue Sharing funds can lead to a definition
of who "the peopa:e" are that the New Federalism is addressing.

In the case studies that follow we will be very

careful to try to determine who the people are who benefit from revenue sharing.

Such an analysis will also give

us an idea of what the Administration means by "returning
government to the people."
We have seen that the goals of the New Federalism
appear to be the establishment of some sense of reality
to the layer cake theory of federalism.

Also, in its goal

of returning government "to the people," the New Federalism leaves open to the states, counties and cities the
chance to reinforce the theory of Jeffersonian individualism in America.
The goals of the New Federalism, then, are as fol.
lows:
(1) See to it that power, funds and responsibility flow from Washington, D.C., to the states, localities and the people.
.
(2) Make government, at all levels, more responsive. This can be done by making specific layers
(national, state, local) of government responsible
for specific programs so it will be easier for the
people to know which layer of government to hold
accountable for which programs. A goal is the decentralization of American government in terms of
certain functions being assumed by certain levels
of government. For example, human and community
services would be functional areas of concern to
state and local governments, not the national government.
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(3) Involve the average citizen in local decision-making processes on public policy matters.
Bring government closer to the people. Citizens
and state and local officials are to work together in establishing priorities and policies
based upon local characteristics and needs.
If these are the goals or hopes of the Nixon Administration for the New Federalism, there are some Americans who
hold certain fears as the Administration pursues these
goals.
III. THE NEW FEDERALISM: FEARS OF SOME CITIZENS
OF WHAT IT MAY ACCOMPLISH
While the goals of the New Federalism appear to have
some merit, to other Americans the thought of their realization incites very real apprehension.

Essentially, all

the "fears" to be analyzed here revolve around the possible
effects of decentralized government.

If this primary goal

of the New Federalism is accomplished, what will it do to
federally sponsored programs that have been developed for
the poor and minority groups?

Will decentralized govern-

ment strengthen local interest groups that have little
sympathy for the disadvantaged in their communities?

Will

local minorities be able to playa role in the local decision-making process that deals with revenue sharing?
Will the city be so strengthened by the New Federalism
that the cause of equal justice for all may be threatened?
These and related issues will now be examined as we take
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note of the apprehension some Americans have over the possible success of Nixon's New Federalism.
The Fear That Decentralization May Cause Abandonment of
Programs for the Disadvantaged
We have seen that a central goal of the New Federalism is the decentralization of governmental responsibilities.

Back in 1967, Richard N. Goodwin, an advisor to

President Kennedy, spoke of the need to decentralize the
huge powers and responsibilities that had accrued over the
years to the federal government.

He suggested that "both

burden and enterprise must be shifted into units of action
small enough to allow for more intimate personal contact
and numerous enough to widen the outlets for direct parti' t '10n an d con t ro 1 ••• "28
C1pa

He goes on to make a crucial

point that President Nixon and his supporters also seem to
say is at the theoretical center of the New Federalism;
The issues involved in decentralization are remote
from the old struggles over states' rights and big
government. Those struggles centered on the question of whether any effort at all should be made
to solve social problems through collective action
and public resources. Decentralization, however,
assumes that this question is resolved affirmativelY"and,see~9the issue as one of structure and organ1zat1on.
The theory of the New Federalism suggested in this
chapter seems to make just this point.

The Nixon Admin-

28Foote, ed., The New Federalism, p. 2.

29Ib~d.,
•
pp. 2 -3.
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istration is advocating a structure and organizational
change in the American system in that it seeks more power
and accountability at the state and local levels of government.

As we saw from Mr. Nathan's remarks, some func-

tions would remain federal responsibilities and others
would be remanded to the states and localities.

Nowhere

is there the suggestion that government at any level
should defer its responsibility "to solve social problems
through collective action and public resources." Instead,
the New Federalism is calling for "a better framework for
the assignment of essential governmental responsibilities"
and not an avoidance of those responsibilities.

The fear

is that there is not a "national consensus at all levels
that there should be collective action to solve social
problems through public resources."

The fear is that

with money and policy-setting responsibilities assigned
to them, powerful local interests may not use their public resources to solve social programs at all.
The Fear of Strengthened Local Special Interests
at the Expense of the Disadvantaged
Fears that local factions might be intolerant

afc~

local minorities are not new in the American experience.
Fear that one faction, with great power, might tyrannize
citizens without power in the community was a basic part
of James Madison's political thought.

Unless factions
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were controlled, the basic liberties of individuals would
be threatened.

Madison feared a tyranny of the majority

and also of the minority.

He lamented the "notorious

factions and oppressions" which may be found in corporate
towns.

He argued that the smaller the units of govern-

ment, the fewer the interests residing in it and the greater the possibility of one man or groups of men lording
over others.

Indeed, Madison theorized in The

Federalis~

No. 10 that the entire system of a compound republic of
concurrent regimes was a means whereby citizens could appeal to "higher" lev,els of government for redress if
their basic liberties were threatened.

More contemporary

writers on the subject of local government and American
political theory share Madison's concerns.
Roscoe Martin questions how secure the rights of all
citizens might be if they had to rely on local government
and local citizens to insure those rights.

He feels that

small governments, especially rural ones, are "governments of men and not laws."

He argues that local gov-

ernments are rules by political bosses who "suppress dissidents ruthlessly, even if they are benevolent to their
followers." "The citizen, apathetic and uninformed, does
not consider local government as government at all. Government for him is at the state capital and more especial-
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ly in Washington."30
Robert C. Wood would agree with Martin and Madison
that local government is basically undemocratic.

He has

argued that "the present quiltwork of local government
plays into the hands of groups who wish to maintain their
social and cultural homogeneity, and to this end use local political power to exclude from their midst people
having different standards.,,3l
Although the Jeffersonian dictum of the virtues of
local self-government runs deep in American ideology,
there are those who distrust people who might rule at the
local level.

There is a fundamental fear, also, that ba-

sic justice is jeopardized when the citizens of a local
community have to rely on their immediate neighbors for
redress of their grievances.

Syed has argued that the

"assumptions and the structural design of Jeffersonian
theory are incompatible with its ethical goals - justice
and the civilization of the individual."32 He goes on to
quote de Tocqueville as observing:
••• the individual, possessed of the notion that
he is sovereign, tends to become selfish, selfcentered, unmindful of his responsibilities to
his fellow men, and apathetic towards the politi30Syed , Political Theory, p. 129
31 Ibid ., p. 131.
32 Ibid ., p. 159.
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cal process. The concept of the individual's
sovereignty is subversive to both society and
government ••• The common principles--sovereignty
of the people and majority rule--breed among
citizens of ward repu~3ics intolerance of the
rights of minorities.
Of course, the United States is not made up of ward
republics, but many individuals who either observe the
domestic scene or work in local or national politics
share many of the same fears of too much power in the
hands of local government.

More specifically, they fear

what might happen to the rights of the poor and minorities
in states and communities if they are left to the governing authorities of those areas and are abandoned by the
national government.

For more thqn twenty years, the

national government has championed the rights of minorities and more recently it has tried to help the poor
throughout the nation.

Some fear the New Federalism is a

call to strengthen state and local governments in such a
way that the liberties, not to speak of the recent progress, of minorities and the poor might be substantially
endangered.

This issue was specifically addressed by many

participants at a May, 1973, conference sponsored by the
Woodrow Wilson International Center of Scholars.
The conference dealt with the New Federalism.

Some

participants questioned Mr. Goodwin's interpretation of
33 Ibid ., p. 161.
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decentralization.

At the same time, some intoned the

fears just outlined of the possible effect on local minorities and the local poor if more power, funds and responsibility are given to local government.

Many at the

conference did not agree with Goodwin that a national consensus had been reached stating that collective action on
a national basis, using public funds, was the best way to
solve social problems.

Indeed, several participants felt

that decentralization was simply an Administration effort
to strengthen states and local governments in such a way
that they might be able to ignore national priorities and
policies that have evolved in recent years.

They feared

that state and local government would deal with major
social questions in accord with the wishes of local power
structures and interest groups who likely will not share
the concern registered by the national government for 10cal disadvantaged citizens.

In this vein, the summary

section of the report from the conference made these remarks:
During the conference, concern was expressed
that a loosening of federal responsibility in setting policy for the use of the funds in the human
services and community services area would result
in a step backward for those who need help most.
One fear was that state and local politicians
were under too much influence fDom local affluent
interest groups to spread the money around to all
segments of the community rather than direct the
money to the areas of need. (Governor Carter of
Georgia) expressed this belief: Even the most
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enlightened legislature is going to spend on an
equal basis those moneys that formerly went to
the poor. (Mr. Hundley, Director of Seattle's
Model Cities Program) agreed that the money'
"will never find its way, not a tenth of it, down
to those people who need it most."
An allied concern was that, under the New
Federalism, Congress would lose the position it
should have in setting public policy for the
nation.
(Congressman Ashley of Ohio) felt that "eongress does have a role in identifying national
purposes and goals, inddeveloping ~trategies
for the achievement of these goals, and in monitoring the results." He went on to say, •••
"the progress that has been achieved with respect to meeting our social problems has been
very largely the produ
of federal action and
federal requirements."

34

At the same conference, Mr. Clarence Mitchell, who
is the director of the Washington bureau of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, argued
that it is necessary for the federal government to take
the initiative in setting national priorities and requirements on the use of federal money in grant programs.

He

said that "the worst possible choice we could make in this
country is to pursue to so-called general revenue sharing
program and the idea of the special revenue sharing program.

You just start a program of giving all this feder-

al money to the local entrepreneurs and the local people
who are going to use it for buying helicopters and reducing taxes ••• and we turn this country back.,,35
34

Foote, ed., The New Federalism, p. 6.

35 Ibid •

118
Others at the conference, however, felt the risk of
abandoning previously established national policies for
the poor and minorities was not as great with the New Federalism.

Some simply argued that we should trust the wis-

dom of local governments to do what is best for their citizens.

Governor Rockefeller of New York and Mayor Lugar

of Indianapolis, for example, "defended the ability and
wisdom of the states to set policy and administer fairly
programs targeted at the needy in their communities.,,36
Mr. Lugar said that "at some point a rough compromise has
to be reached in which the competence of local people is
recognized as probably the superior alternative, given
all the pitfalls of the present system ••• ,,37
In the same vein, Gladys Noon Spellman, President
of the National Association of Counties argues that "all
wisdom is not on the federal level ••• the local level of
government is where the decisions ought to be made, and
that's where the overall thrust of the New Federalism
seems to be, to strengthen the hand of the local citizen
by giving him a greater input into the decision-making
process."

38

What will happen to War on Poverty programs under
36 Ibid •
37 Ibid •
38 Ibid ., pp. 6-7.
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the New Federalism?

What will happen to the fate of the

poor who have lately relied on the federal government to
help them?

Can racial minorities and poor citizens count

on state and local government to take up their cause and
protect the progress made in helping them in recent yearS?
As we have seen, much political theory that has emerged
over the years puts little trust in the willingness of local government to work for the benefit of their minorities.
There is a basic fear that local factions, be they majorities or minorities of opinion, tend to tyrannize those
who are "different." Hence, a basic fear of some is that
the New Federalism, in strengthening state and local government may be abandoning the national effort of the past
few decades to address meaningfully the real needs of
America's poor and racial minorities.

In the case studies

which follow, we will examine whether there is evidence
that this may be happening.

We can do so by examining

whether General Revenue Sharing funds are going to programs for the poor and minority groups in these cities.
Specifically, is the New Federalism money going to shore
up cutback categorical grants from the federal government
that were directed to the community's less fortunate citizens?

On the other hand, as we have seen, some feel that

local government will be responsible to the needs of all
members of the community.

The feeling persists that local
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leaders can be trusted to do what is best for their cities.

As we examihe revenue sharing in Seattle, Tacoma,

Portland and Eugene, we will try to see if City Hall officials in those towns agree that the "money, power and
responsibility" given them through General Revenue Sharing
has been used wisely and in the best interests of all
their citizens.
The Fear That the Disadvantaged Will Be Excluded
From Local Decision-Making
We saw earlier that a goal of the New Federalism
was to return funds, power and responsibility to the
states, localities and "the people."

Now we see that a

fear held by some is that "the people" to gain may not be
those most in need of governmental help, the poor and the
minorities.

Along with the fear that these people might

not get their fair share of General Revenue Sharing funds
is the fear that they will be excluded from the local decision-making process that allocates the monies in the
first place.

Of course, there might be a better chance

for the poor and minorities to be part of "the people"
who gain "power, funds and responsibility" if they are
among those who decide how the funds are to be allocated
in the city.

Because the Revenue Sharing Act does not

specify who is to participate in the decision-making process, it is up to local government and local influentials
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to make that decision.

The Act only requires that the

regular budget process of the state, city or county be followed.

That process usually includes local budget commit-

tee meetings which are open to the public.

When the bud-

get committee reaches a decision, it recommends a policy
for spending to the City Council, which also holds open
meetings on the subject.

It sounds like quite an open

process, but as we saw earlier, a major goal of the War
on Poverty was to try to politicize the poor.

The poor

and minority groups, and also the aged, often do not participate in local decision-making processes.

Sometimes

they feel they don't know enough about the issues to participate, or they feel they will be politely listened to
and then ignored, or they feel their lack of resources in
terms of funds and votes makes them unimportant as a local political force.

So the War on Poverty sought, as

we have seen, to politicize these people.

A measure of

the War on Poverty's success will be whether that politicization worked.
It will be a purpose of this paper to see whether
those citizens in these cities who were part of the War on
Poverty programs were sufficiently politicized and activated to lobby for General Revenue Sharing funds.
fically, have they

~aken

Speci-

part in the local decision-mak-

ing process over the allocation of GeneraliRevenue Sharing
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funds?

We will also examine the extent to which local

government has gone out of its way to include the whole
community,

espe~ially

those less accustomed to participa-

tion in local government, in the General Revenue Sharing
decision-making process.

In reality, the Nixon Adminis-

tration has left i t to local government to determine how
inclusive the term "the people" is to be through their
decision-making processes and disbursement of General
Revenue Sharing funds.

In the case studies to follow we

will see what four cities have done in this matter.
The Fear That Decentralization Will Strengthen
Interest Group Liberalism at the Local Level
and thus Frustrate Justice
The remaining discussion of the fears held by some
with regard to the New Federalism will revolve around an
important critic of American liberalism, Theodore Lowi.
In his work, The End of Liberalism, Lowi offers some conventional arguments for the development of liberalism in
America and some of the difficulties liberalism is now
facing in realizing its goals. 39

Where Lowi becomes con-

troversial is in the solutions he offers to the failures
of liberalism.

This discussion will be based on elements

of the Lowi arguments that seem to pinpoint what some fear
may be the detrimental effects of the New Federalism.

A

39Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism, (New York:
W.W. Norton and Co., 1969).
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special effort will also be made, however, to indicate
where the Lowi solutions to liberal problems may be at
fault.
We have seen that a primary goal of the New Federoalism is the decentralization of American government and
also that some people fear the results of that decentralization.

The primary fear is that local government may not

make policy with the input of the poor and minorities, or
for their benefit.

Lowi is also concerned that some citi-

zens in America may not be getting the justice they deserve.

He argues that the interest group politics that

is so much a part of the practice of American liberalism
has compromised the interests of minority groups and the
poor.

He further argues that although there would be

merit in divesting the federal government of some of its
power, the only level of government that should be consequently strengthened is the state level, definitely

BE1 city government.
Lowi argues that many of the stated goals of liberalism are worthy.

He believes the community as a whole

has a responsibility to help the discriminated-against and
the poor, and although social justice is a sacred goal of
liberalism, so also is compromise.

Lowi feels that al-

though many pieces of legislation for the less fortunate
have come out of Washington, they have not resulted in
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accomplishing their goals because the legislation did not
contain specific guidelines of implementation.

Once a

piece of social legislation leaves Washington with very
ambiguous guidelines of implementation, it is easy for local interest groups to compromise away the spirit of the
legislation.

For example, if Washington passes an act

calling for local efforts to deal with poverty and gives
the city the money to do so but does not specifically direct how the act is to be carried out, local interests
opposed to the act can nullify its effect by dickering and
lobbying with local governmental authorities.
Federal bureaucrats at the local level are also compromised in the same way.

Justice is not giveQ, therefore,

to those for whom the act was intended.

There is not a

rule of law in America, he argues, only a rule of process.
What is needed is legislation with precise rules governing its application at the local level that cannot be
"bargained away."

Administrators at the local level need

statutory guidance so that legislation passed in Washington can be strictly enforced at the local level.

The re-

sult would be the establishing of the rule of law in
America and real justice.
Lowi is not against interest group bargaining per
see

What is important, however, is that all bargaining

and compromising go on before the legislation is enacted.
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Such bargaining should take place at the formu1ation_
stage.

Once an act becomes law it should be enforced,

with strict guidelines, at the local level so all citizens
can benefit in a just manner, and in the way Congress intended.

Lowi sums this up in the thesis statement of his

book. " ••• {P)olicy without a rule of law will ultimately
come to ends profoundly different from those intended by
their most humanitarian and libertarian framers. (An evil
outcome to such programs can be predicted by) the absence
of public and explicit legislative standards by which to
guide administrative conduct."40
Lowi argues that it is up to the courts to require
the legislative branch to establish firm guidelines for
liberal legislation.

There is some question whether this

is a realistic answer to the problem of interest group
liberalism.

Traditionally, the American courts have re-

strained themselves from proscribing how the legislative
branch should conduct its business, requiring only,.of
course, that the Constitution be followed.

Interest group

liberalism is so firmly entrenched in the American political process that it would be naive for Lowi to suggest
that there would be any hope of the legislative branch
setting firmer guidelines to liberal legislation by itself.
Nevertheless, the difficulties caused by the whole interest
40 Ibid ., p. 263.

126
group political process in this country is a significant
and important critique on modern public policy-making.
Our examination of the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972 in Chapter II made it quite clear
that the act has broad guidelines.

The point of the leg-

islation, of course, was to give just the latitude to 10cal interest groups and local government that Lowi believes is responsible for the lack of effective problemsolving by liberal government.

As we shall see, the lo-

cal officials interviewed for this study indicated that
there was great interest group activity in deciding what
would be done with General Revenue Sharing funds and who
would do the deciding.

We also saw that General Revenue

Sharing funds can be used for almost anything.

As such,

one can suppose that Lowi would consider the intent and
effect of General Revenue Sharing would be to set back
further the effectiveness of American liberalism as well
as the rule of law and

justi~e

in America.

The Fear That Decentralization Will Strengthen the
Autonomous City and Frustrate Justice
Lowi would be especially displeased with the New
Federalism goal of seeking to strengthen city governments.
He believes that the authority now exercised by cities, or
at least the interest groups of the influential within
them, plays an important role in the inability of American
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liberalism to accomplish its goals.

Too often, Lowi ar-

gues, cities are treated as legal federal entities and
city administrators given too much discretion and independence in applying federal law to local situations. "Nationa1 legitimacy is tarnished to the degree that it is
loaned to the cities for discretionary use - there is an
absence of the rule of law in such a process ••• it is why
liberal governments cannot achieve justice.,,41 He argues
that the federal Constitution created two types of citizenship in America, national and states, " ••• but there is
no constitutional grounds for city citizenship.,,42
Lowi fears that the nation is too decentralized so
that there is not enough central authority to implement
meaningful social legislation.

The compromise process of

interest group liberalism is bad enough at the national
and state levels and the added entity of local brokerage
politics makes even more remote the chance to achieve a
real rule of law in this country.

He especially distrusts

local elites and feels they are capable of taking away the
goals for social justice that is the purpose of much liberal legislation.

At this point Lowi clearly agrees with

spokesmen at the New Federalism conference mentioned earlier in this chapter.

It will be remembered that several

4l Ibid ., pp. 263-4~

42f~id., p. 273.
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of them feared revenue sharing because they were sure it
would mean the transfer of national power to determine
policy from Washington, D.C., to less socially sympathetic
local elites.
The Fear That Decentralization Will Jeopardize
Civil Rights and Set Back Justice
Lowi feels it should be a goal of this nation to destroy the corporate or "autonomous city" and strengthen
the states.

43

Even then, aid should only go to state gov-

ernments that prove, before the fact, that state programs
will deal with the rights of their citizens.

The more

concurrent regimes there are, the more opportunities for
brokerage politics to subjugate the establishment of the
rule of law.

It is clear to Lowi that the cities have

proven they are unable to cope with urban problems, even
with federal help, and he adds, "(W)e have, in any case,
no other place but the states to turn to.,,44

He is, of

course, suggesting that the states will need federal aid
to deal with their problems and that aid must be accompanied with strict standards. n(T)here will be no social
justice with federal programs without a rule of law that
states unmistakably what is to be achieved and what is to
43 Ibid ., p. 274.
44 Ibid ., p. 305.
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be forbidden."45

Yet Lowi is not calling for un1imit~d

power for the national government, either •
••• (R)estoration of the rule of law provides a
basis for establishing some practical limitations
on the scope of federal power. If an applicable
and understandable set of standards must accompany every federal program, federal power could
not extend to those objects for which no general
rules are either practicable or desirable. Thus,
where regional or local variation is desired, the
federal government is not even the appropriate
unit. Unconditional rebates would be infinitely
preferable. When regional variation is not desirable, it is usually because s~me problem uniformly distributed across the country has been
identified and is well known, as for example civil rights, military service, tax liability, access to airwaves, obligations of contracts, free
speech and petition, in which case there is no
barrier, except fear, to prevent enactment of
statutes in which clear and effective standards
~an !gcompany delegations of vast public author~ty.

In many ways this statement takes us to the heart of
some important revenue sharing issues raised earlier.
Lowi endorses "unconditional rebates", which is essentia11y what General Revenue Sharing is, "to those general objects for which no general rules are either practicable
or desirable."

But strict guidelines must accompany fed-

era1 aid when regional variation in the applicationsof a
policy is

n2i

desirable, and this is sometimes the case

when "some problem uniformly distributed across the country has been identified and is well known."
45 Ibid ., p. 266.
46 Ibid ., p. 305.

The revenue
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sharing debate points out, however, that there may be less
national consensus than Lowi suggests as to what areas of
American public policy should be applied uniformly throughout the nation without regional or local variation.
As we have seen, some critics of revenue sharing
fear that it might negate what progress has been made in
the civil rights area, an area Lowi feels has been "identified" as one deserving of national priority in the app
plication of its goals and standards.

It is true, how-

ever, that Lowi feels the primary reason national programs
have failed is because, as we have seen, they were not
accompanied by "clear and effective standards" that would
require local conformity to national standards, rather
than their conforming to the priorities of local elites.
But is revenue sharing the type of "unconditional
rebate" aimed at "those objects for which no general rules
are either practicable or desirable," or is it simply
another federal program without established guidelines
that further sets back the cause of planning and justice
that has plagued federal programs for so long?
matter of interpretation.

It is a

Many of the city officials in-

terviewed for this study see General Revenue Sharing funds
and the entire thrust of the New Federalism as suggesting
that in the human and community service areas it is up to
the states and localities to set their own policies and

13l

priorities.

This does not sound like the areas Lowi had

in mind when he suggested that unconditional rebates
m~ght

be a good idea.

He would probably argue that the

New Federalism and General Revenue Sharing are
able and in fact considerably exacerbate the

~

lac~

desirof jus-

tice in America because (1) the funds are relegated to the
states and cities with virtually no guidelines, to be used
in human and community service areas where strict

guide~

lines should be required to see to it that the poor and
minorities are served, and (2) such funds going to cities
will theoretically strengthen them and thus alao the cause
of interest group liberalism.

Lowi might welcome the part

of the revenue sharing plan that seeks to strengthen the
states, but that benefit would be negated several times
over because it accompanies strengthening cities.
Lowi's analysis of modern liberalism is significant
because it raises questions about the real problem-solving
ability of modern big government.

Richard Nixon, too, has

decided that too much reliance on big government, at least
at the national level, is not a good idea.

We can see,

however, that Lowi would not agree with President Nixon's
means of redressing the difficulties of big government.
Lowi's fears for the rule of law and justice in America
and his fear that the city is an inappropriate place for
wide-ranging decisions affecting social concerns, are
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shared by others we have examined in this chapter.

In the

following case studies, we will see whether city officials
feel more guidelines in federal legislation are desirable.
We will also see whether they feel progress made in recent
years for the poor and minorities in America is likely to
be continued in their cities under General Revenue Sharing
and the New Federalism.

We will also analyze their com-

ments on the General Revenue Sharing decision-making process in their city to see if interest group liberalism
seems to have been strengthened by revenue sharing. Also,
in the opinion of city officials, does the city seem to be
strengthened enough by General Revenue Sharing to where
it is the "autonomous city" that Lowi fears'?
What then are the fears held by some Americans as
they see the implementation of General Revenue Sharing and
the New Federalism?

From the foregoing discussion, it

seems the major fears are:
(1) Decentralization will cause the abandonment
of programs for the disadvantaged.
(2) Decentralization will strengthen local special interests at the expense of the disadvantaged.
(3) Decentralization will exclude the disadvantaged from local decision-making.
(4) Decentralization will strengthen interest
group liberalism at the local level and frustrate
justice.
(5) Decentralization will strengthen the autonomous city and frustrate justice.
(6) Decentralization will jeopardize civil
rights and set back justice.
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In this chapter, we have looked at the goals of the
New Federalism as set forth by President Nixon and his
advisors.

We have further seen that General Revenue Shar-

ing is a main ingredient in achieving these goals.

We

have also examined some of the fears held by those skeptical of General Revenue Sharing and the New Federalism.
Specifying these goals and fears provides us with tools
with which to evaluate how General Revenue Sharing and the
New Federalism have been working in Seattle, Tacoma, Portland and Eugene.

Each of the points outlined as goals and

each outlined as fears will be used as criteria by which
to evaluate the progress of General Revenue Sharing in
these four cities.

Congress has specifically called for

careful scrutinY. of General Revenue Sharing after the
first five years of the program so it can decide whether
to continue it or not.

This paper is an early effort at

evaluating General Revenue Sharing for those in government
or the average citizen, so that he may determine its effects on urban America.
In the concluding chapter to this study, we will
pull together the experiences of these four cities and
evaluate them in terms of the goals and fears held for the
New Federalism and General Revenue Sharing.

Also, at the

end of each case study, certain preliminary or sub-conclusions will be offered with respect to that particular
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city's experience with General Revenue Sharing.
move to the first case study.

We now

It is of the largest city

studied and evaluated, Seattle, Washington.

CHAPTER IV
GENERAL REVENUE SHARING IN SEATTLE
I.

CITY FINANCES AND REVENUE SHARING
WHAT SEATTLE HAS DONE

Seattle, Washington, has the largest population of
the cities to be studied in this paper.

As of 1970 9

Seattle's population was about 531,000 peop1e.

l

As the

largest city in the State of Washington, Seattle has a
diverse urban population comprised of persons from many
ethnic groups and races.

The Boeing Company is the lar-

gest single employer in the city and Seattle's economic
fortunes are greatly influenced by Boeing's prosperity
or lack of it.
It is not surprising that a city of this size would
have financial problems.

Indeed, as the data from inter-

views with those people in City Hall indicates, Seattle
is clearly in the most difficult financial situation of
the four cities studied.

Without exception each official

interviewed suggested Seattle was in the midst of a fiscal crisis which was going to be particularly acute by
1975.

As stated by Frank Doolittle, Finance Director of

1The 1972 World Almanac and Book of Facts,
(New York: Newspaper Enterprise Association, Inc., 1972),
p. 193.
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the Office of Management and Budget, it is a matter of
anticipated expenditure levels exceeding recurring revenue
sources. 2 Before getting into the General Revenue Sharing
story specifically, it might be useful to relate Mr.
Doolittle's findings regarding Seattle's fiscal situation.
His findings help to put the revenue sharing issue of this
city into perspective.

In his capacity as Financial Econ-

omist for the city, Doolittle prepared a document stating
the difficulties the city could anticipate in balancing
the 1974 budget. 3 His findings are summarized on the following page in Table III.
Doolittle's concluding remarks explaining this table
are:

Even with the use of approximately $4.5 million in
General Fund Asset Balances to cover a deficit between recurring revenues and recurring expenditures,
there still remains an unfunded deficit ranging
from $2.2 - $5.7 million. ThUS, a potential ~efi
cit of $6.7 - $10.2 million seemingly exists.
Doolittle recognizes that state law requires a balanced budget, and he suggests that with cost cutting, increases in recurring revenues, and a General Fund Asset,
2Frank D. Doolittle, ttAna1ysis of General Fund
Revenues and Expenditures", 23 July 1973, Office of Management and Budget, City of Seattle, Seattle, Washington,
p. 1.
3Ibid ., pp. 1-2.
4

Ibid., p. 2.
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TABLE III
ANALYSIS OF SEATTLE GENERAL FUND
REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON
1973-4
EXPENDITURES
1973

1974

Level of Service Costs
General Fund
General Revenue Sharing

$71.6 million
5.4 million

Total costs in 1973 Budget

$77.,0 million

Mandatory Increases in Costs
of Maintaining January 1, 1973,
Services Levels
Labor Costs
Labor Settlement
Other Personnel Cost

$6.5 - $7.5
2.5 - 3.5

Total Increases in Labor

$9.0 - $11.0

Non-Personnel Costs
Total 1974 Increases
1974

Potential Budget

2.0 $11.0

3.5
$14.5

$88.0 - $91.5 million

(Table continues on next page.)
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TABLE III (cont.)
REVENUES
1973

1974

Revenues/Income
General Fund Recurring
Revenues
General Revenues Sharing

$69.1 million
tt
5.4

Total Recurring Revenues

$74.5 million

Deficit Financed from
General Fund Asset Balance

$ 2.5 million

Total Revenues/Income

$77.0 million

Revenues/Income
General Fund Recurring
Revenues
General Revenue Sharing

$71.8 million
9.5
"

Total Recurring Revenues

$81.3 million

Available General Fund
Asset Balances to Cover
Deficit

$ 4.5 million

Preliminary Total Revenue
Available in 1974

$85.8 million

SOURCE: Frank D. Doolittle, "Analysis of General
Fund Revenues and Expenditures", 23 July 1973, Office of
Management and Budget, City of Seattle, Seattle, Washington, p. 1.

3
c.
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the city should be able to balance its budget in 1974. 5 A

look at Doolittle's data also shows that revenue sharing
plays an important role in his calculations for 1974.
The revenue sharing period, however, that we are
most interested in is 1972-3.

The Office of Management

and Budget in Seattle's Executive Branch and the Mayor's
own personal staff worked together in the early stages to
draw up alternative plans suggesting how the city should
allocate its general Revenue Sharing funds.

A descrip-

tion of how the Executive Branch in Seattle's city government proceeded to deal with the revenue sharing issue
is summarized in a document from the Office of Management
and Budget entitled "History of Revenue Sharing".

The

document tells us something of Mayor Wes Uhlman's feelings
on revenue sharing which he communicated to the City
Council in an October, 1972, budget message:
One portion of this money is needed to simply
balance our present budget and maintain present
services levels in critical areas. Another portion, however, should be set aside for special
projects that could not be undertaken without
revenue sharing.
Citizens should join with us in determining how
this money should be spent •••• l will send to the
Council a proposal on the citizen mechanism to make
revenue sh~ring the real innovation it can and
should be.
5 Ibid., p. 2.

6"History of Revenue Sharing: Position Taken by the
Executives to Date.", 25 May 1973, Office of Management
and Budget, City of Seattle, Seattle, Washington, p. 1.
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The "histor),'document also tells us that the Mayor
offered three plans from October, 1972, to February, 1973,
recommending what the City Council should ultimately do
with revenue sharing funds.

There were certain consis-

tencies evident in these plans:
First, the established criteria were developed
(enumerated in the points that follow) to address
the very real problem of future 1974-5 General
Fund deficits. To raise operating levels by allocations to projects which expand services by expanding management and operation and labor costs
would further aggravate an already serious matter.
This line of reasoning is equally relevant today.
(That is, considering 1972-3).
Second, there was the need for an eventual
approval of 1972 Budget Balancing dollars of
$5.4 million.
Third, there were the department requests which
constituted an attempt by existing service agencies to evaluate their needs.
Fourth, from 1974 on, all revenue sharing is required to balance the budget. By 1975, we will
need an addit;onal revenue source on top of revenue sharing.
As we shall see, these guidelines offered by the Mayor
had real impact on what the Seattle City Council finally
decided to do with its revenue sharing funds.

These

guidelines or "plans" offered by the Mayor were only one
source of data furnished the City Council as the main
body that has the final say in the city's allocation of
funds.

Other data was submitted by the Office of Manage-

ment and Budget.

That office told the Council how city

departments wanted to deal with revenue sharing funds.
7

Ibid., p. 3.
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The wishes of non-government groups such as social service agencies were also communicated to the Council by
the Office of Management and Budget.

Naturally, the

Council was lobbied by these and other groups as well.
Alan Barrie, Legislative Auditor for the City Council has
also made suggestions to the Council as to how revenue
sharing funds should be allocated and the criteria the
Council might use in making its decisions.

Therefore,

from the earliest stages throughout the revenue sharing
decision-making process in Seattle, the executive and
legislative branches were both very active, with the executive branch making the first moves.
The Mayor'S guidelines mentioned above were unofficial ones in that they were only suggestions to the
Council.

The City Council decided it needed a formal set

of guidelines to consult in debating the revenue sharing
issue so the Mayor and the Office of Management and Budget
drew up guidelines for both the Council and city departments to consult in deciding how to allocate revenue sharing monies.

Although the Council did not formally adopt

these guidelines until June, 1973, they were widely known
among the members throughout the decision-making process.
This included knowledge of the important meeting of
February 7, 1973, that we will examine in detail as this
chapter proceeds.

The first three of these guidelines

r
f..
~

~'
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were suggested by the Office of Management and Budget
and the fourth guideline was drawn up by the Council
itself:
(1) To be funded with General Revenue Sharing
funds the activity is to be ·necessary for the continued performance of city services.
(2) The project requested is to be of a one time
nature and not to require continued support.
(3) Recommended projects should induce efficiency
through labor saving and cost reductions.
(4) It would be wise to provide a one time tide
over funding for some social programs if there was
a very strong indication there was going to be continued funding from otfter sources, Special Revenue
Sharing, or the State.
As will become clear later, the fourth point has real significance in that it is a more "liberal" statement than
the other guidelines and represents the liberal power
balance on the City Council that prevailed throughout the
revenue sharing debates.
AS Seattle's city government went through its various plans and debated and adopted working guidelines, it
was agreed by all that the revenue sharing funds would be
considered as a separate package of money.

General Rev-

enue Sharing funds were not automatically included in the
city's general fund.

The General Revenue Sharing money

was dealt with by itself.
As we have seen, the Local Fiscal Assistance Act of
1972 does not require that any receiving governmental unit
8Interview with Allan Barrie, Legislative Auditor
for the City Council, Seattle, Washington, 22 June 1973.
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set up special procedures for deciding how the local area
is to spend its money.

In fact, the Act suggests that

regular budget processes be used.
was done in Seattle.

This is exactly what

The public participated in the de-

cision-making process to the extent that they could.

As

individuals and as interest groups, they petitioned the
Office of Management and Budget for the allocation of
funds to the programs they wanted funded.

Citizens and

representatives of special interests could also attend and
speak at the three public hearings held by the City Council on the revenue sharing issue.

But Seattle did not go

out of its way to enlist citizen participation in revenue sharing deliberations.

There was, however, an in-

direct input to the decision-making process by a group
called the Commission on Seattle 2000.

This group was

organized by the Mayor to be a task force to study problems and suggest programs to deal with them so Seattle
could plan its future to the year 2000.
Mayor Uhlman suggested to the Council that this
Commission should also recommend to the Council what
should be done with revenue sharing funds.

This was to

be the citizen participation mechanism he suggested in
October, 1972, which was to be what was needed to "make
revenue sharing the real innovation which it can and
should become."

The Council turned down the Mayor's
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suggestion, however.

The Council felt that Seattle 2000

had enough to do in dealing with Seattle's problems and
plans that might occur between now and the year 2000.

The

Council simply felt the revenue sharing job was outside
the spectrum of the original purpose of the Seattle 2000
concept.

The Council did not set up an alternate mechan-

ism either.

As we shall see, Councilman Miller will

indicate some of the reasons why.

The point here is that

although Seattle 2000 did not make specific input into the
Council's deliberations on revenue sharing, the

Commis~

sion's report is now finished and its suggestion about
current needs of the city may have impact on how Seattle
allocates its remaining 1973 revenue sharing funds, and
perhaps on how the city deals with its revenue sharing
monies in future years.

And although the Seattle 2000

participants were widely representative citizens from all
types of groups in the city, it is clear their input into
the revenue sharing process is of the most indirect sort.
Citizen involvement was perhaps at its lowest level
when Seattle made its first revenue sharing allocation.
As can be seen from Mr. Doolittle's figures in Table IV,
$5.4 million in revenue sharing money was used to help
balance the 1973 budget.

It became obvious to the Office

Management and Budget and the Council that these new
federal funds offered a way to balance the 1973 budget
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without cutting city employees or cutting back services.
The Mayor, however, had proposed that the budget be
balanced with a continuation of the city's business and
occupation tax surcharge.

But for some time the Council

had been anxious to fulfill its earlier promise to the
business community to remove the unpopular surcharge.

So

the Council refused the Mayor's suggestion and instead
decided to use $5.4 million of General Revenue Sharing to
balance the budget.

The money went to the 1973 budget for

police patrol and firefighters salaries.
cation the 1973 budget was balanced.

With that allo-

This was strictly

an "in-house" decision' and no hearings were held and the
public was not actively involved except to the extent local
elites in the business community were lobbying for the
repeal of the business and occupation surtax.
With the "budget balancing" allocation, Seattle
still had about twelve million dollars in General Revenue
Sharing funds to allocate from federal checks received in
1972 and 1973.

The Mayor at this point suggested that a

large part of this money should go for property tax relief
and another large portion should go to; the various city
departments.

He was not suggesting, in other words, that

revenue sharing should go for new city programs.

Along

with the Mayor's suggestions, the Council also heard from
the city departments themselves through the Office of
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Management and Budget.

Citizens made their will known by

lobbying the Council in three public hearings held to
discuss revenue sharing allocations.

By February, 1973,

the Seattle City Council had decided it was ready to make
its revenue sharing decisions.

As we shall soon see, that

meeting was a controversial one indeed.

By a five to four

decision, the Council decided to allocate a portion of the
remaining revenue sharing funds, it resolved to reserve
a portion and left an amount unexpended.

As of this

writing, the unexpended as well as the reserved funds have
yet to receive final Council action.

The table on the

following page summarizes the current status of Seattle
General Revenue Sharing funds in terms of amounts of money
and expense areas.
An analysis of that table shows that those monies
so far expended, including those budgeted for balancing
the 1973 budget, are monies for traditional city services.
In the "reserved" area, however, a sizeable amount of money
has been suggested for social programs only narrowly or
not at all funded by the city previously.

So, as of

September, 1973, the Seattle City Council still had to
make a final determination on the "reserved" items to see
whether and to what extent they would be finally funded.
Also, the Council had to decide what to do with the remaining $3.2 million.

11.:47

TABLE IV
GENERAL REVENUE SHARING FUNDS
ALLOCATIONS AND RESERVES
1972 AND 1973
1972 Retroactive Revenue
1973 Anticipated Revenue
Total Two Year Receipts
1973 Budget Balancing for Police
Patrol and Firefighters Salaries
Supplementary Department Expenditures
Building
Park Department
Seattle Center
Engineering Department
Library
Animal Control
Police
Comptroller
Community Development
Total Supplementary (Expended)
Council Proposals (Reserved)
Housing Rehabilitation
Historic Preservation
Indian Culture Center
Asian Culture Center
Seattle Center
Total 1972 and 1973 Revenues
Total Allocations and Reserves
Remaining Funds for City Council Action

8,136,004
9,279,700
$17,415,704

$

$ 5,408,175
$

35,000
457,000
475,000
390,000
797,000
300,000
12,000
470,000
31.000
$ 2,967,000
$ 4,500,000
600,000
500,000
200,000
50.000
$ 5,850,000
$17,415,704
14 1 225.175
$ 3,190,529
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In terms of the Mayor's proposals for the allocations of revenue sharing funds, the Council largely turned
down his request to use a big chunk of the money for a tax
cut and they also, through the reserved and left-over
funds, failed to fund city departments to the extent the
Mayor had suggested.

The Mayor, however, did sign:and

approve the Council's actions as decided by the 5 to 4
Council vote.
What will happen to the $3.2 million not yet dealt
with?

Several of those interviewed feel the money should

not be appropriated until the city knows what will happen
to federal funding of social programs in the city.

If

federal funds dry up and are not replaced to some degree
by Special Revenue Sharing funds, then the city should
think about temporary funding of some social services
until federal funds arrive.

To help the Council decide

what to do with these funds, now classified as "reserved",
and future revenue sharing monies, Councilwoman Jeanette
Williams asked Allan Barrie, Legislative Auditor for the
City Council, to prepare a statement of what he and his
staff considered the "goals and policies for the City of
Seattle" to be at that time.

Mrs. Williams evidently felt

the previously developed guidelines, along with the Mayor's
suggestions and the report of Seattle 2000, were not
enough to guide the Council in its revenue sharing
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deliberations.
In his ,statement, Barrie indicated that Seattle
will have a very difficult time between 1973 and 1976
avoiding a budget deficit without taking serious action.
A reduction in city employees through attrition and the
use of all General Revenue Sharing funds to help balance
the budget seem called for, he feels.

The memo says the

Council is faced with deciding its role with respect to
how to allocate incoming state and federal funds in the
most prudent manner possible given the circumstances.
To aid the Council in these decisions, Barrie has offered
as the city's objectives the following:
(1) Provide protection of life and property:
police, fire,public health, municipal courts,
animal control.
(2) Provide basic services: electricity,
water, sewer, storm drains, streets, bridges,
and sidewalks (transportation), recreational
facilities.
(3) Encourage economic development: promote
business activity, regulations to encourage
business development.
(4) Assure a habitable environment: air
quality, noise pollution, visual pollution,
quality of housing.
(5) Assure a basic array of social services:
social development, cultural identity, handicapped, older Americans, equality.
(6) Plan and manage to assure attainment of
goals in the most efficient manner. 9
9Allan Barrie, "Goals and Policies for the City of
Seattle," Memo to Councilwoman Nilliams, 22 June 1973.
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As of this writing the Council has not formally
adopted these goals, but they have them at their disposal
to aid in arriving at final allocation determinations.
It seems clear, however, that if the Council should use
Barrie's goals to guide them the programs now in the reserved category would have a difficult time receiving much,
if any, revenue sharing funding.

The large amount of mon-

ey now "reserved" for housing rehabilitation and the other
"reserved" monies for social services are clearly low priorities in Barrie's analysis of current city needs in
light of budget constraints.
At this time, then, Seattle has made few "final" decisions on the revenue sharing money it has received so
far.

Ironically, the most definitive decision so far on

revenue sharing in the city may be the one dealing with
what is to be done with future federal checks.

We have

seen that the Executive Office as well as Allan Barrie
of the Legislative branch agree that all future revenue
sharing monies are going to have to go inta the general
fund to balance the budget.

As we shall see, there is

little disagreement among those interviewed with regard
to that decision.
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II.

THE POLITICS OF REVENUE SHARING IN SEATTLE:
HOW CITY OFFICIALS VIEW REVENUE SHARING

If money is power, then the large amounts of federal money coming into cities with few strings attached
is bound to invoke political struggles.

In Seattle, the

politics of revenue sharing was more evident than in the
other cities studied.

The political dimension was clear

not only in the overt political actions of City Council
members and the Mayor, but also in the political opinions of those interviewed on a broad range of revenue
sharing related topics.

This section of the study of

Seattle will look at both the

po~itical

ions of some City Hall officials.

actions and opin-

The emphasis will be

on how they interpret the original intention of Federal
Revenue Sharing, how they feel about what Seattle has so
far done with its revenue sharing funds, their feelings
about Seattle's revenue sharing decision-making process,
and how they view the entire question of federal aid to
cities.

At the conclusion of this chapter, certain pre-

liminary conclusions will be offered on Seattle's revenue
sharing experience and how it addresses itself to the
goals and fears raised by the New Federalism outlined in
Chapter III.
Views of City Officials on the Original Intention of
Federal Revenue Sharing
As we have seen, the State and Local Fiscal Assist-
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ance Act of 1972 establishes only very broad guidelines
as to how revenue sharing funds can be spent at the local
level.

We have also found that the intentions of Congress

and the Administration are either varied or so broad as to
leave much room open for interpretation.

Therefore, it is

not surprising that city officials in Seattle had different ideas as to what they considered to be the intention
of General Revenue Sharing_
Frank Doolittle, Finance Director for the Office of
Management and Budget, and City Councilman George Cooley
held similar opinions on what they felt the purpose of
revenue sharing might be.

Doolittle felt that the initial

federal money should be used largely for tax relief.

He

simply did not believe the City Council could intelligently allocate such a large sum of money in a short time and
therefore Seattle's citizens would be helped most through
a reduction in taxes.

Doolittle says this proposal, which

was prepared by his staff and the Mayor, was turned down
by the Council as too politically motivated.

Revenue

sharing monies were seen by Doolittle as a means "whereby
the city can control taxes at the present level."

He

would further argue that the revenue sharing money not
spent to stabilize taxes should be spent only for capital
and labor-saving types of projects.

As a man intimately

concerned with Seattle's financial situation, it is not
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surprising that Doolittle felt that the first two years
of revenue sharing funds could be seen as a windfall, some
of which should be used to balance the budget with the
rest available for other things.

The last three years of

federal allotments, however, should be used for the purpose
of balancing the city budget.
Mr. Doolittle saw the intention of revenue sharing
as being money returned to the city to aid the city in a
severe financial crunch.

Because Seattle's financial dif-

ficulties are not as severe this year as he anticipates
they will be in the next few years he would see it as all
right to spend part of the money on tax relief and laborsaving or capital projects.

As the fiscal situation gets

tighter, however, revenue sharing should go to help the
city meet its most basic traditional service needs and to
. i
l ar1es.
.
10
pay mun1C
palsa
Councilman Cooley sees the intent of federal revenue
sharing in similar terms.
sirability of using

reY~nue

He feels strongly about the desharing for tax relief.

He

feels the money should also be used for traditional city
services and to pay city employees.

Councilman Cooley

further believes that the city is on "shaky grounds" in
using the money for non-traditional types of social ser10Interview with Frank Doolittle, Financial Director
of the Office of Management and Budget, City of Seattle,
Seattle, Washington, 26 July 1973.
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Allan Barrie, Budget Advisor for the City Council,

also feels that revenue sharing funds ought to go first
for the service and security of persons and property in
Seattle.

Only if there is an acute need to use the money

for social services does he perceive its intent as justifying such an expenditure.

The essential point, accord-

ing to Barrie, is that the city simply does not have an
excess of money and if revenue sharing or any other funds
are spent for social services or other "non-traditional"
city expenses, it then follows that the money will not be
·labl e f or more b
··
ty
as~c
c~

ava~

·b·l·t·
~ ~ ~es. 12

respons~

Not surprisingly, Rick Painter, of the city's Department of Human Resources, would not agree with the
above three men.

Mr. Painter feels the social needs of

Seattle are so great and have been so long neglected by
all levels of government that the revenue sharing monies
can be very justly spent in trying to deal with social
needs.

He specifically notes that Model Cities, Head

Start and other programs that have clearly helped citizens and also face federal cutbacks could and should be
funded with General Revenue Sharing money.

He admits

llInterview with George Cooley, Seattle City Councilman, Seattle, Washington, 30 July 1973.
l2Barrie, Interview.
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that Special Revenue Sharing is supposed to be doing that
job, but he also feels that the guidelines of General Revenue Sharing are broad enough that it can justifiably be
used for social services as well. 13
At least one man on the City Council would agree.
Councilman John Miller felt revenue sharing was designed
to allow cities to do things they were financially unable
to do before.

He saw the money as giving the city an op-

portunity to "change its spending priorities."

Specific-

ally, Miller felt the revenue sharing money should go for
programs to improve the quality of neighborhood living
and for creating lively, exciting events and institutions
for the city.

All things considered, he feels the intent

of revenue sharing is to offer an opportunity to the city
to meet the twin needs of making the neighborhoods pleasant places in which to live and making the whole city more
exciting to live in by developing attractions that people
will want to remain near.

The funds are a way the city
can combat the fleeing of citizens to the suburbs. 14
Those interviewed can clearly be classified into two
groups.

One group saw the maintenance or improvement of

city services as the intention of revenue sharing funds.
l3Interview with Rick Painter, Department of Human
Resources, City of Seattle, Seattle, Washington,
31 July 1973.
l4Interview with John Miller, Seattle City Councilman, Seattle, Washington, 27 July 1973.
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The other group saw the money as an opportunity to expand
city services and programs into areas previously neglected
but deserving of attention.
Views of City Officials on How Seattle Has Allocated Its
Revenue Sharing Funds
The philosophical difference we see regarding the
real intention of revenue sharing in the opinions of city
officials is carried over to their feelings on how the
city ultimately allocated General Revenue Sharing funds.
While all seem to agree that the $5.4 million spent to
balance the 1973 budget was necessary, there is considerable controversy over the money now in the "reserved"
category.

Again, Doolittle, Cooley and Barrie represent

one point of view while Miller and Painter represent
another.
Mr, Doolittle is not at all sure the City Council
was capable of making decisions on windfall grants such as
revenue sharing because they are used to making tlallocations at the margin only and only on basic services."

He

maintains that the tlthinking" process, budget process and
planning processes of the city are not geared to deal with
windfall gains.

Consequently, he and the Mayor recom-

mended that the Council use a large part of the revenue
sharing money to give Seattle citizens a tax break.

Be-

cause this was not done, he is displeased with much of
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what the Council did do.

He feels that "in future deci-

sions (on revenue sharing) the Council will show concern
for whether the city should or is financially able to finance a high level of social programs that have always
been the responsibility of state and federal government."
Doolittle is especially concerned over the "reserved" $4.5 million for housing rehabilitation.

Not

only is this a great deal of money, he says, but it is
being spent in an area where the city has had no direct
dealing before.

The city has helped the federal govern-

ment administer housing programs before, but never before
has the city itself been "in the housing business."

He

stated that he was not sure that this and other projects
in the "reserved" category were legal and he was not sure
they would ultimately be funded at present suggested levels.

He rather hoped they would not.
Whereas housing rehabilitation would be a new ac-

tivity for the city, Doolittle feels that the "reserved"
monies for Black, Indian and Asian cultural centers are in
line with previous city expenditures in these areas.

The

difference now, however, is that the city has never before
expended as much as the Council now recommends.
As we saw earlier,

Doolittle and others agree that

the last three years of Seattle's revenue sharing money
will have to go to balance the budget and cannot be spent
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for "new programs."

Doolittle feels, however, that if the

city should again get into funding social programs, it
should fund only those programs that have proved themselves successful and only those in areas where the city
has already assumed some responsibility in the past.
an example, he cited health clinics.

As

However, if federal

monies dry up, he would not be opposed to using the remaining $3.2 million for social programs to tide them over
for one year. lS
Councilman Cooley would agree with Mr. Doolittle
and he had an interesting political story to tell as well.
Cooley suggests that although the Council is officially
nonpartisan, it is "split philosophically on approaches
to things."

In what he calls a "closed meeting," five

members of the nine member Council (he was not one of the
five) got together and assembled an $8 million package of
General Revenue Sharing proposals.

Cooley feels a deal

might have been made between the five and the Mayor as
some of the Mayor's supplemental budget proposals were
among the items in the package.

The five launched into

some programs he did not agree with.

He disputed the al-

location for historical preservation because it was not
clear how it would be administered and would almost certainly create ongoing costs -- a violation of the Office
lSDoolittle, Interview.
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of Management and Budget guidelines.

The "huge reserva-

tion" for housing rehabilitation was unwise, he felt,
because the five had only worked on it for a month and
they had changed their minds several times already on
how it was going to be administered.

Cooley simply does

not believe the city should be in the housing business.
He acknowledges that the city does administer some federal grants in the public housing area and feels that is all
right, but it is not right for the city to spend its own
money on such projects.

Essentially, Councilman Cooley

is of the opinion that social services are state and federal responsibilities largely because cities do not have
the revenue to deal with these types of services and also
do a good job maintaining traditional services.
Spending part of the remaining $3.2 million for
some social services until federal aid to those programs
resumes would be all right with Cooley.

But in the main

he clearly believes revenue sharing funds should go to
improve efficiency in government and develop only a few
one-time programs that are in traditional city responsibility areas.

He agrees with Doolittle and others that

the last three years of revenue sharing must go to balance the budget and maintain basic city services.

There-

fore, Cooley is not pleased with how the majority of the
Council has so far dominated the revenue sharing alloca-

160
tion process.

He is',philosophic:a11y opposed to the
16
thrust of their proposals.
Allan Barrie is largely of the viewpoint held by

Doolittle and Cooley.

As financial expert for the Coun-

cil, he feels the city just does not have the money to
spend on projects such as housing rehabilitation when so
many traditional services are underfunded.

He goes so far

as to say that the revenue sharing money is really only
enough to keep some city employees on the payroll and it
17
is certainly not enough to go into new service areas.
At least one member of the City Council would not
agree with Barrie, Cooley and Doolittle.

Councilman John

Miller was one of the five Councilmen who sponsored and
put through the Council the "expended," "reserved," and
"remaining" allocations itemized in Table IV.

It is not

surprising, then, that he is very much in favor of how the
Council dealt

with revenue sharing.

Miller explains that

he and the others on the majority side of the Council
vote had two themes in mind in allocating the money the
way they did.

As briefly mentioned earlier, they wanted

to improve the quality of life in the city's neighborhoods and they wanted to refurbish downtown and other
facilities that would bring exciting programs and areas
16coo1ey, Interview.
17B arr~e,
.
I
·
n t
erv~ew.
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of interest to the citizens.
The quality of life in Seattle's neighborhoods, according to Miller, can be greatly improved if housing is
rehabilitated.

The sum of $4.5 million was thus put into

"reserve" for that purpose by the Council.

He says that

housing rehabilitation has been a long neglected local
problem.

Federal programs in the housing area have large-

ly been failures in Seattle.

He says that Seattle probab-

ly has a higher percentage of single family owner occupied homes than any city in the United States of comparable size.
ly.

In his view, about half of them are aging bad-

The question then becomes: "In five or ten years is

the city going to tear down these homes and hope for adequate new housing or is it going to try to rehabilitate
what is there now?"

He feels it has become the city's

responsibility to go into this area because the private
sector has shown little willingness to do the job alone.
"The financial community isn't interested in financing
rehabilitation.

The banks won't loan the money for it."

In spite of Mr. Cooley's contention that the "five"
had not thought out the housing rehabilitation program
very well, Mr. r-a1ler was fairly specific on what the
Council majority had in mind.

If the plan were finally

adopted by the Council, the city would seek help from
previously reluctant banks to go into the housing rehab-
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ilitation business together.

The city would bank its

$4.5 million and seek matching funds from banks.

The

earned interest from this combined amount (about $500,000)
would be offered to poorer people in no-interest loans to
help them rehabilitate their homes.

Also, Miller hopes

the city will develop a program where banks would loan to
the Seattle Housing Authority (a private corporation)
funds for moderate income persons to borrow for housing
rehabilitation.

In this case persons would pay one-half

the regular interest rate.

Also, he hopes to develop a

scheme for upper and middle income people to have access
to money for housing rehabilitation purposes.
Miller also hopes the city could spend more revenue
sharing money to improve neighborhoods by improving their
streets, parks and libraries.
Theme one, uniting the Council majority, was a real
desire to make neighborhoods pleasant places in which to
live.

It was also a desire to create or enhance attrac-

tions in the downtown area or other places that were of
were of such high quality that people would want to stay
in the city to enjoy them.

Hence, there was "reserved"

money for preservation of historical attractions and the
development of cultural centers.

Also, the allotment for

aiding the Seattle Center is in the same vein.

All of

these ideas are aimed at keeping people in Seattle by
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making it a pleasant and more exciting place to live in
than a suburb.
Miller was quite proud of the fact that fewer than
ten percent of the programs approved by the Council and
endorsed by the five councilmen as useful ways to spend
revenue sharing money were programs not under the two
themes outlined above.

He was anxious to mention that,

in accord with Office of Management and Budget guidelines, the projects are investments.

The money for hous-

ing rehabilitation, for example, will be put in a trust
fund and the principal kept in tact.

Only the earned

interest will be loaned.
It is clear that the five councilmen who share
Miller's philosophy about the needs of the city hold a
slim majority on the Council and only slick political
maneuvering got them what they wanted.

They believe the

revenue sharing money is "new" money to do needed tasks
regardless of how "non-traditional" those tasks might be.
Miller reinforced this point by saying he was glad the
Council did not do as the Mayor wanted and just divide
General Revenue Sharing funds between city departments and
use the rest for a tax cut.

He also argues that a very

good use of the remaining money would be for social services until Special Revenue Sharing becomes a reality.lS
18Mi11er, Interview.
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Only very recently, Seattle has developed a Department of Human Resources.

Seattle, along with other com-

munities which realize the city must get increasingly involved in the social service area, has created a department with far-sighted goals but not much money.

Rick

Painter of Seattle's new department indicated that as
long as the federal government gives social service responsibilities to cities either through cutting funds to
federal programs and thus "forcing" the cities to pick up
the slack, or through Special Revenue Sharing types of
programs, the cities must "gear up" for the huge task before them.

We have already seen that the city's problems

in taking on such responsibilities may be more than a lack
of experience and money.

Another problem will be city

officials who honestly feel social service responsibilities are either for federal, state or county governments
or for the private sector to handle.

Painter feels that

as his department grows and gains experience it may be
able to lobby effectively before the City Council and the
Office of Management and Budget and gain support for its
programs.

As of now, he is pleased with what the "liber-

al" majority on the Council has accomplished for social
services in their allocation of revenue sharing monies.
He feels that if the department had been better established when revenue sharing came along, it could have

,
. ,--
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influenced the Council.

At this time, however, Painter

is very happy with the "reserved" programs, especially
the housing rehabilitation program.

He agrees that the

$5.4 million spent to balance the 1973 budget was probably necessary.

He is also happy with the many social

service proposals now being suggested for funding with
the remaining revenue sharing funds.

19

Views of City Officials on the Seattle Revenue Sharing
Decision-Making Process
\ve now turn to an examination of the opinions of
those interviewed in Seattle with regard to the decisionmaking process employed to decide what was to be done with
revenue sharing funds.

It will be remembered that the

revenue sharing act itself only implied that normal budget procedures be used.

It did not require that the city

go out of its way to include a cross-section of citizen
participation in decisions on revenue sharing.

In this

way, as we have seen, it was very different from some
"War on Poverty" legislation requiring the "maximum feasib1e participation" of local citizens in deciding how the
local application of the program and its funding would
affect them.

Seattle officials differed as to their

opinions regarding the effectiveness of "maximum feasible
participation" in their city and its effect on the
. t
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po1iticization of Seattle's citizens.

They also differ

as to how satisfactory they feel Seattle's decisionmaking process was in dealing with revenue sharing.
It was pointed out at the beginning of this chapter
that Seattle dealt with its revenue sharing money as a
separate sum from the monies in its budget's general fund.
It was also pointed out that Seattle did not set up any
decision-making mechanism especially for revenue sharing
processes.

The money was handled, pursuant to the im-

plications of the law, in terms of the normal budget decision-making process.

Mr. Doolittle of the Office of

Management and Budget feels this was the best process to
use.

He said that citizen recommendations were not soli-

cited or wanted because the Office of Management and Budget had already decided where the money should go, and
must go, in the future.

Doolittle was specifically re-

ferring to the undesirability of setting up some special
mechanism for citizen inclusion into the decision-making
process beyond that usually involved in the regular budget processes.

He simply felt that a large scale citizen

involvement process might force the Council to allocate
revenue sharing funds for social programs and some capital programs that the city could not maintain without
raising up to $10 million in new taxes.
straightforward fiscal question.

To him it was a

He felt the revenue
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sharing money alone was only enough to balance the budget
this year and delay a tax increase for a while.

I

Mr. Doolittle is careful to point out that the
overall decision-making process is not over.

Final de-

cisions on the "reserved" programs and the $3.2 million
yet to be allocated have to be made.

Also, public hear-

ings on the housing rehabilitation programs have yet to
be held.

It is still possible for citizens to give their

views and even for the city to develop mechanisms for
citizen inclusion beyond the open hearing process.
Especially he feels, the finished report of the Seattle
2000 Commission will have an effect on the Mayor's recommendations on spending the remaining money and on the
Council's final decision on the same subject.

The Commi-

sion was established with the widest possible inclusion
of citizens from all segments of the city and thus its
indirect input may have some significance.
Representatives from Model Cities seem to have made
an impression on the Council and Office of Management
and Budget in lobbying for revenue sharing funds.
Doolittle specifically mentioned that Model Cities task
force personnel have been effective in making the program
work in Seattle and want revenue sharing funds to keep
the program going as federal categorical support is cut
back.

The group was not successful in getting any revenue

168
sharing money in the first go round, but they are now
trying for part of the remaining funds. 20
Councilman Cooley was concerned with citizen participation as an issue, but he was most concerned with the
conduct of some Councilmen in deciding what to do with
revenue sharing funds.

Specifically, he was upset about

the clandestine way the five Councilmen got together and
drew up their $8 million package, as they did not openly
arrive at the decision.
The Seattle Municipal League has also been singling out Cooley for criticism, he says, on the overall
city process for deciding how to allocate revenue sharing
funds.

The League feels the city should have set up a

special mechanism for including the citizens in making
decisions.

But Cooley feels citizens were adequately

involved in the sense that the city took all their
recommendations into account.

Also the Office of Manage-

ment and Budget priorities and recommendations given the
Council were in part based upon citizen and group inputs.
As far as Mr. Cooley is concerned, what happened
at the hearings is a basis for feeling that even broader
citizen participation would not do the city any real good.
In the first place, he feels the people who came to the
20Doolittle, Interview.
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hearings were asking the city to get into "non-essential"
areas of social service (mental health, public health,
etc.>; non-essential, that is, for the city.

Also, very

large numbers of paid professional social workers came
to the hearings essentially, in Cooley's opinion, to get
money from revenue sharing to maintain their jobs because
the federal government was cutting back its support.

In

other words, were these activists "representative" of
anyone but their own narrow, special interest?

Cooley

saw them as basically trying to "rip-off" the city.2l
From his position as auditor for the City Council,
Allan Barrie views the revenue sharing decision-making
process similarly to Councilman Cooley.

He agrees that

the behind the scenes coordinating of the five Councilmen,
before they met with the whole Council to make revenue
sharing decisions, was very controversial behavior.

There

have been charges of railroading and also, that the five
had no real criteria of judgment in drawing up their
program.
Mr. Barrie also feels that the Council needs to
beware of special interests that tend to flock to open
hearings in that they may not be representative of wide
constituencies.

He suggests it is a tough job for a

21Coo1ey, Interview.
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Councilman to wade through all the special interests'
requests and "figure out what is best for the city -- he's
up against it."
Most of the social agencies seeking revenue sharing
funds were working against the tight budget situation of
Seattle and the expectation on the part of the Council
that Special Revenue Sharing, not General Revenue Sharing
was the part of the New Federalism program that was
to transfer financial aid to social programs of the local
government from federal categorical grants.

As Special

Revenue Sharing was not yet a reality, both the city and
the social agencies found themselves in a kind of limbo.
As Barrie suggests, however, the city was willing to
give some money to the legal aid program, for example,
in anticipation of federal funds arriving to maintain the
22
program.
As might be expected, Councilman Miller looks at
things a bit differently, but not entirely.

First, he is

clearly proud of being one of the "five" in the Council
majority who put through a revenue sharing package.

The

interviewer got the impression that Miller simply saw this
as another political battle that, in this case, he and his
coalition won.

He hopes the coalition can stay together

22B arr1e,
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in the face of "political pressures and fiscal realities."
Somewhat ironically, Miller sees the Seattle 2000
Commission as being in the way of the creation of a
genuine citizen participation mechanism for helping to
decide revenue sharing questions.

Seattle 2000 was a

massive effort, he says, to get citizens involved in meeting together to set goals for the year 2000.

The purpose

was to get ideas upon which to build a comprehensive plan
for the city for development to the year 2000.

Miller

feels that getting these people in the first place was a
great city-wide effort, and the energy they expended in
their task was also very great.

The whole effort "drained

the city's activist resources."

To come along and develop

another open ended process for General Revenue Sharing was
not feasible.

He continued:

"There is only so much you

can do in terms of broad citizen participation at one time
••• there are only so many activists in the city to go
around. "
Miller differs sharply with Doolittle in his opinion
of the capability of the City Council to deal with windfall monies like revenue sharing.

Miller feels there was

no question in the minds of many Councilmen as to where
the money could be usefully spent.

Citizens, he argues,

had petitioned and lobbied for some time for programs the
city could not previously afford to fund.

Many of the
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programs in the "reserved" category were programs that
citizens had wanted for some time and at lease five
Councilmen must have agreed they were important.

Miller

agrees that some lengthening of the decision-making
process might have been a good idea. and perhaps, even with
Seattle 2000, more citizen participation could have been
sought.

He seems to feel, however, that a majority on the

Council knew what the people wanted through previous
communications from them and voted their revenue sharing
allocations accordingly.
In all of the cities studied for this paper, a mention of neighborhoods as important social and political
entities was made by one or more city officials interviewed.

Miller spoke strongly about his opposition to

Mayor Uhlman's plan to set up "little city halls" in
Seattle's neighborhoods.

These would be places where

citizens could go and ask questions or complain about
city government.

To Miller this would be just another

level of government that, in fact, might just keep
citizens from coming directly to City Hall when they
sought to petition government.

He could support the con-

cept if the neighborhood offices were places where citizens could go and talk with an advocate who would take
their complaints to City Hall.

Actually, Miller said,

Seattle's neighborhoods are doing quite well without

r
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little city halls, from rich ones to poor ones, in letting
city government know how they, as communities, feel about
issues.

Residents of the Model Cities neighborhoods are

particularly effective and active, he says.
Model cities, more than any other War on Poverty
entity, has done a great deal to politicize citizens.
The ordinary citizen in these neighborhoods is likely to
show up at City Hall hearings.

On the other hand, it is

only those politicos from Office of Economic Opportunity
agencies, rather than clients of those agencies, that come
to hearings.

Said Miller:

"The average citizen (in an

Office of Economic Opportunity program) probably doesn't
even feel Nixon's cutbacks are so bad because he has
never gotten the fruits of the program anyway ••• "23
Rick Painter perceives the situation similarly.

He

indicated that while some Office of Economic Opportunity
programs, especially Head Start, seem to have politicized
previously nonparticipating citizens, the work of Model
Cities has clearly been the most effective in getting
citizens active in community affairs.

Seattle's Model

Cities area has a citizen participation mechanism whereby
the citizens of the area give advice to the formal Model
Cities staff.

Painter says that often the staff will make

23Mi11er, Interview.

r
'i
{'

"

[;,

f

L

174

r

I

changes in their programs due to citizen input. "It is

f

very encouragjngto see Model Cities people, who have nev-
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er before been involved in politics, get involved."

rv1r.

Painter feels strongly that people within the Model Cities
area see the program as useful and responsive to them.
This po1iticization has brought both common citizens and
Model Cities administrators to the revenue sharing public
hearings.
On the whole, however, Painter does not believe
there was adequate citizen participation in the decisionmaking process on General Revenue Sharing.

He feels the

reason was a lack of a mechanism for community involvemente

He indicates that this is a serious shortcoming in

Seattle's policy-making process, not only with respect to
revenue sharing policy, but all policy making that goes on
at City Hall.

The Seattle 2000 Commission, he says, is

working out a participation mechanism for the future; a
systematic way to tap opinions of the population on matters before final decisions by government are made.
not clear as yet what form this mechanism will take.

It is
Mr.

Painter's own Department of Human Resources is also working out a similar mechanism in conjunction with their
Comprehensive Human Resources Plan. 24 Model Cities thus
has a participation mechanism.
24p a1n
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cies of city government talk about such mechanisms, but
none was used in revenue sharing deliberations.
Views of City Officials on Federal Aid to Cities
As we saw early in this paper, federal aid to cities
has been public policy for some time.

We have also seen

that the form of aid can vary, General Revenue Sharing
being a block grant type.

All City Hall officials in-

terviewed had strong opinions on the desirability of federal aid to cities and the form that aid should take.
There was an amazing similarity in their views.

Their

opinions on this subject are very important, of course,
in evaluating the New Federalism philosophy's impact on
the minds and actions of city officials.
Generally speaking, economist Doolittle dislikes
categorical grants and favors block grants to cities from
the federal government.

As the federal government con-

tinues to cut back in categorical grants, as he sees it
doing, an increasingly difficult task for cities will be
deciding which of those categorical programs are worthwhile enough to warrant continued operation by the city.
For example, in his opinion many programs under Model
Cities have been worthwhile, especially the health clinics.
They (the health clinics) have provided a real service to
the community and, if Model Cities finally folds, those
clinics ought to be put under the city/county health
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department.

He feels the city should analyze which cate-

gorical grants have been most effective and place them
under appropriate city departments as their federal funding expires.

He is of the opinion, however, that if the

city is to pick up social service from the federal programs as federal funding expires, they ought to be only
those in areas of responsibility the city has assumed for
some time.

Hopefully, of course, block grants from the

federal government would help the city pick up this burden.
Although some categorical grants have been successful, Doolittle believes that by and large they have been
difficult for the city government to deal with.

"They

take too large a bureaucratic load and expense." He joins
with many others interviewed in all four cities in consternation over the cutting back or elimination of many
categorical grants by the Nixon Administration before
Congress has finally passed Special Revenue Sharing legislation.

He is sympathetic with the idea that eventually

all categorical grants might be replaced with block grants,
but he says the burden is now too heavy on the city to
make possible the funding of federally discontinued categorical grants in the social service area.

The city sim-

ply does not have the money even with the receipt of General Revenue Sharing funds.

Although he feels the total
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elimination of categorical grants might not be a bad idea,
he had no idea Nixon planned on doing so, especially
before Special Revenue Sharing was a reality.

Doolittle

agrees with the philosophy that the federal government is
too highly centralized, but feels it needs an organized
and coherent policy of decentralization; if one type of
aid is to be discontinued, it should only be done when
substitute aid has been established.
Although he favors the concept of block grants,
two other significant problems have developed with respect to revenue sharing in the Seattle experience.
First, the city staff is not prepared to deal with the
funds.

As we saw earlier, Doolittle feels the City

Council was not prepared to make careful decisions on this
wind fall grant.

But he also feels the city bureaucracy

is understaffed to adequately administer these new funds
that take more local discretion in their administration.
Second, the state legislature seems to feel the city is
now quite well off financially with the receipt of General
Revenue Sharing funds and has consequently cut Seattle's
property tax millage by 10% starting in 1975 -- just the
year when Seattle expects its worst deficit problem.

As

we will see, those interviewed in Tacoma are also very
upset over the Washington State legislature's response to
revenue sharing aid going to the cities.

City officials
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are insistent that the revenue sharing aid is far too
small to warrant cutbacks in state aid to cities and
that the legislature's reaction is not responsive to the
fiscal realities of the cities in washington. 25
Councilman Cooley feels that the concept of block
grants such as General Revenue Sharing is very good.
But in terms of current realities it can be seen as a
mixed blessing.

Cooley is proud to point out that Seattle

has gotten very good at grantsmanship.

In 1972, for

example, Seattle received over $82 million in federal
categorical grants while the city's general fund stood
at $72 million.

So while favoring the concept of revenue

sharing, he feels that Seattle is going to receive much
less federal aid from that type of federal grant program.
Cooley maintains that he predicted at the outset that
revenue sharing would be a "rip off" to major central
cities.

He predicted they would get 50 cents on the

dollar with revenue sharing compared to what they got in
categorical grants.

As he sees it, suburbia ("the

President knows where the Republican votes are") is getting a better formula interpretation.

This will es-

pecially manifest itself with Special Revenue Sharing.
For example, in 1972, Seattle received $25 million in urban
25Doolitt1e, Interview.
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improvement grants of various sorts.

As it looks now,

with the Community Development and Better Cities Acts
as part of Special Revenue Sharing, Seattle by fiscal
year 1974 will receive only $12.1 million for these same
types of urban programs as were funded by categorical
grant monies.

His information says this amount should be

reduced by another $5.8 million by 1976.

The city is

supposed to take care of HUD programs, Model Cities,
Open Space and other previous categorical grant programs
with the lesser Special Revenue Sharing allocation.
Seattle, then, will have to deal with many social programs
previously funded with $25 million with only
lion.

$12~1

mil-

The battle between social agencies for these

monies should be fierce, he feels.

Cooley maintains it

is a clear political move by Nixon to solidify suburban
and rural constituencies at the expense of the nonRepublican central cities.

26

As we have seen, Miller and

Cooley often disagree on the revenue sharing question,
but in this case they share some feelings.
Councilman Miller is concerned with the political
reality in Washington, D.C. that seems to have crippled
Nixon's efforts to get his whole New Federalism program
through Congress.

He feels the revenue sharing situation

26Cooley, Interview.
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is confusing now.

Special Revenue Sharing was supposed

to replace cutback categorical grants but they do not
know when or if they will get Special Revenue Sharing.
So, perhaps the General Revenue Sharing funds Seattle has
yet to allocate will have to go for social programs.

He

is in favor of city funding of those programs but essentially those programs were supposed to be funded with
Special Revenue Sharing funds.

He adds, "Watergate has

jeopardized the whole revenue sharing approach."
Although Miller may agree with Cooley that the
revenue sharing situation is not working as it should at
the moment, he clearly believes block grants of this sort
are best for Seattle, if not best for all cities.

He

believes this to be so even if Seattle won't get as much
money from the federal government.

He feels Seattle can

make better decisions than the federal government on how
best to spend funds in local problem areas.
Housing is a good example in the Councilman's
opinion.

There have been a few federal housing programs

in the rehabilitation area.

He feels, though, that the

federal programs were drawn up with eastern cities in
mind, not Seattle with its large number of single family
owner-occupied homes that are aging badly.

The federal

programs were written with the idea of meeting the Harlem
slum problem where people live in very dense multiple
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dwelling accommodations.

Seattle has its own slum area

where about one-half of the people live in single family
dwellings.

In his opinion, the poor Blacks and Chicanos

in Seattle have never wanted to live in multiple dwelling
public housing projects; their relatives live in single
family dwellings so other poor citizens want to live there
too.

The old federal programs were thus out of touch

with the "Seattle mentality."

Categorical housing grants

were too inflexible to deal with Seattle's housing realities.

The advantage of a block grant program like

revenue sharing is that a city can define its own particular problems and then design programs to deal with
them that are locally tailored to deal with the local
problem.

The "reserved" housing rehabilitation program

passed by the City Council is such a program in Miller's
opinion and it would not have been possible without
General Revenue Sharing.
Rick Painter in the Department of Human Resources
sees a real irony in the current revenue sharing block
grant situation that

ot~

interviewed implied.

The

New Federalism in theory says local government is better
able to decide where money should be spent in addressing
their problems than the federal government.
27Miller, Interview.

But cutbacks

182
in categorical grants, with no replacement for the loss
through Special Revenue Sharing, plus inflation and rising
labor costs, mean that local governments may be forced to
put money from General Revenue Sharing into general
services only and also do some shoring up of cutback
federal categorical grants.

This precludes the city from

using the General Revenue Sharing money as "new money"
to be used over and above other federal grants and other
local monies to assess local needs and money spent on
them.

28

III.

SEATTLE:

SUB-CONCLUSIONS

In this section of every case study chapter an
effort will be made to assess the data reported in the
case study in terms of the theoretical framework discussed in Chapter III.

In Chapter VIII we will draw

together the "sub-conclusions" from each case study and
arrive at general conclusions on revenue sharing.
In terms of the philosophy behind the New Federalism,
it is clear that its major goal was to give more power
and responsibility through the allocation of block grant
monies to the "states, localities and the people."
simply too early to reach any real conclusion as to
. t
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whether the City of Seattle and its people have appreciably more "power" as a result of less than two years of
receiving General Revenue Sharing funds.

If power can

be defined as the command over the allocation of resources,
then the fact that the Seattle City Council has exercised
the allocation of revenue sharing funds suggests they
possess an increased measure of power that they would not
have been able to exercise either without the block grant
money or with more restrictive categorical grants.
Certainly the city does have more responsibility than it
would have had under categorical grants in that General
Revenue Sharing allows considerable discretion on the
part of the officials as to where the money should go.
The fact that city officials felt the weight of that
responsibility is reflected in controversies reported
above as to whether the Council was really able to make
such decisions in the time span they used, and in the
controversy surrounding what was done with the funds as
of this writing.

On the basis of the short time frame

in which Seattle has dealt with General Revenue Sharing,
it can be suggested that a small amount of power has been
gained by the city and more new responsibility seems to
be felt by those dealing with the issue in City Hall.

It

is very important to add, however, that whatever new
power the city may have with General Revenue Sharing, it
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seems to have been largely compromised by the fiscal
realities of decreased federal aid in the form of categorical grants and the huge cost of maintaining city
services and labor expenses.

The financial constraints

on the city are so real that whatever "increased 'power"
officials might have felt due to the receipt of General
Revenue Sharing funds was clouded by strict demands on
all their fiscal resources.
The New Federalism also suggests that States and
localities should be able to establish their own priorities and determine the best methods for meeting their
social needs through their use of revenue sharing funds
and this should lead to a more decentralized American
system.

As we have seen, there is considerable contro-

versy among those interviewed in Seattle as to whether
fiscal realities can allow for the establishment of spending priorities in any areas other than traditional city
service and responsibility areas.

A major priority in

Seattle is simply maintaining services through the use of
General Revenue Sharing funds.

Again, this is exacer-

bated by inflation, demands by city employees for higher
wages and federal cutbacks in categorical grants.

In

Seattle, however, a "liberal" majority on the City Council
did exercise their option under the New Federalism and
established in the "reserved" category certain new pro-
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grams that, in their opinion, do meet the priority needs
of Seattle that may be quite different from the needs of
other cities.

Because the amount of revenue sharing money

received so far is relatively small, it is hard to suggest that the work of the City Council has in any way
decentralized the structure of American government.
is true, though, that the

It

housing rehabilitation program

and other parts of the "majority package" were not federal
dictates.

The City Council determined the priority and

spent what it could.

Perhaps that is a step toward de-

centralization of the establishment of priorities to meet
social needs.
In Chapter III, Mr. Richard Nathan, who worked closely with the Nixon Administration on revenue sharing and
the whole concept of the New Federalism, suggested that
part of the decentralization aspect of the New Federalism
was that the states and localities would now be expected
to assume functional responsibility for human and community service programs.

In Seattle, we have found sub-

stantial disagreement as to whether these areas of responsibility justly belong to the city at all.

Some argued

that it was the responsibility of the city to deal in human services far more than it had before, while others
argued that only the most basic and traditional sorts of
city responsibilities should be maintained even with
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revenue sharing.

It seemed clear, however, that federal

cutbacks in categorical grants and the delay in creation
of Special Revenue Sharing were the main reasons the city
could not move boldly into new or relatively unfamiliar
service areas.

Fiscal realities moderated or prohibited

those interviewed from being as expansive in the assumption of human and community programs as they may have
wanted to be.

In truth, of course, the liberal majority

on the Council did get through some programs that were
new in the community development areas, housing rehabilitation being an example.

Councilman Miller, however,

suggested that he would like to have spent much more on
that area and on other programs to make the neighborhoods
more pleasant and keep people in the core of Seattle.
Thus, some of those interviewed saw revenue sharing as an
opportunity for the city to assume responsibilities where
the federal government was viewed as having been negligent in the past.

Again, this applies specifically in

the housing area.
Considering the fact that Special Revenue Sharing
is far from being a reality, it is quite significant that
the Seattle City Council moved as boldly as it did into
assuming new and expanded community service responsibilities with their very limited General Revenue Sharing funds
and the fiscal crisis the city faces.

The ethnic cultural
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centers are a further indication that Seattle is moving
into the area of responsibility for human services, even
though the "reserved" funds there are somewhat modest.
Although some of those interviewed did not believe philosophically, or in terms of fiscal realities, that the
city should move into new human and community service
areas, the majority of the Council did agree with the
functional decentralization aspects of the New Federalism.
Those who believed that it was the proper role of
the city to take up certain social and community programs
were fearful, however, that in this uncertain period,
where many categorical grants in these functional areas
have been cut back and Special Revenue Sharing is not a
reality, many useful programs might get lost in the
shuffle.

Certainly, if the debate allover this nation

is as strong as it is in Seattle, it is certain that many
cities will simply opt not to assume responsibility for
social and community service programs being cut back by
the federal gevernment.

If the guidelines of Special Rev-

enue Sharing are very broad, as it appears they will be,
many federal programs can still be dropped by local government.

In the case of Seattle, however, it appears

that for the time being a majority on the Council see as
a just responsibility of the city a duty to pick up previously funded categorical grant programs that have

188

"worked" and also the responsibility to expand city participation in the social and community service areas.
It must be noted, however, that these programs are only
in the "reserved" category and are not yet final Council
allocations.

The political situation could change be-

tween the time of this study and the time of final allocation.
The New Federalism calls for bringing government
closer to the people.

We have seen, however, that it is

not clear who the New Federalism considers the "people"
to be.

A basic part of each case study is to see who the

people are that are participating in and benefitting from
revenue sharing.

Such an analysis will tell us who the

people are who are gaining from the New Federalism.

In

this case, how has Seattle defined "the people"?
Seattle dealt with its revenue sharing money as a
special block sum.

The decision-making process over dis-

bursement of the funds was exactly like the city's regular budget process.

It is in this decision-making pro-

cess that we may see who the people are that are benefitting from the New Federalism.

In a strict sense, the

decision-making process in Seattle was open.

Those who

knew Seattle had received the funds and who wanted to
make requests to the Office of Management and Budget were
able to do so.

Interest groups could also petition the
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City Council and the Mayor for consideration.

City

Counci1men.could ask their constituents, as could the
Mayor, what they thought the city should do with its
revenue sharing money.

Indeed, the Mayor suggested that

the Seattle 2000 Commission should take as part of its
job the recommendation of priority spending for revenue
sharing funds.

As we have seen, that Commission was

made up of a cross-section of all aspects of the city's
population.

But the Council felt the revenue sharing

job would get in the way of the planning function that
was the Commission's real responsibility.

The Council

did not set up an alternative decision-making mechanism.
Certainly Councilman Miller realized that such a mechanism would have been a good idea and that just holding
three open hearings on revenue sharing was not really
"opening" the process to the people.

When Mr. Doolittle

indicated that such a decision-making mechanism would
complicate things by involving the public in the process,
he was admitting that minimal public participation results from merely holding open hearings on any fiscal
question.

Councilman Cooley acknowledged that budget

hearings are very sparsely attended as a rule, and in the
case of the revenue sharing hearings they were monopolized
by special interests in the social service area who were
threatened with losing their jobs due to federal cut-
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backs in their social service areas.

In other words, it

can be argued that unless a city goes out of its way to
get "John Q. Citizen" to participate in a decision-making
process through creating a special mechanism to include
him, the average citizen may well be left out.

The

elderly and the poor who often feel alienated or neglected
by City Hall anyway, are unlikely or unable to come and
be heard at regular open hearings.

It would take a

special mechanism of inclusion to bring the voices of
these people, and others who feel government is closed to
them, to the decision-making process on any issue including
revenue sharing.

Technically Seattle abided by the

Revenue Sharing Act implication that the regular budget
process could be used in deciding how to allocate
General Revenue Sharing funds.

But if the individual

citizen is to be given the chance to petition the city
regime, it can be suggested that this would only be a
reality if the city went out of its routine way to include average citizens from all aspects of city life, as
Seattle did in the creation of the Commission on Seattle
2000.

Recognizing this, Councilman Miller felt however,

that Seattle was "all participated out" with the Commission and so no such mechanism was established for General
Revenue Sharing.
As we have seen, Seattle has also embarked on the
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establishment of "little City Halls" in the community
neighborhoods.

But these little City Halls have not

been used as devices to solicit the opinions of citizens
on how to distribute revenue sharing funds.

So far they

are only a means whereby neighborhood residents can find
out what sorts of services the city can provide for them
and also register some complaints.

But as Hr. Miller

pointed out, the city staff in these neighborhood offices
are not supposed to bring to City Hall the feelings of
neighborhood residents on issues that bother them.

The

little City Halls are not instruments of communication
from the citizen to the city official in any organized
sense.
The people who actually benefit from revenue sharing
in Seattle will not be clear until final Council action
on the "reserved" and remaining revenue sharing funds.
If those who are to benefit from the reserved monies
actually get these funds, many of Seattle's less fortunate
will be served.

This suggests that the people helped by

revenue sharing may be quite a broad cr.oss-section of
Seattle's population.

But Seattle's decision-making

process was very traditional and in no way fostered the
participation of individuals or groups who were not likely
to participate, i.e. the poor, minorities and aged.

In

this case the people who benefited from revenue sharing
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and the New Federalism were those in city government and
the influential interest groups who regularly help set
city policy priorities.

The Seattle experience tells us

that it is up to the city government to decide who the
people are who will benefit from revenue sharing.

In

Seattle there was no Jeffersonian individualism in evidence.

The collectivities of city government and

traditionally influential interest groups seem to have
been the people most benefited by General Revenue Sharing.
We have seen that a major goal of the New Federalism
is the decentralization of the American System.

This

implies some measure of "independence" of each layer of
the federal system from the other.

In the case of cities

it should mean that they may be strong enough to avoid
being totally dominated by their state and the federal
government.

Although Seattle has been given revenue

sharing funds and the discretion to use them as the local
political system allows, the dominance of the national
government and the State are still clear.

The potential

for added independence and strength to Seattle has been
largely negated by the inability of the Nixon Administration to complete the revenue sharing package and its cutbacks in categorical grants.

These two factors, as we

have seen, substantially limit the latitude of the city's
discretion in spending revenue sharing funds.

Certainly
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Seattle has done some bold things with the money this
year, but all agree this is a "one-time" thing and that
the rest of the General Revenue Sharing funds will have
to be used to balance the budget.

'I;~a

State has also

shown its influence by cutting back its aid to the city
in certain areas because they feel the city is now quite
rich with its revenue sharing funds.

Even with revenue

sharing, the city is still at the mercy of the state, as
it always has been.

Thus, it is difficult to suggest that

revenue sharing has made the City of Seattle very independent vis-a-vis either the federal government or the
State of Washington.

Our federal system divided powers

between the national government and the states.
ies were to be creatures of the states.

The cit-

From looking at

Seattle, revenue sharing seems to have done nothing to
~lter

the power balance in any measurable degree.
What revenue sharing has done, however, is offer a

means whereby those affected by federal cutbacks in categorical grants can seek a replacement for those funds.

In

this sense, revenue sharing has provided a means whereby
a citizen frustrated by the response from one level of
government can appeal to another level, in this case the
city.

We have seen that representatives from Head Start,

Model Cities and other interest groups which see their
federal funds in jeopardy have petitioned the city for
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replacement funds.

Seattle's limited funds may only fur-

ther frustrate the members of these groups, but at least
there now is a level of government to appeal to beyond the
national level.
'de have seen in Seattle that the War on Poverty programs, particularly Model Cities, had an effect in politicizing people who were previously not at all politically
active.

Many of those interviewed pointed out how repre-

sentatives from Model Cities, not only administrators but
neighborhood residents as well, came to City Hall to petition for revenue sharing funds.

It is in this area that

we could say that revenue sharing has afforded a further
development of the participation of groups in government
decision-making.

This did not occur because the city de-

signed mechanisms to make it so, but rather because of the
politicization of citizens caused by previous government
programs.

Revenue sharing has given us an opportunity to

see to what extent the "maximum feasible participation"
programs of the 1960's have caused continuing participation by those they were designed to politicize.

In the

case of Seattle, City Hall officials felt those programs
have had a real effect in politicizing the citizens they
were supposed to politicize.
At this stage it is difficult to assess the degree
to which Seattle will help fund federal programs which

i

i
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have been cut back in the human and community services
areas.

As we have seen, virtually all of those inter-

viewed believed the revenue sharing money yet to be allocated, about $3.2 million, could very well go to tide
over cutback federal programs until Special Revenue Sharing or other sources of funds can support these programs.
It should be noted, however, that the debate was very
strong as to whether the city could afford to support
faltering national programs on its own, even with
revenue sharing funds.
The social programs fought for by national elites
during the 1960's are in trouble in Seattle if the priorities of local interests are represented in City Hall.
To be fair, however, it must be emphasized that the main
reason the city may not take up these programs is the fiscal inability of the city to handle them.

It is true that

some of those interviewed felt social programs like Model
Ci ties and the

~'lar

on Poverty programs are simply not the

responsibility of city governments, no matter how wealthy
they might be, but a majority sympathized with the social
goals of recent national administrations and lamented
their financial inability to do more in the human and community service areas.

A look at the "reserved" revenue

sharing allocation programs gives witness to this fact.
The real test of the commitment of City Hall to the social
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and community programs of the War on Poverty will come
when the city finally allocates the remaining $3.2 million
and finally decides whether and to what extent the "reserved" programs will be funded.

The majority on the

Council is a majority by only one vote and if the minority on the Council can be seen as representing the wishes
of some local elites, those local elites are close to
achieving what they want.
The Seattle study tells us something of whether
there is a national consensus that there should be collective action to solve social problems through public
resources.

It is fair to say that those interviewed be-

lieved there should be collective action in America to
solve social problems but they would differ as to whether
all levels of government should work on all social problem areas or whether the responsibility for social problems should be divided among the various levels of government.

Those interviewed believed something must be

done for the less fortunate and the minorities, but they
did not all feel Seattle should be doing the job.

We may

find in the future that some interests in Seattle are able
to influence City Hall enough to where the city only marginally participates in the social service area.

This

will not necessarily mean that City Hall or major local
interests do not believe in social and community programs

Ir
~

,.
I
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for the poor and minorities.

It may only mean they feel

it is the responsibility of other levels of government to
fund and administer these sorts of programs.

If a nation-

a1 consensus means that officials at all levels must believe it is their duty to chip in and deal with the social
questions of the day as a high priority of city government,
then those interviewed in Seattle, as a whole, would
indicate there is such a national consensus.

E21

But if it

means that the social problems are there and different
levels of government should take some aspect of the problem and deal with it as best they can, then there is a
large consensus in Seattle.
The liberal majority on the Seattle City Council
seems to be striving to maintain a concern for minorities
and the poor that typified the priorities of national
elites in the 1960's.

They would probably go even fur-

ther if they had the money.

A strong minority on the

Council felt that the goals of the War on Poverty and
the Council majority may be valid, but they feel that the
city should not assume a substantial responsibility for
accomplishing them.
Seattle's experience with revenue sharing also addresses itself to the themes of Lowi's The End of Liberal-

!!m.

The question here is whether revenue sharing is the

type of unconditional rebate aimed at those objects for
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which no general rules are practicable or desirable, or
whether it is simply another federal program without established guidelines that further sets back the cause of
planning and justice that has plagued federal programs
for so: long.

The Seattle experience seems to indicate

that revenue sharing may be used for virtually anything.
This means that the money may go for things that would
not require federal guidelines in that they would be wholly inappropriate.

The money may, however, also go for

social, community and civil rights projects that may require guidelines if they are to promote the rule of law
and justice Lowi advocates.

Those interviewed seemed to

believe the city was capable of deciding what to do with
the funds and that it could maintain justice for its citizens and still determine better than the federal government how to spend the money.
There is no question that the Revenue Sharing Act
has few guidelines and is virtually an unconditional rebate.

General Revenue Sharing and Special Revenue Shar-

ing, however, seem to be aimed at more than those objects
for which no general rules are either practicable or desirable.

Administration statements and the opinions of

those interviewed suggest that the entire revenue sharing
package is aimed at allowing states and localities to determine their own policies and priorities in a very wide
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area of policy determination.

We have seen that Mr.

Nathan believes only the human and community service
areas are to be the functional concern of the States and
localities under the New Federalism.

The ambiguity of

these terms suggests a wide range of local policy making,
indeed.

It especially leaves open the possibility that

local government may have great latitude in the civil
rights area without benefit of specific federal guidelines.

The possibility is there, then that revenue

sharing in Seattle and other cities and States could set
back the progress that has been made in the previously
established national priority area of civil rights.

If

the liberal majority stays in a dominant position in
Seattle, it is less likely to happen there.

It does mean,

however, that the continuance of previously established
national prioritY'policies is at the mercy of local
politics under the New Federalism and revenue sharing.
It is possible that after Congress evaluates the revenue
sharing program in four years, it may see the erosion
of certain policies such as civil rights programs and
not renew revenue sharing.

In the meantime, the latitude

given cities under the legislation gives local elites and
other local interest groups a great opportunity to compromise previously established national priority programs.
This is most likely in areas, such as the War on Poverty
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program, where continuance of the program will depend on
localities funding them with their revenue sharing money.
There is no question but that revenue sharing in
Seattle has furthered the process of interest-group
liberalism.

The lack of guidelines in the legislation

(or the broadness of them) allows interest groups of all
types to determine what will be done with the money.
But the purpose of the legislation was to promote just
such local policy making; it was never intended to be a
policy with strict rules and regulations to get the
localities to conform to specific national priorities.
In the case of Seattle, the liberal majority on the City
Council seems to believe the lack of guidelines in the
revenue sharing legislation to be its greatest strength.
You will remember Mr. Miller saying how Seattle's housing
situation was unique and it is best that Seattle decide
how to deal with it.

Yet, many of those interviewed did

fear that some successful programs from the War on Poverty
and Model Cities programs might be lost in the national
shift from categorical grants to block grants.

So,

although there was an appreciation for the broadness of
the revenue sharing guidelines, there was also the fear
that certain national programs might be lost.

CHAPTER

V

GENERAL REVENUE SHARING IN TACOMA
I. CITY FINANCES AND REVENUE SHARING
WHAT TACOMA HAS DONE
As of the 1970 United States census, Tacoma,
Washington, had a population of 154,600. 1

Tacoma is

located about thirty-five miles south of Seattle and is
often over-shadowed by her larger and economically more
prosperous sister city.

Using Tacoma in this study is

occasioned because the city's population is a different
size from the other cities studied.

At about 155,000,

Tacoma stands at about twice the size of Eugene but less
than one-third the size of Seattle.
Unlike Seattle, Tacoma does not find itself in
quite as severe a financial bind.

As a matter of fact,

Mr. William Donaldson, the City Manager, suggests that
if the State Legislature had not cut back funds to the
city and if the Nixon Administration had not severely
cut back categorical grants to the city, Tacoma would
be in a healthy financial situation. But the State Legis1The 1972 World Almanac and Book of Facts,
(New York: Newspaper Enterprise Association, Inc., 1972),
p. 193.
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lature figures the city is well off with its revenue
sharing funds and has cut back its transit allocation
to Tacoma.

Also, many social service agencies are

clamoring for city funds due to federal support drying
up.

These factors, together with high inflation, mean

Tacoma faces the possibility of a budget deficit of $1.5
million this year.

The fiscal picture is further compli-

cated by the fact that as city costs have increased
dramatically in recent years (especially labor costs),
the city is tied to a relatively inflexible tax receipt
base made up of property taxes and business license
taxes.

These two revenue sources have suffered lately,

as well, due to the recent economic recession in the
Seattle-Tacoma area.

The Manager reports that although

revenue has gone up about 10% in recent years, costs have
gone up about 14%.

Before the city knew how the State

legislature and the Federal Administration were going to
ultimately deal with the revenue issue, it appeared that
General Revenue Sharing and Special Revenue Sharing would
be the financial lift the city needed.
Tacoma has dealt with its General Revenue Sharing
funds as a separate package.

This was the case wib'l

both the 1972 and 1973-4 General Revenue Sharing funds.
The money was not automatically included in the city's
general fund budget and allocated as just another munic-
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ipal revenue would be.
Tacoma received a total of $3.3 million in General
Revenue Sharing funds in 1972.

The city allocated $1.4

million of that sum in late 1972 and combined the remainder with its 1973 allocation.

The $1.4 million was

looked at by city officials as essential money to carry
out important city functions on an emergency basis. 2
The Federal Projects Team, made up of the City Manager
and City Department heads, came up with a list of
policies and priorities on how to spend the money.

They

suggested that all the money go for capital expenditures
and projects, such as equipment rental, local improvement of neighborhoods and the improvement of interdepartmental communication systems that were felt to be very
outdated.

These projects were suggested to the City

Council for funding with the revenue sharing money and
the Council approved.

The public was not involved in

the decision-making process concerning the disbursement
of these funds.
For the 1973-4 fiscal year, Tacoma had $5.7 million
in General Revenue Sharing funds to allocate.

$3.8

million of this money was the city's 1973 General Revenue
2Interview with Stearns Wood, Assistant Program
Management Systems Director, Tacoma Planning Office,
Tacoma, Washington, 25 July 1973.
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Sharing allocation from the federal government.

$1.9

million was carried over from the 1972 allotment from
the federal government.

Although Tacoma developed quite

an elaborate decision-making process for deciding how to
allocate the bulk of its revenue sharing money, this
process was not used in deciding how to allocate a large
portion of its 1972 funds and $477,000 of its 1973 funds.
Before that process could be established, the Mayor, his
administrative staff, and the Council decided there was
a great need for the funding of certain programs on a high
priority emergency basis.

The $477,000 went primarily

for summer youth employment and recreational programs.
Summer jobs for 400 youths were created in one program.
Some of the money went to .repair considerable damage
to city property resulting from a recent storm.

Another

large sum went for the creation of a Department of Human
Development that would administer and oversee social
programs under Special Revenue Sharing. 3
The Revenue Sharing Evaluation Process
Although sizeable amounts of Tacoma's 1972 and 1973
General Revenue Sharing funds were allocated without open
public hearings, and consequently not in accord with the
3Interview with Gordon Johnston, Mayor of Tacoma,
Washington, 25 July 1973.
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city's regular budget process, by far the greatest amount
of revenue sharing money received by the city was allocated by a process that went beyond its regular budget
process in terms of citizen involvement.

The series of

events that led to the development of Tacoma's "evaluation process" for revenue sharing started in the summer
of 1972.

At that time the City Manager and the current

Director of the Program Management System decided that
Tacoma needed a new over-all city program for management
and budget procedures.

They also felt an evaluation and

monitoring procedure for city programs should be devised.
To get funds to develop such a system, Tacoma applied
for a $106,000 Community Renewal Program grant from the
federal Department of Housing and Urban Development.
Tacoma received the grant and began to develop a Program
Management System.

Soon thereafter General Revenue

Sharing came along and it was decided that an important
part of the decision-making process for evaluating what
should be done with General Revenue Sharing funds would
come under the new Program Management System.

The City

Manager asked the Program Management System group to
develop some type of means to evaluate all the programs
that were to come in asking for General Revenue Sharing
funds.

The Program Management System then contracted a

consultant firm to make recommendations as to a process

F"
I
1
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for evaluating revenue sharing project proposals.
On January 15, 1973 the consultant submitted a
report to the Program Management System group.

This

report was very significant in guiding the group in the
drawing up of the final evaluation process.

As time went

on, those interviewed suggested, the community and city
government became more and more enthusiastic about this
evaluation process.

There was also considerable national

attention paid to the Tacoma effort.

And, by July, 1973,

a Policy Advisory Team was set up to see if a similar
technique could be worked out for evaluating the whole
city budget in the future.
The Program Management System staff has printed a
booklet entitled "An Evaluation Process for the Selection
of General Revenue Sharing Programs.!'

It tells the com-

plete story of Tacoma's evaluation process for General
Revenue Sharing.

At one point in the booklet a general

overview of the evaluation, selection and monitoring
process is given.

It is:

In an effort to fairly and equitably judge pro-.
gram proposals, a systematic evaluation process
has been developed. Very generally, the process
acts like this:
1. The information on the application is
reviewed by a Technical Evaluation Team utilizing
a formal set of evaluation criteria in accordance
with City Council policies. A numerical rating
of each proposal will result.
2. A Management Team will review the ratings
and rankings and develop a recommended 'package'
of programs to the City Manager. Individual
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program funding levels will be included as a
part of this package.
3. Subject to adjustments by the City Manager,
the program recommendations will be submitted to
the City Council for their action. All proposals,
regardless of whether or not they are a part of
the recommended package, will be submitted to the
City Council.
In addition to se1ecting.programs for revenue
sharing funds, the City must hold itself responsible for monitoring the efforts of the
operational programs. This monitoring effort
includes a continuing awareness of the status
of the program as it relates to achievement of
objectives, compliance with work schedules, and
fiscal management. While the City will assume
a general or overall responsibility for monitoring and evaluating all operational programs,
the funded agencies must provide similar effort 4
to keep track of and control their own programs.
Because the Tacoma evaluation process is unique
among the cities studied in this paper and perhaps
unique in the nation, some further discussion of the
details of the evaluation process would be valuable.
A great many details, however, need not be included in
the text of this case study.

Therefore, in Appendix A,

there are a number of important explanatory documents
which accurately detail the evaluation process. S A
segment from the booklet describing the "Composition and
Responsibilities of Principle Functioning Units" in the
4Staff of the Program Management System, Tacoma,
Washington, "An Evaluation Process for the Selection
of General Revenue Sharing Programs," Tacoma, Washington, July, 1973, p. 3.
SSpecifica11y, the reader should refer to "Details
of Evaluation Process for Revenue Sharing Proposals,"
in Appendix A.
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evaluation process and a chart from the booklet entitled
"General Revenue Sharing Evaluation Process," are presented on the following pages as they help explain the
basics of the evaluation process.
The Tacoma City Council passed certain "Revenue
Sharing Policies" that were to aid those involved in the
evaluation process.

They are as follows:

1. Policy: Emphasize the importance of nonrecurring programs or expenditures in view of
the presently established expiration date for
the Revenue Sharing Program, and in recognition
of the long term or permanent encumbrances
associated with recurring programs.
2. Policy: Recognize the value of expanding
or improving already existing programs where
such programs are recognized and accepted as
necessary and effective.
3. Policy: Strive to select programs which
will result in maximum benefits from the investment dollar.
4. Policy: Maintain a concern for citizen
desires and opinions by selecting programs with
which a maximum number of persons can identify
and support.
S. Policy: Consider programs which increase
the level of operational efficiency of Tacoma
government through improved management techniques,
job skills and material.
6. Policy: Expand the capabilities of the
general fund for future program opportunities
by meeting commitments to outstanding loans and
encumbrances.
7. Policy: Realize the importance of providing for new services and programs of recognized
need or demonstrated value.
8. Policy: Recognize that a fair and objective
evaluation of all programs will aid the Council
in making equitable decisions regarding potential
programs and will enhance support of such decisions
by participating agencies and the general public.
9. Policy: In recognition of the concern for
social and economic problems, strive to provide
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1.

Technical Evaluation Team a. Composition:
15 community representatives and
15 city department staff members. The community
representatives are appointed by the Mayor. City
staff members are appointed by their respective
department heads.
b. Responsibilities: Review, evaluate and rate program and. project proposals and make recommendations.

2.

Technical Evaluation Team Executive Committee a. Composition: Two city staff members and three
community representatives selected by the technical
evaluation team.
b. Responsibilities: Serve with PMS staff to prepare
recommended budget package for submission to program management team.

3.

Program Management Team a. Composition: Department Directors.
b. Responsibilities: Review PMS staff and technical
evaluation team executive committee recommendations.
Revise as required and submit to City Manager.

4.

City Manager a. Composition: Not applicable.
b. Responsibilities: Review ranked program and project proposals and recommendations and modify if
appropriate. Make recommendations and submit as budget package to the City Council for final action.

5.

City Council a. Composition: Not applicable.
b. Responsibilities: Review ranked programs and project proposals and recommendations and make final
decisions regarding revenue sharing program funding.

6.

Program Management System Staff a. Composition: City staff under the Director of Program Management System reporting to City Manager.
b. Responsibilities: Review and summarize incoming
project proposals. Prepare information packets for
evaluation process. Summarize ratings with the assistance of the technical evaluation executive committee and prepare budget package for program management team review. Perform other duties as required.

Figure 2. Assignment of Responsibilities for Revenue
Sharing. SOURCE: Stearns Wood, Program Management System,
Tacoma, Washington, 1973.
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for a cross-section of citizen needs through a
mixture of p~ysical, social and economic programs.
10. Policy: Provide for a contingency fund
in recognition of emergency needs and future
desirable programs, as well as for encumbrances
resulting from possigle changes in State and
Federal legislation.
Policy statements one through seven are used by the
Technical Evaluation Team.

Each of these statements has

been assigned a weighted value in terms of their relative
importance to each other, and are thusly used by the
Technical Evaluation Team in the numerical ranking process
of evaluating project proposals for the use of revenue
sharing money.

The booklet further explains that policy

statements eight through ten do not apply to specific
programs and are used to provide a general overview for
all programs.
Also in Appendix A is a "General Revenue Sharing
Program Proposal Evaluation

For~."

This is the form used

by the Technical Evaluation Team in the evaluation and
rating of programs and project proposals.

It can be seen

by examining the document that the "Revenue Sharing Policies" just outlined are on the right hand side of the
form.

On the left hand side are certain "Program Eval-

uation Criteria".

These, too were adopted by the City

Council to aid those doing the evaluating.

The reader

6System Staff, "Evaluation Process", pp. 13-16.

·
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is invited to review these statements in Appendix A, as
they give a further dimension to the thoroughness of the
Tacoma evaluation process as well as an indication of its
complexity.
Also included in Appendix A is a document indicating the "Scoring Process for Revenue Sharing Proposal
Evaluation."

This document gives a further explanation

of the numerical weighting aspect of the evaluation process.
Although we will discuss the point more fully later
in the chapter, it is important to note that the Technical
Evaluation Team was made up of fifteen Tacoma community
representatives and fifteen city department members.

The

Mayor appointed the fifteen community representatives and
was very careful that they were representative of the
city in terms of socioeconomic status, occupation, race,
ethnic group, sex and other such criteria.

Another docu-

ment in Appendix A is entitled "Technical Team Evaluation
Process Scores by Individual Program for Revenue Sharing."
This document is the final compilation of program proposals and the ratings and rankings given them by the
Technical Evaluation Team.

Numbers one through fifteen

at the top of the chart are the fifteen community representatives and numbers sixteen through thirty are the
city department staff members.
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The result of Tacoma's elaborate evaluation process is the Appendix A item entitled, "Revenue Sharing
Entitlement Period 3 and 4, Program Management Team, Recommended Budget, June 15, 1973".

As you can see, the

programs were finally ranked from one to sixty-three.
Before this final document was drawn up it was clear to
the Technical Evaluation Team Executive Committee that
all sixty-three programs could not be funded at the suggested funding level within the existing General Revenue
funds.

The Executive Committee went through all the

program proposals again and looked for (1) program duplications, (2) what they considered to be non-budgetary
requests, and (3) legal problems.

They went over the

original applications and talked to applicants as well.
They finally made three recommendations to the Program
Management Team and later, in process, to the City Council.
The Program Management Team could choose one of these
recommendations as a means of deciding how many and which
of the evaluated and ranked programs could be funded with
General Revenue Sharing monies.

The Technical Evaluation

Team Executive Council suggested:
(1) Taking and funding programs until they run
out, about through program number 40.
(2) Making cuts and adjustments in the first
40 programs based on the above three points and
take the extra approximately $600,000 and use it
so the overall list of programs funded would
more correctly match the Council's earlier guideline that they equally distribute funds among

214
physical, social and economic priorities. The
original ranking showed that the first 40 programs were mainly physical and economic and only
a few social programs. Also, funding 50 rather
than 40 programs is thus possible and is suggested.
(3) Going with the first 40 programs as ranked,
reviewed and revised, and give the extra $600,000
that has been developed to the Department of Human Development and let th,m decide which social
programs are to be funded.
The Program Management Team carefully evaluated
these recommendations and decided to adopt number three.
They also decided that some money should be left in reserve in case the State does not come through with needed
funds for the City next year.

Their final recommendation

is embodied in the Revenue Sharing Entitlement Period
3 and 4 document referred to above which is located in
Appendix A.
In September of 1973 this final document was presented to the Tacoma City Council.
ed the document "generally."

The Council accept-

That is, they accepted

the evaluation and ranking "process" but decided they
would fund the programs one at a time on a "first ready"
basis.

According to Stearns Wood,

Assistant Program

Management Systems Director, this means that the programs
that are in the first fifty ranks will be funded as soon
as they are taken under the umbrella of a city department
and their program is finally drawn up in accord with the
7

Wood, Interview.

~

.
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guidelines of that department (environmental impact
studies and so forth).

The program will then go to the

Program Management Team, to the City Manager, and finally
to the City Council for final approval.

In essence, the

Council decided to reserve the right to adjust the rankings and funding levels of programs as i t saw fit.

8

Ex-

act1y what this says about Tacoma's evaluation process
is difficult to assess until the Council is finished passing judgment.

It is clear, however, that the first fifty

programs are in the order they are in because of the input
of a wide range of citizens as well as city staff personne1.

Tacoma did include its citizens in the revenue shar-

ing decision-making process, going out of its way to deve10p a special mechanism for this purpose.

No matter

what the Council finally decides, their range of choices
and alternatives has been determined by that mechanism.
II.

THE POLITICS OF REVENUE SHARING IN TACOMA:
HOW CITY OFFICIALS VIEW REVENUE SHARING

As with each case study, we will now examine how
city officials interpret the original intention of federal revenue sharing, how they feel about what their city
has done with its revenue sharing funds, what their feelings are about they city's revenue sharing decision-making
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process, and how they view the entire question of federal aid to cities.

At the end of this, and each case

study chapter, certain preliminary conclusions will be
offered on that city's revenue sharing experience and
how it addresses itself to the goals and fears raised
by the New Federalism outlined in Chapter Ill.
Views of City Officials on the Original Intention
of Federal Revenue Sharing
Those interviewed in Tacoma generally agree that the
intention of General Revenue Sharing was that the funds
were to be used by the city as "new money."

The new money

was to go for programs and services the city could not
previously afford to fund, but which city officials felt
needed to be provided.
Regina Glenn is Manpower Planning Director in
Tacoma's Mayor's Office.

She has spent a great deal of

time studying the effect of revenue sharing on manpower
programs already established by various levels of government.

She has been particularly active in drawing up

Tacoma's evaluation process.

She feels that General Rev-

enue Sharing funds offer an opportunity for Tacoma to do
some new things, but she agrees with city staff and City
Council recommendations that funds should not go for recurring expenses.

The difficulty is, however, that recent

cutbacks in federal social service programs have made her
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and others in Tacoma government feel that General Revenue
Sharing funds might have to go to shore up those cutback
programs.

She reads the guidelines of the Act as suggest-

ing that some General Revenue Sharing funds should go for
a "maintenance of efforts" which can be interpreted to
mean that the federal government wants the cities to pick
up programs it is cutting back as they wait for Special
Revenue Sharing.

Mrs. Glenn argues that this may be nec-

essary but that it would certainly get in the way of the
city being able to do much "new" with the funds.

Mrs.

Glenn feels that General Revenue Sharing funds should
not go for property tax relief.

If the revenue sharing

program is dropped in a few years, the taxpayers would
have their property taxes upped again and, of course,
they would not like it.

She believes that if the city is

to spend the money mainly on programs of its own design
or many previously established federal programs that have
been cut off, there should be a balance of spending on
physical, economic and social programs. 9
Mrs. Glenn's sentiments on the intention of revenue sharing are largely reflected by Stearns Wood,
Assistant Director of the Office of Management and Budget in Tacoma.

Mr. Wood is at the heart of the Program

9Interview with Regina Glenn, Manpower Planning
Director, Office of the Mayor, Tacoma, Washington,
24 July 1973.
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Management System and as such has worked for some time
on the whole revenue sharing issue for the city.

He

felt strongly that Tacoma had no preconceived notions
about what should be done with its revenue sharing money,
but hoped it could be used to benefit areas of city concern previously financially neglected.

City officials

did not want the money to go for recurring expenses or
into the budget's general fund.

On the other hand, Wood

agreed with others interviewed that Tacoma did not want
to become too dependent upon General Revenue Sharing
funds, either.

The innovative programs were to be such

that they would not put too much drain on city funds if
revenue sharing should stop.
Unlike Mrs. Glenn, who felt the Revenue Sharing Act
implied a justified and even expected use of General
Revenue Sharing funds was to pick up cutback federal
programs, Mr. Wood suggested that it was the purpose of
Special Revenue Sharing to fund those cutback categorical
grant programs, not General Revenue Sharing funds.

The

intense pressure being put on the city to spend General
Revenue Sharing funds on cutback federal programs is
really an encroachment on the "freedom" to use General
Revenue Sharing funds as new city money for new

progra~s.

Tacoma's evaluation process, however, allows for any
program supported by any interested individual or group
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to apply for General Revenue Sharing funds and to be
evaluated by the criteria and persons described in the
first part of this chapter.

Mr. Wood was careful to point

out that although the intent of General Revenue Sharing
was, in his opinion, to be new money for the city and not
to be a substitute for reduced federal funds, Tacoma's
evaluation process allows those evaluating and ultimately
the City Council to decide where the money should go.

He

points out further that many previously funded categorical
grant programs are in the top half of the rankings resulting from the evaluation process.

IO

This sense of city

responsibility for social services was widespread among
those interviewed.

Mayor Gordon Johnson agreed with Mr.

Wood that even if General Revenue Sharing was not intended
as substitute money for cutback federal social programs,
if the programs are dOing some good in the city, they
should be funded from whatever sources of funds the city
can find - including General Revenue Sharing funds.
Mayor Johnson was quite outspoken in his criticism
of federal cutbacks in Office of Economic Opportunity
and Model Cities programs.

He feels that American society

has too long been negligent in aiding the less fortunate
in a way that might substantially change their lives, and
he particularly resents having to use General Revenue
IOwoOd, Interview.
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Sharing money as replacement money for the cutback federal
programs.

The Mayor clearly believed those programs were

not to be cut back until Special Revenue Sharing was enacted.

He feels, however, that the city has a definite

responsibility to go beyond its traditional services into
the social service field, and if General Revenue Sharing
funds have to be used for this purpose, then he believes
it is justified.

He originally saw General Revenue Shar-

ing as new money that "was not intended to be substitute
money for anything."ll
The Tacoma City Manager would largely agree with his
colleagues but he had a slightly different slant on why
the original intention of General Revenue Sharing would
not be realized in Tacoma and elsewhere, also.

William

Donaldson is the Tacoma City Manager and he, too, believes
General Revenue Sharing was supposed to be new money for
the city to deal with problems it could not afford to
deal with before.

From his administrative point of view,

he blames "politics" for getting in the way of his city
perhaps not being able to do with revenue sharing what was
intended.

"Two things," he argues, "beyond Tacoma's con-

trol have gotten in the way."
islature's attitude.

'l'he first is the State Leg-

The State Legislature seems to feel

the city is well off financially now that it has General
IlJohnson, Interview.
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Revenue Sharing funds.

He points out that the legislature

has cut in half its subsidy to the city's transit system
(about $475,000).

They have also changed the reassess-

ment of property valuation that severely cuts back city
revenue from the property tax.

He further points out

that the legislature has changed the firemen's and policemen's pension situation to where they want the city to pay
the unfunded liability of $400 million.

"Now, when in-

flation is worst, the legislature is renigging on some of
its aid.

This is exactly what is not supposed to happen

in the use of General Revenue Sharing funds."

Donaldson

says that this situation means that Tacoma now faces a
budget deficit of about $1.5 million and an easy way to
balance the budget would be with General Revenue Sharinq
funds, "but Tacoma is not doing this."

Like the others

interviewed, the City Hanager wants to use the money, if
at all possible, for non-traditional budget expenses or
to take up the slack from state and federal aid cutbacks.
Secondly, Mr. Donaldson blames the Nixon Administration.

"With Watergate and the shape of the economy, the

Nixon Administration is in so much trouble now that alot
of people are forgetting now that General Revenue Sharing
is just part of a total program." Part One of the program
is going great guns, that is, cutting out all the categorical grants.

"The 'cut off' part is working but the
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'come on' part is not." For example, look at Special Revenue Sharing.

"General Revenue Sharing is caught in the

middle and it puts the city in the bind of being pushed
to use General Revenue Sharing for the purposes for which
categorical grants and Special Revenue Sharing were intended.,,12
Although it is important to know what city officials
in Tacoma interpret the original intention of General Revenue Sharing to be, it is necessary to emphasize that
those officials created an evaluation mechanism for deciding where the General Revenue Sharing money should go that
was mainly guided by the City Council statement that there
should be a balance between economic, physical and social
programs funded.

This guideline and the whole evaluation

process imply that the money can go for virtually anything
put high in the ranks by the evaluation process.

The eval-

uation process itself seems to conform most to Mrs. Glenn's
opinion that General Revenue Sharing funds should go for
new programs but money can also go for maintaining cutback federal programs.

Such an expenditure would clear-

ly be within the guidelines of the Act itself and is not
the abrogation of the Act that so many of those interviewed suggested.

Of course, Mrs. Glenn was reacting to

l2Interview with William Donaldson, Tacoma City
Manager, Tacoma, Washington, 25 July 1973.
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the letter of the Act while those who felt differently
seemed to be reacting to its spirit.
Views of City Officials on How Tacoma Allocated
Its General Revenue Sharing Funds
As we have seen, the City Council has not made any
final decisions on which of the fifty top-ranked programs
it will fund.

The Council has said it will fund the first

fifty programs on a "first ready" basis.

All of those

interviewed agreed that the Council guideline of a mix
between social, economic and physical programs was a good
mix and they assumed the final appropriations would be so
mixed.

It was further assumed that the Department of Hu-

man Resources would make "ready" its decisions to the
Council on which of the social programs ranked should be
funded to bring the social programs into equivalency with
the economic and physical programs.
As we have seen, some revenue sharing money was a1located before the evaluation process was put into effect.
Those interviewed said that the money needed to be allocated as it was and they felt the amount going for creation of the Department of Human Development was an especially useful expenditure.

Mrs Glenn states that "that

project would not have been possible with adequate staff
without revenue sharing funds.,,13
13

Glenn, Interview.

The City Manager said
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the Department was created in order to prepare the city
for the administration of Special Revenue Sharing, which
they thought would be fast arriving.

The hope was not to

let the city get trapped the way Model Cities did by
giving money "to the guy who yelled the most."

The city

also wanted to make sure it did a better job of administering social programs than did the Community Action Program.

At this stage, the Department is evaluating social

service programs going on in the city to see which should
be funded with Special Revenue Sharing funds and administered by the city.

While Mr. Donaldson did not feel

General Revenue Sharing funds should go for support of
cutback federal programs unless absolutely necessary, he
does feel the creation of this department was a worthwhile use of General Revenue Sharing funds.
As we have seen, Mr. Donaldson did not want to use
General Revenue Sharing money for balancing Tacoma's budget, but he worried that a fiscal emergency might arise
and General Revenue Sharing funds might be so needed.

He

therefore hoped the City Council would adopt a priority
system in terms of the ranked

p~ograms

instead of speci-

fically funding any program in case the city finds it
needs General Revenue Sharing to balance the budget.
This would only mean the city would not be able to provide
funding as far down the list of rankings as it might

r
~,
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otherwise want to do.

As of September, 1973, the City

Manager was saying the city faced a deficit of from
$1.7 to $2.7 million and he wanted the Council to start
thinking about using revenue sharing funds to deal with
it.

stearns Wood, however, reported at the end of

September that the Council has not decided to use revenue sharing funds to balance the budget and will fund
the top fifty ranked programs on the "first ready" basis
explained earlier.
Views of City Officials on the Tacoma Revenue
Sharing Decision-Making Process
Those interviewed in Tacoma were very proud of the
decision-making process used in their city for the allocation of revenue sharing funds.

They felt confident that

the guidelines of the Revenue Sharing Act and of the City
Council were broad enough that those engaged in the program evaluation process could use considerable discretion
in deciding how Tacoma should use the federal aid.

Mr.

Donaldson, the City Manager, mentioned that in a recent
meeting he had with Mr. Graham Watt, Director of the Office of Revenue Sharing, United States Department of the
Treasury, Watt said he felt Tacoma's evaluation process
was a very good idea and that it was the only one of its
type in the United States, to his knowledge.
Mayor Johnston felt the evaluation process was cer-
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tainly the most sophisticated in the State.

He goes

along with others interviewed in considering himself the
prime mover behind development of.the citizen participation scheme.

The Mayor explains that he had a previous

experience with citizen participation in local decisionmaking with the Manpower Area Planning Council funded
through the United States Department of Labor.

In this

experience, he noted how capable citizens on the Council
were in making hard decisions and confronting special
interests.

He therefore became confident of the ability

of ordinary citizens and decided they should play a significant role in the revenue sharing decision-making process.

He is careful to point out that those participating

were not local politicos, but average citizens who had
not previously spent much, if any, time in politics or
government.

For example, he said he called the Superin-

tendent of the Tacoma Public Schools and asked for a recommendation on who could serve on the evaluation team
and the Superintendent recommended a vice principal of a
local high school.

The Mayor did a similar thing in seek-

ing a representative from among the city's private
schools.

He also called the Central Labor Council and

they suggested a local barber, which pleased the Mayor,
because he felt persons in that profession had a feeling
for what was on the people's minds.

He called around, in
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other words, and got persons from many walks of life in
the city.14

As it turned out, the citizen component in

the evaluation process came from all geographical areas
of the city, from various age groups, races, occupations,
both sexes and different income groups.

There was a

Chicano, an Indian and a Black from the citizen group,
along with three people in the city staff group who were
minorities.

Mrs. Glenn, herself black, said she felt

there was "an adequate minority representation" in the
evaluation process.

She said this in light of the fact

that about six percent of Tacoma's population is minority:5
In the opinions of those interviewed, the openness of the
system is further evidenced by the fact that any individual, organization or group could present a program to the
evaluation team for consideration for revenue sharing
funding.
The Mayor was particularly interested in the fact
that, although social programs were in the minority in
the top forty rankings, the citizen component in the evaluation process did rank social programs higher than economic and physical programs fairly consistently.

To the

Mayor this meant that the city staff may not have a feeling for what the people of Tacoma really want.
14Johnston, Interview.
lSGlenn, Interview.

In order
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to see to it that the citizens in the evaluation process
truly represent the wishes of the city's citizens,
Johnston believes the citizen component in the evaluation
process should change every year.

He believes this is

also a good idea because " ••• over time a large number of
people will have become involved in the decision-making
process and will have sympathy with the complexities and
efforts of city government."

Tacoma, then, intends on

using this or a similar citizen involvement evaluation
for the allocation of each year's revenue sharing money.
This will apply to Special Revenue Sharing as well. l6
Both Mayor Johnston and Regina Glenn believed that
the War on Poverty programs of the Johnson Administration and the Hodel Cities program have had considerable
effect in politicizing Tacoma's citizens, particularly
the disadvantaged and the minorities.

Mrs. Glenn points

out, however, that Community Action Program representa-'
tives were deliberately excluded from representation on
the Technical 5valuation Team because they are already
very active on their Community Action Program boards and
they are heard at all levels of city government so much
already.

She re-emphasized the Mayor's wish that the cit-

izen component in the evaluation process be average citizens and not representatives from any special interest.
16JOhnston, Interview.
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She further pointed out, however, that Community Action
Program representatives have been at all the Council
hearings on revenue sharing and, of course, they made program suggestions for the dispursement of revenue sharing
funds to be considered by the Technical Evaluation Team
and finally by the City Council.

A member of the Board

of Trustees of the local Community Action Program organization herself, Mrs. Glenn feels that "CAP clients may
be better off if CAP's stay quiet because, although they
have been proponents for their clients, they have been
poor administrators;

~odel

Cities, too.

Actually,

~

spite of CAP's, they city is using some of its money and
General Revenue Sharing funds for social services."l?
She goes on to say that many of the social programs proposed for funding in the evaluation process were proposed
by other than Office of Economic Opportunity or Model
Cities groups and that neither of these programs had anything to do with setting up the evaluation process. "It
was the Mayor's initiative that did it.
the turmoil of OEO.

He did not want

He wanted citizens to participate and

develop specific programs.,,18
The Mayor added that another reason he did not feel
it appropriate for Office of Economic Opportunity reprel?Glenn, Interview.
18 Ibid •

L
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sentatives to sit on the Technical Evaluation Team is
that many of their programs go outside city limits and
there is virtually no communication between Tacoma and
Pierce County on social service matters:"(The) city has
consistent trouble with the county because the Commissioners are very conservative and only inteLested in legislation that will increase their power and not so interested in people's welfare and new social programs."l9
It is clear that those interviewed in Tacoma were
very enthusiastic about the evaluation process that was
developed for revenue sharing.

Mrs. Glenn points out

that the Revenue Sharing Act itself only requires the
city's regular budget process be used for the allocation
of revenue sharing funds, but Tacoma went beyond and this
has now caused the city and many of its citizens to want
to modify Tacoma's regular budget process.

Mrs. Glenn

is now Chairman of a team that is reviewing the whole
budget process of the city with a notion to use the General Revenue Sharing decision-making process, or something like it, in regular budget process in the future.
The main point, she feels, is that there ought to be a
citizen component in the budget process that goes beyond
the open hearing process.

As of now, the City Manager and

the department heads review the department budgets and
19Johnston, Interview.
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approve or disapprove those budgets and present that
package to the City Council.

However, because of the

impact of the General Revenue Sharing evaluation process,
the citizens have asked why they cannot participate in
the whole budget process, rather than just revenue sharing.

So the General Revenue Sharing evaluation process

has had great impact on the overall decision-making process for the city's budget.
cess Review Committee,

As Head of the Budget Pro-

Mrs. Glenn is recommending to

the City Council the following:
(1) That fifteen citizens be chosen from the community at large by geographical area, occupation,
education, civil organization, social service delivery agencies, industry, and citizens at large,
to serve on the budget review staff.
(2) That they should rotate with and be equal
to the number of department directors sitting in
review of the city's budget plus the finance director; e.g. three department directors, three
citizens plus the finance director. Thus, seven
people would look at each department budget and
make final recommendations to the City Council.
(3) That Citizens are to be appointed by the
Mayor and Council according to the above criteria.
Also, the 2btizen component should be changed
each year.
As of this writing, this proposal is still under discussion by the City Council, and Mrs. Glenn expects a proposal exactly like, or similar to, the Budget Process Review Committee's to be adopted.
Although those interviewed were enthusiastic about
20Glenn, Interview.
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the revenue sharing evaluation process, they did not think
it perfect.

Stearns Wood was careful to point out that

the Council could abolish the entire mechanism if it wanted to, but he thought that unlikely.

He did feel, however,

that some modifications of the process were likely for
next year, that is, for the revenue sharing deliberations
whether for General Revenue Sharing or Special Revenue
Sharing.

For example, he feels some changes are needed

in the evaluation form itself because some questions
asked of the evaluation team required the expertise of a
budget specialist which the citizens were not.

Also, for

those applying for revenue sharing funds, he feels that
perhaps there should have been a pre-application seminar
to clear up legal difficulties that might arise in some
applications~

The seminar would be helpful in aiding ap-

plicants on how to fill out their application correctly,
too.
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Views of City Officials on Federal Aid to Cities
In terms of federal aid to cities generally, those
interviewed in Tacoma were enthusiastic about block grants.
The primary categorical grant that Mayor Johnston cited
as beneficial to Tacoma in recent years was Model Cities:
"(I)t is tragic that Nixon cut back this program before it
really had a chance to get going."
2l wood , Interview.

Whether Model Cities
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is a block grant or a categorical grant is open to interpretation, with most federal aid experts feeling it is a
block grant.

The Mayor is correct, however, in suggest-

ing that Model Cities is a more directed form of federal
aid than the sum of General Revenue Sharing.

Johnston

feels that categorical grants, as a whole, are drawn up
to satisfy the needs of big eastern cities and not cities
like Tacoma with different needs.
their flexibility are better.

Thus, block grants and

The Mayor feels that with

categorical grants the city has to deal with "rip-off
artists" but with block grants like General Revenue Sharing that allow for the creation of a broad-based citizen
group along with city staff doing the evaluation of programs, "you have the people making decisions ••• with such
a process it means that one element of the city is not
deciding all.,,22
City Manager Donaldson agrees that the needs of one
city are often not the needs of another and that the flexibility of block grants is good.

He would even take less

federal aid in order to get the discretion of a block
grant like General Revenue Sharing.

He adds that although

some cities are probably more able than others to deal
with block grants, he feels Tacoma is very able to handle
the responsibility.

He sees no danger to civil rights or

22Johnston, Interview.

~-.
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other "well-established" national programs by giving discretion to the cities that General Revenue Sharing gives.
Donaldson did fear two potential eventualities, however.
First, he fears that the Nixon Administration will continue to develop·
suburbs.

formula interpretations that will favor

He fears the President may come to use revenue

sharing as a political tool to shore up Republican
strength in those areas.

A.lready, he feels, as former

City Manager of Scottsdale, Arizona, that suburban communities have money from General Revenue Sharing "coming
out their ears."

Secondly, he fears that too many cities

may use the General Revenue Sharing funds unwisely, inefficiently, or illegally.
doom the program.

If they do, it will certainly

23

Mrs. Glenn echoed the City Manager's opinion on
this matter and added that although block grants may not
be best for all cities, they should continue to those
"that have shown a real ability and success with them.
Politics may not work that way, but ideally the federal
government should give to those who prove they know how to
deal with it.

As in any business, you should receive ac-

cording to your performance.,,24 Mrs. Glenn shared with the
others interviewed the consensus that Tacoma has done a
23Donaldson, Interview.
24Glenn, Interview.

I
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particularly outstanding job with its General Revenue
Sharing responsibilities.
III.

TACOMA: SUB-CONCLUSIONS

The New Federalism stated that "power, funds and
responsibility" would flow from Washington, D.C., to the
"states, localities and the people."

In the case of

Tacoma, there is no question but that money and responsibility have come to the city with General Revenue Sharing.
As time goes on, the amount of money may be less than the
city has received in categorical grants, but as we saw,
some city officials still prefer the added responsibility.
Tacoma has taken the responsibility very seriously and
has developed an elaborate evaluation process for deciding
how to distribute its General Revenue Sharing funds.

Of

all the cities examined in this study, it is the author's
opinion that Tacoma has gone the farthest in recognizing
the added responsibility of the General Revenue Sharing
block grant and has planned thoughtfully for how to deal
with it for the maximum benefit of the entire community.
But does the city have more power?

Again, if we

define power as the command over the allocation of resources (money as a fundamental resource), then Tacoma
has power in the sense it has the "new" General Revenue
Sharing money and can decide, by whatever means it wants
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pursuant at least to regular budget processes, how to allocate that money.

But, as we saw in Seattle, that power

is compromised by increased fiscal demands from inflation,
rising labor costs, state aid cutbacks and the cutbacks in
federal categorical grants.

Therefore, the "net gain in

power" may be quite small.
The New Federalism also suggests that American government will become more decentralized as cities start developing their own priorities and start determining the
best methods for meeting their social needs.

The Tacoma

City Council guidelines of the State and Local Fiscal
Assistance Act of 1972 leave wide discretion to the Tacoma
evaluation process to do just that.

The Council wanted

the final rankings to include equal numbers of social,
economic and physical programs and it appears the Council
will remain true to its own guideline in its final approvals.

But the extent to which the city can really set

its own priorities and meet its social needs, even if it
has taken the responsibility of stating them, depends ultimately on the funds available.

Tacoma's total

General

Revenue Sharing funds are not large and, again, what can
be done with them is largely determined by the factors
mentioned above that are beyond the city's control.

But

Tacoma seems to welcome the opportunity to establish its
priorities and its social needs.

Those in authority only
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wish they had more money, especially Special Revenue Sharing, and fewer "outside" restrictions that compromise the
"liberating" -effect of General Revenue Sharing.
It should be remembered that Mr. Nathan of the
Nixon Administration specifically suggested that human
service programs and community service programs were to
be local responsibilities as part of the "sorting out"
process in the decentralization aspect of the New Federalism.

The Tacoma City Council seems to recognize this

responsibility in its guidelines to the Technical Evaluation Team calling for the balance in social, economic
and physical programs.

It is only implied here, however.

Those interviewed clearly believed that the funds for the
bulk of human and community programs are to come from
Special Revenue Sharing.

The city does, however, seem to

accept the responsibility for funding such programs on a
temporary basis with General Revenue Sharing money until
Special Revenue Sharing or some other federal or state
funds become available.
Tacoma seems to be taking special precautions to
see to it that certain responsibilities for citizens,
assumed by various levels of government, are not lost in
the shuffle as we move from categorical grants to a reliance on block grants.

As we have seen, those interviewed

feel that worthwhile federal programs should be maintained
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by the city if the federal government will no longer
fund them.

But which programs are worthwhile?

To be

sure, this has become a local responsibility with all
the accompanying hazards.

In the case of Tacoma, however,

a serious effort has been made to set up a Department of
Human Development to evaluate federal categorical programs in the social services area to see which should
be funded and to what extent under Special Revenue Sharing.

Without Special Revenue Sharing, or an alternate

source of funds, many programs would certainly be lost
in the shuffle because the city could simply not afford
to fund them no matter how committed its officials might
be to the liberal goals of national elites.
Has General Revenue Sharing brought government
closer to people in Tacoma?

In any political system,

"the few" ultimately decide and "the many" make what
input they can.

Tacoma went out of its way to augment

the regular input devices (open hearings, lobbying,
elected representatives in the City Council) to bring
the city's decision-making process on revenue sharing
closer to the people.

The City Council will ultimately

decide what is to be done with the city's General Revenue
Sharing funds', but the fifteen "John

Q.

Public" citizens,

deliberately chosen because they were not political activists, have had an impact on the ranking of programs
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the Council has decided to choose from in making its
final decisions.

As suggested in other places in this

study, if a governmental unit does not go out of its
way to include citizens in its decision-making processes,
many citizens will be left out because they are apathetic,
alienated, or unable to participate for various reasons.
The Tacoma decision-making process with respect to
revenue sharing was "open" in more than the traditional
input sense.
There was an important element of Jeffersonian
individualism in the Tacoma experience.

"The people"

who benefitted in Tacoma from General Revenue Sharing
were individuals who participated in the evaluation process.

The city government as a collectivity and various

interest groups also participated, of course, but to a
far greater extent than any other city studied, Tacoma
went a long way toward bringing government closer to the
people as individual citizens.

It is particularly signi-

ficant that these individuals were representative of a
broad cross section of the community.

Tacoma, therefore,

has defined "the people" as both individuals and groups
of individuals that participated in, and benefitted from
General Revenue Sharing.
A goal of the New Federalism is that various levels
of government should have responsibility for certain
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governmental functions.

As we have seen, those inter-

viewed in Tacoma, and the results of their revenue
sharing process so far, indicate that the city is willing
to take over human and community service responsibilities.
However, to really do so, the city needs more money.
This means that the responsibilities will never be the
city's alone, because it will always be dependent upon
federal funding to do the job.

By setting up its

Department of Human Development, however, Tacoma sees
its administrative and evaluative responsibilities in
that area, but acknowledges its financial dependence on
the federal government to do a meaningful job of providing services.
There was no indication in the Tacoma study that
City Officials feel the city will gain a measure of
strength from revenue sharing through the New Federalism
to where it could develop any real independence from
either State or Federal governments.

As we have seen

the "power" gained by the money and added responsibili.:..
ties of revenue sharing are partly, even largely,
negated by other fiscal and political realities.

The

amount of money so far is also too small to give the
city the "independence."

Revenue sharing or no, the city

is still the legal creature of the state and the state
retains many options that can negate any possible challenge
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the city may render to the power of the state.

As we

have seen in the case of Tacoma, part of the reason it
feels so little new power from its revenue sharing money
is the possible need to have to use those monies to shore
up programs the State Legislature has cut from Tacoma
thinking the city was now '!fat" with revenue sharing
money.
There is considerable evidence that Tacoma citizens
are using both the traditional input mechanisms and the
new evaluation process to gain revenue sharing funding
at the city level because of the frustration they now
find from federal cutbacks in categorical grants.

As

we have seen, the citizen component in the evaluation
process ranked social programs high in terms of priority
for revenue sharing funds.

It can be assumed that they

were certainly aware of federal cutbacks in categorical
programs if only because of the programs submitted to
them in those categories by social agencies for evaluation.,
Those interviewed repeatedly pointed out how politicized
many citizens had become due to War on Poverty and Model
Cities programs and indicated officials from those programs submitted program proposals for evaluation and
attended open hearings on revenue sharing.
Those interviewed in Tacoma were unanimous in saying the revenue sharing evaluation process was set up
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using nonpolitical activist citizens as half the Technical
Evaluation Team in a deliberate effort to avoid the influence of local elites in that aspect of the decisionmaking process.

Mayor Johnston was particularly cogni-

zant of the need to get average citizens to serve on the
Team.

He genuinely wanted the average man's input.

Cer-

tainly local power interests will have their chance to
influence final revenue sharing decisions by whatever influence they exercise over the City Council, but in terms
of national priorities versus local priorities, Tacoma
went out of its way to see that the influence of local
power interests can be balanced by the input of average
"representative" citizens.

\ve have seen that those in

City Hall are willing to use General Revenue Sharing
funds to support War on Poverty and r'lodel Cities programs
although all do not agree this was the intention of General Revenue Sharing.

They also felt the support should

be temporary until other funds for social and community
programs arrived for the city.

It does not sound as if

Tacoma is abandoning national priorities as they manifested themselves in the late 1960's in categorical grants
for the poor and minorities.

This conclusion may be a

bit premature, however, because

a1tho~gh

the City Council

has called for social programs to be funded at the same
level as economic and physical programs, we must wait
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and see which programs the Council ultimately does fund
to reach any final conclusions.
Another national priority in recent years has been
trying to politicize the poor and the minorities into
permanent activist groups.

In Tacoma, we have seen that

Office of Economic Opportunity and Model Cities groups
are active in the revenue sharing decision-making process and the Tacoma evaluation process seems a further
commitment to the national elite goal of political inclusion of the disadvantaged.
The guidelines established by the Tacoma City
Council seem an effort to maintain a governmental responsibility for worthwhile programs no matter what level
of government might once have sponsored the program.

The

establishment of a Department of Human Development seems
to say the city recognizes collective action to solve
social problems is part of the responsibility of government in America today.

The need to solve social problems

through public resources has been a goal of government
for many years, as explained and examined in Chapter III.
There is no indication that local power interests in
Tacoma are trying to subvert that national goal.

Again,

final Council action is needed to verify that statement,
but at this point the opinions and actions of City Hall
officials support it.

The thing that seems to be holding
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back Tacoma from further collective action to help its
disadvantaged citizens is not a lack of commitment, but
a lack of funds.

It should be noted, however, that in the

programs now ranked one through fifty, the programs in the
"bottom twenty-five" are those most related to social services.

It is still up to the Department of Human Develop-

ment to suggest to the Council more of the lower ranked
social programs for higher ranking and thus funding.
Tacoma city officials interpret the guidelines to
General Revenue Sharing as very broad.

Mrs. Glenn even

felt the Revenue Sharing Act provided that General Revenue
Sharing Funds could be used, and even should be used, to
continue federal programs that might be cut back.

There

was no indication that those interviewed felt General
Revenue Sharing needed more guidelines to preserve what
progress had been made in this country for the poor and
disadvantaged.

They did not feel the cause of civil

rights was jeopardized by giving block grants with few
guidelines to the city to allocate.

As was the case in

Seattle, city officials seem to feel those in power in
their city CQuld not use the new federal money to set
back what progress has been made in civil rights and related areas.

It is true, however, that interest .. group

liberalism was not weakened in Tacoma with the arrival of
General Revenue Sharing.

Interest groups lobbied the city
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bureaucracy, the Mayor's Office and the City Council for
part of the General Revenue Sharing pie.

The city, how-

ever, took the special precaution of establishing the
evaluation process that was intended to make sure special
interests did not dominate the decision-making process
and that the "little man" was heard.

It is interesting

that the elaborate guidelines discussed in the early part
of this chapter which were established by the City Council
to direct the Technical Evaluation Team were intended to
give a measure of planning and purpose to the use of the
General Revenue Sharing funds.

Lowi's fear that block

grants and categorical grants tend to encumber the causes
of planning and justice in this country because of the
interplay of interest groups and government after legislation has been passed may have been dealt with in Tpcoma
because of the direction the City Council has given, after
the federal legislation was passed, to the use of General
Revenue Sharing money.
Lowi points to the "autonomous city" and suggests
it is a further handicap to achieving the rule of law in
America because it is a decentralization of the political
system beyond the original federal structure.

On the face

of it, General-Revenue Sharing monies going to Tacoma
would seem to strengthen its "autonomy", but as we have
seen, there are many factors, fiscal and political, that
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take away substantially from that autonomy.

Yet whatever

measure of increased power and discretion is given the
city through revenue sharing is a further decentralization of the American political system and the Tacoma experience does not suggest that city has not been somewhat
"strengthened" by the new funds.

As would be expected,

those interviewed felt the city, more than the state or
federal governments, best knew how to handle urban problems and did not see decentralization as a handicap to
achieving justice in America.

Tacoma city officials seem

to recognize the political encumbrances to solving problems but mainly see financial limitations as keeping them
from getting the job done.

CHAPTER VI
GENERAL REVENUE SHARING IN PORTLAND
I.

CITY FINANCES AND REVENUE SHARING
WHAT PORTLAND HAS DONE

Portland, Oregon, is the largest urban center in
the State of Oregon.

As of the 1970 U.S. census, the pop-

ulation of Portland was 380,620 persons. l

Unlike Seattle,

which is a city dominated by one major industry, Portland
is considered to be a center of diversified commercial
and industrial enterprises.

The city has witnessed an

unemployment rate of about six percent in recent years
due to a regional recession affecting the Pacific Northwest, but it is predicted that that rate should soon return to the three and one-half to four and one-half percent rate that is average for Portland. 2
General Revenue Sharing funds have been handled
differently in Portland than in the other cities contained in this study.

Portland has taken its General

Revenue Sharing funds and included them in the city's
IThe 1972 World Almanac and Book of Facts,
(New York: Newspaper Enterprise Association, Inc., 1972),
p. 193.
2"The City of Portland, Oregon, 1973-74, Approved
Budget", 16 May 1973, p. 119.

248
General Fund.

Because of this, in order to understand the

general fiscal situation in Portland and the role played
by General Revenue Sharing, it would be useful to examine
the resources and expenditures for the City of Portland's
General Fund for 1973-74, which is contained on the following page in Table V.
General Revenue Sharing, therefore, accounts for
12.3 percent of the total resources for Portland's General Fund for 1973-4.

While not an extremely large amount

of revenue, those interviewed in the city along with the
Budget itself indicate that General Revenue Sharing has
been an important factor both in the fiscal and policy
making activities of the city this year.
The story of General Revenue Sharing in Portland
starts in 1972 when the City Council became aware of the
need to prepare for the arrival of revenue sharing funds.
The Council asked the Office of Management Services to
survey the city bureaus soliciting what each felt its
needs might be for revenue sharing funds.

Those requests

were then to be considered for funding either through the
Accelerated Supplemental General Revenue Sharing Budget
of Fiscal Year 1972-73 or through the City of Portland
Budget of Fiscal Year 1973-74 where General Revenue Sharing funds are to be considered as part of the General
Fund.

.. ,::t
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TABLE V
SUMMARY OF TOTAL GENERAL FUND
RESOURCES AND EXPENDITURES
PORTLAND, OREGON
1973-74
Summary of Total Resources for the General Fund:
Beginning Cash Balance
Revenues (taxes, fees, etc.)
Transfers from Federal Grants
Transfers from Revenue Sharing a
Transfers from Revenue Funds
Transfers from Operating Funds

$

Total General Fund Resources

$ 79,179,377

3,131,979
45,427,104
10,885,028
9,769,000
6,927,054
3.039,212

Summary of Total Expenditures for the General Fund:
Police
Fire
Parks
Streets, Sidewalks, Structures,
Sewer Maintenance
Traffic Maintenance
Streets, Sidewalks, Structures,
Construction
Building Safety
Human Resources
Administrative, Legislative and
General Transport SerBices
Transfer to Other Funds
b
General Operating Contingencies
Other

$ 15,500,000

Total General Fund Expenditures
and Requirements

$

12,900,000
7,400,000
7,000,000
2,500,000
6,400,000
1,600,000
1,300,000
17,200,000
227,243
7,140,000
12.134
79,179,377

SOURCE: "The City of Portland, Oregon, 1973-74,
Approved Budget," 16 May 1973, pp. 122 and 124-5.
aRevenue Sharing Funds account for 12.3 percent
of General Fund revenues.
bThe Portland City Budget Classifies these items
as "requirements" rather than "expenditures" for the
General Fund.
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Near the end of 1972, the bureau requests were submitted to the Office of Management Services and they prepared for the City Council a document entitled "Revenue
Sharing Summary, December 1, 1972."

In the report, the

Office of Management Services tried to acquaint the
Council with the probable effect of revenue sharing on
the normal operations of the city and its probable impact
on further fiscal allocations by the city.

Also, they

suggested the Council develop a strategy for the allocation of revenue sharing funds over time.

Pursuant to

this, the Office made certain alternative strategy suggestions.
The report included the requests by bureaus for
revenue sharing funds.

These were classified as being

mainly for capital expenditures and deferred maintenance
projects.

A number of requests were classified as con-

tinuing programs.
In the section of the report entitled "Summary and
Recommendations", the Office of Management Services set
forth their guidelines and alternative strategies by
which the Council could identify how best to deal with
General Revenue Sharing funds.

Specifically, they rec-

ommended that the Council consider:
Integrating revenue sharing funds within the
normal budgetary process to the fullest extent
possible.
Distributing the revenue sharing funds over
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a seven year time period.
Providing for the expenditure of revenue sharing funds on an increasing schedule of payments,
rather than according to the manner in which
they are received.
Investing the check received in December (1972)
for the remainder of the 1972-3 fiscal year.
This would generate over $100,000 in additional
funds to be appli~d at a later date for revenue
sharing purposes.
The Office of Management Services went into many
reasons why they thought the Council should adopt their
recommendations.

They pointed out that the Revenue Shar-

ing Act gave full responsibility to the city to deal with
revenue sharing funds with few guidelines.

Specifically,

revenue sharing funds are to be treated as any other
source of general fund revenues, i.e. "any project or
program which is an ordinary and necessary expenditure"
can be funded with revenue sharing funds.

The Office

thus recommended that revenue sharing funds be integrated
with the normal budget process keeping in mind that they
must be accounted for separately.

In early 1973, the

Portland City Council adopted this recommendation.
The Office of Management Services felt the Council
should spread the revenue sharing funds over a seven year
period and spend the money on an increasing schedule of
payments "rather than according to the manner in which
3"Revenue Sharing Summary, December 1, 1972",
Office of Management Services, Harold Johnson, Management Service Director, Portland, Oregon, pp. 1-2.
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they are received," largely because Portland is undergoing at this time "some very critical changes" in its
bUdget process and adoption of all the recommendations
would foster the development of these new budget procedures.

The report explained the Office of Management Ser-

vices position by stating:
In general, we eventually hope to be able to
divide services and activities into broad program
areas. Having allocated needs within this program structure, goal statements can be developed
which explain what is to be accomplished. Goal
statements are accompanied by objective statements which explain how a given goal is to be accomplished. Planning and implementation become a
continuous process, one providing feedback for
the other. The most critical stages to be concerned with in this decision-making process are
identifying needs, converting them into goal
statements, determining expenditure lev~ls, and
finally prioritizing the list of goals.
The report goes on to explain that the Office is
just beginning to move into such a program and dealing
with revenue sharing funds in conjunction with the regular budget process will reinforce their efforts.
Office was certain that if the Council treated

The
General

Revenue Sharing funds as windfall funds and did not integrate both the money and the decision-making process
for allocating it into this new program of budgeting, the
5
new "fiscal management system" would be compromised.
4 Ibid ., p. 5.
5 Ibid ., p. 6.

253
The report goes on to suggest how important revenue
sharing monies are to Portland in the 1972-73 fiscal year
and how important those funds will continue to be.

It is

pointed out that the property tax is the basic source of
general revenue for the city.

That source of revenue is

not expected to expand any more in the future than in the
past and with increasing expenditures the significance of
revenue sharing becomes obvious.

"Revenue sharing will

now become the second leading source of funds among 'general revenues'.

In 1972-73 alone, it will increase rev-

enues to a new level of nearly $62 million.

Revenue shar-

ing will represent twenty percent of this total, the property tax forty percent.,,6
Although revenue sharing will continue to be an important source of city revenue as long as the program
lasts, the Office of Management Services report points out
that revenue sharing funds will decline in Portland during the five year period of the program.

"This is because

revenue sharing is on a calendar year basis and our budgeting falls within fiscal years."

So the largest payment

will be in the first "year" (eighteen month period from
January, 1972, to July, 1973) and the smallest payment
will be in the last year.
6 Ibid ., p. 8.

The report continues:
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Because of the declining payment schedule, the
revenue sharing funds take on less importance relative to the rest of the general funds over time.
By 1975-76, the $10.3 million of revenue sharing
will represent only 15.8% of all general revenues.
This is based on projections of the other revenue
elemen;s of the general fund at various growth
rates.
The Office of Management Services predicts that between 1972 and 1980 general revenues for the city will
reach a peak in fiscal year 1976.

By 1977 revenues

should drop about 3.8 percent or $3 million.

In 1978,

the first full year without revenue sharing, the drop
is expected to be another $2 million.

To cushion the

reduction in city revenue, the Office suggests drawing
the revenue sharing funds out over a seven year period.
Such an accomodation is not forbidden by the Act.

The

report further suggests:
To account for annual rises in costs and the
increase in demand for future services and goods,
it would be advantageous to expend general revenue sharing funds on an increasing scale. This
would better enable revenue sharing funds to become part of the normal budget process, allowing them to grow in like manner with other gen- .
8
eral revenues •••
In a short time, after considering this report from
the Office of Management Services, the Portland City Coun7Ibid ., p. 8. This 15.8% fig~re would probably be
reduced considerably by the Office of Management Services
at this time because as of the 1973-74 budget General
Revenue Sharing accounted for only 12.3% of general fund
revenues, as we have seen.
8Ibide, p •. 14. See "Revised Expenditure for Revenue Sharing" in Appendix B.
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cil adopted all of those recommendations regarding revenue sharing.

The Council decided to expand the fourth

recommendation regaring the investment of the 1972-73
check and to invest all federal revenue sharing checks
that had come to Portland as of September, 1973.

It is

expected that will earn the city from five to seven hundred thousand dollars per year in interest. 91
With respect to the bureau requests submitted to
the Office of Kanagement 3ervices for revenue sharing
funds, the Office decided the projects were not complete
enough; they contained "insufficient information."

It

appears the requests were sent back to the bureaus and
were asked to be resubmitted for consideration for funding under a later supplemental or regular budget.

It was

assumed, of course, that the resubmitted projects would
be thought out in terms of Office of Management Services
recommendations and adopted City Council guidelines (which
are one and the same).
Early in 1973, the City of Portland saw the need
for a supplemental budget to the Annual Budget of the
City of Portland which began July 1, 1972.

City Ordin-

ance Number 136302 authorized the supplemental budget
saying:
9Interview with Mike Kaeil, Office of Management
Services, Portland, Oregon, 5 September 1973.
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Inasmuch as this Ordinance is necessary for the
immediate preservation of the public health, peace
and safety of the City of Portland in this: That
it is necessary to proceed with the projects and
services set forth in Supplement No. 1 to the
1972-73 Budget without undue delay; therefore, an
emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this
Ordinance shall be in full force and iofect from
and after its passage by the Council.
Because an "emergency" situation was found to exist,
Portland did not hold public hearings or use other aspects of its developing new budget process in allocating
these funds.

The bureaus were asked to submit requests

for the funds on the basis of their most urgent needs.
By April, 1973, the Supplemental Budget had been submitted to the State Tax Supervision and Conservation Commission and after their approval adopted by the City Council
and signed by the Mayor.

While the funds were actually

waiting to be spent, they were invested to gain interest
for the city.
The Supplemental Budget used $2,379,105 of General
Revenue Sharing funds then held by the city.

By the end

of the 1972-73 fiscal year, $1,769,000 of this General
Revenue Sharing money was not spent and was thus reallocated to supplement the 1973-74 General Revenue Sharing
funds and consequently included in the city's General
Fund for that fiscal year.

The Supplemental Budget rev-

100rdinance No. 136302, City of Portland, Oregon,
signed by Mayor Neil Goldschmidt, 4 April 1973, p. 5.
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enue sharing funds were allocated as follows:
TABLE VI
PORTLAND REVENUE SHARING ALLOCATIONS
1972-3
$
Bureau of City Engineer (services reimburse)
15,871
Bureau of Maintenance (reimburse)
94,822
Bureau of Fire (reimburse)
661,000
Bureau of Parks (reimburse)
860,782
Bureau of Communications & Electronics (reimb.)
110,364
Bureau of Building Maintenance (reimburse)
53,000
Office of Commissioner of Public Utilities
19,559
Non-Departmental (reimburse)
10,839
200,000
General Operating Contingencies
TOTAL REVENUE SHARING FUND ALLOCATIONS
$ 2,379,105

SOURCE: Ordinance No. 136302, City of Portland,
Oregon, April 4, 1973, p. 5.
For the fiscal year 1973-4 Portland had $9,769,000
in General Revenue Sharing funds.

$8 million was in "new"

revenue sharing money from the federal government, and
$1,769,000 was General Revenue Sharing money rebudgeted
from the 1972-3 allocation.

ll

Pursuant to the advice of

the Office of Management Services which was now City Council policy, these General Revenue Sharing funds were incorporated into Portland's General Fund in the amount and
proportion suggested at the beginning of this chapter.
Consequently, the decision-making process with regard to
the allocation of these funds was the regular city budget process for the fiscal year 1973-4.

The actual de-

lineation of funded General Revenue Sharing projects and
the final approval by the Council of that delineation,
llCity of Portland, "Approved Budget," 1973-4.
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however, were in addition to the regular budget process,
as we shall see.
The first stage of the Portland budget process is
the Office of Management Services asking the city bureaus
to develop their own budgets for the 1973-74 fiscal year.
They were asked to take into

consider~tion

the guidelines

established earlier with respect to the use of General
Revenue Sharing funds.
In working out their 1973-74 fiscal needs, five of
Portland's bureaus worked with a task force assigned to
each bureau.

Citizens made up these task

forces.~They

were appointed by the Office of Management Services and
the Mayor's Office.

There were usually two or three citi-

zens on each task force.

Their job was to help develop

goals and objectives for those bureaus.

Their role is to

be expanded next year as Portland further develops its
neighborhood concept that is to evolve into more representation from neighborhoods into City Hall.

Several of

those interviewed in Portland commented on the neighborhood concept and how revenue sharing relates to it.

The

next section of this chapter will look at that in some
detail.
After the bureaus, with their task forces, develop
budgets they submit them to the Office of Management Services for review.

Analysts there review the bureau bud-
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gets and make recommendations and send this information
to the Budget Review Hearing Committee.
The Budget

Rev~ew

Hearing Committee is made up of

two citizens (a housewife and a worker for the Port of
Portland), the Management Services Director, a member of
the Mayqr's staff, and the Commissioner's assistant responsible for the budget under review at a particular
time.

Open hearings are held while this Committee exam-

ines each budget request.

At one time or another all

Commissioner's assistants attend to make the case for
their bureau to the Committee.
After these hearings, the budgets go back to the
Office of Management Services, where its analysts make
adjustments when necessary.

At this stage, the Office is

working closely with the Office of the Mayor to try to
develop a balanced budget.

After the Mayor has had time

to look over the city budget developed so far, it is sent
to the City Council for approval.

This year, the Mayor

and the Office of Management Services suggested that $3
million be set aside in municipal funds as a mid-year contingency fund.

It was suggested that all bureaus will

have a chance to vie for the funds at mid-fiscal year on
the basis of performance in terms of efficiency and effectiveness in the use of regularly budgeted funds.

As we

will see, those interviewed felt the contingency fund
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might have to be used, however, for programs cut back by
the state and federal governments.

Exactly what will be

done with the money will not be known until the Council
decides on its allocation, of course.

At this stage of

approving the 1973-74 City Budget, however, the Council
did agree to establish the contingency fund.
Before the Council could give final approval to it,
however, it had to hold public hearings.

Representatives

from many social service groups attended these hearings
and asked the city to fund their programs because the
federal government was either ending its support, cutting
it back, or would end it soon.
Also, before the Council could give final approval
to the budget, i t had to submit it to the State Tax Supervision and Conservation Commission for approval.
Commission approved the budget.

The

The budget was then

ap~

proved by the City Council and signed by Mayor Goldschmidt.
Before revenue sharing, the Portland budget process
would end at this stage.

However, two additional steps

were taken for the 1973-74 budget process because revenue
sharing funds were included in the general fund.

The Rev-

enue Sharing Act requires that programs and their funding
levels where revenue sharing is used must be specifically
identified for auditing purposes and to see to it that the
Act's guidelines are followed.

Therefore, because of

261

Portland's procedure of not dealing with revenue sharing
funds separately but instead incorporating them into the
city's general fund, it became necessary after setting up
and approving the budget to go back through those programs approved by the Council and delineate those that
will now be considered funded with General Revenue Sharing monies.

The Department of Finance and Administration

of the Office of Management Services drew up a document
indicating those programs Portland will now consider
funded with General Revenue Sharing funds.

They were

careful to try and balance the programs between capital
and social programs.

This document, specifying revenue

sharing funded programs and their funding levels is entitled "Revenue Sharing Allocations" and is in Appendix B
to this paper.

A representative from the Office of Man-

agement Services talked with representativesof the Revenue
Sharing Office of the United States Treasury about the
Portland procedure for dealing with revenue sharing funds
and they felt the procedure not to be in violation of any
T reasury gU1'd e l'1nes. 12

The "Revenue Sharing Allocations" document was submitted to the City Council for approval and was approved
by the Council.

They also stipulated that $1,893,700 of

General Revenue Sharing funds will
l2Kaeil, Interview.

contribu~e

to the
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$3 million the Council would budget after the mid-year
review in January.
Portland dealt with General Revenue Sharing in a
very different manner from the other cities studied in
this paper.

As we shall see in the following section,

those interviewed in City Hall all agreed it was the best
process for Portland.
II. THE POLITICS OF REVENUE SHARING IN PORTLAND
HOW CITY OFFICIALS VIEW REVENUE SHARING
Portland's experience with General Revenue Sharing
is given fuller meaning through an examination of how
city officials feel about the original intention of federal revenue sharing, how they feel about what their city
has done with its revenue sharing funds, what their feelings are about the city's revenue sharing decision-making
process, and how they view the entire question of federal
aid to cities.

At the end of this chapter, the Portland

experience with General Revenue Sharing will be briefly
analyzed in terms of the goals and ideas of the New
Federalism outlined in Chapter III.
Views of City Officials on the Original Intention
of Federal Revenue Sharing
City officials interviewed in Portland feel that the
original intention of revenue sharing was to give funds
to the states and localities to reduce their fiscal bur-
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den.

Mike Kaeil, of the Office of Management Services,

points out that local governments do not have the kind of
elasticity in their revenues that the federal government
has and therefore the federal government is a better
collector.

ta~

He points out that Portland is in a "tight"

financial situation at the moment and that revenue sharing
dollars have enabled the city to fund some traditional
city services like the Park Department and the Fire Department that have long been in need of additional funds
for essentials.

He further points out, however, that

revenue sharing has been real "opportunity" money for
Portland, also.
certain projects.

It has "freed up" money to be used for
Altho~gh

it will not be found in the

"Revenue Sharing Allocations" sheet in Appendix B to this
paper, revenue sharing money is responsible for Portland
getting its neighborhood concept off the ground.

The ac-

tual money came from"'other general fund sources, but it
was available only because revenue sharing financed other
programs to make the neighborhood project money available.
Kaeil explains that Portland's current fiscal situation is
such that without revenue sharing it would even be difficult to balance the budget and retain current service
levels and current city staff: "Without the total receipt
of revenue sharing funds we wouldn't have had any money
available for any new programs or services, period."
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There is probably no one in Portland who has worked
more closely on revenue sharing than Mike Kaeil.

There-

fore, it is significant that he should feel that revenue
sharing should not go for tax relief purposes.

He won-

ders if using it for such purposes is even within the
guidelines of the Act.

"And besides," he adds, "it would

win no friends for revenue sharing."

Mr. Kaeil's position

differs from many of those interviewed in other cities,
particularly Mr. Doolittle in Seattle.

It may be remem-

bered that Doolittle not only thought that tax relief was
within the guidelines of the Revenue Sharing Act, but that
it would be the best use of funds for Seattle.

He is

Seattle's revenue sharing expert.
In his position at the Office of Management Services, Kaeil felt it was important that revenue sharing
funds not be used for recurring expenses and that the
money mainly go for capital expenses.

Remembering, how-

ever, that revenue sharing has not been allocated as a
separate package, Kaeil believes that the $3 million left
from the budget for mid-year allocation, some of which is
revenue sharing money, could justifiably go for social
projects, such as cutback federal programs. l3
Making up for cutback federal categorical grants is
an unfortunate use of General Revenue Sharing funds in
l3Kaeil, Interview.
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the opinion of Bill Scott, assistant to Portland's
Mayor Goldschmidt.

He too sees the original intention

of revenue sharing money as being funds for the city
to use to meet needs ignored or underfunded before due
to lack of money from other city sources.

Scott

suggested, "the threat of now having to use General
Revenue Sharing funds for replacement money for discontinued categorical grants is in flat contradiction to
the promise of the Administration."

Scott said that the

Nixon Administration got cities to support the Act in
the first place through the National League of Cities
and the U.S. Congress of Mayors by indicating this money
was not going to be substitute money for presently
running categorical grants.
Mr. Scott also sees the revenue sharing funds as
being opportunity dollars for Portland.

He does not see

it as enough money to solve all of the city's problems,
of course, but as need money to get some new things going.
Significantly, Scott feels the receipt of these federal
funds may have postponed the need for a city income tax
in Portland.

What is unfortunate, he adds, is that the

money may be eaten up by the need to use parts of it as
substitute money for cutback federal categorical grants.
Also, if inflation continues at the current rate, and the
size of revenue sharing money does not dramatically in-
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crease, the money will all be "eaten up" by the end of
·
th e f 1ve
year program. 14

A somewhat different opinion about the intent of
General Revenue Sharing was offered by Frank Ivancie,
City Commissioner.

Mr. Ivancie is of the firm opinion

that·"revenue sharing funds should go for capital items
long neglected in the city.

He does not really see as

justified spending the money for creating "new layers
of bureaucracy" such as the neighborhood development
concept.

Ivancie is responsible for city parks and the

Fire Department and it is understandable that he feels
the neglected needs of these departments should be
attended to now that money is available.

He quotes the

guidelines of the Act where it says the General Revenue
Sharing funds should go for the "necessary and ordinary
expenditures of government."

To him this does not in-

clude funding programs that belong as the responsibility
of other units of government.

In this vein he points

to Day Care Centers which he feels should be funded by
the State as they are not a city responsibility.15
l4Interview with Bill Scott, Assistant to the Mayor
of Portland, Oregon, Portland, Oregon, 16 July 1973.
l5Interview with Frank Ivancie, City Commissioner,
Portland, Oregon, 17 July 1973.
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Views of City Officials on How Portland Allocated Its
General Revenue Sharing Funds
Those interviewed in Portland could not really
comment on how General Revenue Sharing funds were ultimately allocated because revenue sharing money was pooled
with other city revenues and made part of the General
Fund.

Therefore, City Officials commented on the pro-

grams revenue sharing money supported indirectly.

That

is, these new federal funds freed up General Fund money
to develop new city programs.

They also commented on

whether the city should have dealt with revenue sharing
in the way it did.
Bill Scott joins all others interviewed in feeling
there was really no better way for the city to deal with
General Revenue Sharing monies than to integrate them into
the General Fund.

He said that then the money would not

be treated by the City Council as "mad money."

Scott

emphasized that the revenue sharing money allowed Portland
to try to fundamentally improve city government itself.
It freed up money so that the city could develop institutional changes that "can effect the way the current city
bureaucracy deals with its problems ••• "

He felt that

the wisest use of the money was to try to make Portland
government more efficient rather than spending the money
on "new services that we aren't sure

\'Ie

can continue to
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fund after five years."

Specifically Scott pointed to

funding certain management planning programs that should
save money in the long run for the city.

They could not

be funded before because of the lack of money for this
purpose -- the money had to go for essential city services alone.
Money freed for use by the receipt of revenue
sharing is now going into development of the neighborhood
concept should also make Portland city government more
responsive to its citizens, and thus, more effective
government in the opinion of Mr. Scott.

There is an

effort here to set up neighborhood planning councils
to help coordinate city services with neighborhood needs.
"Neighborhoods were given money, seed money, to try and
aid them in developing programs to help themselves."
Scott also points to the Bureau of Human Development which he feels would not have gotten off the ground
without the indirect aid of revenue sharing.

As we can

see from looking at the Portland Revenue Allocations
document, some revenue sharing money was specifically
allocated to social services under this Department.

The

amount was not too much, but Scott would maintain, as
stated above, that the prime use of General Revenue
Sharing funds was not create new programs but to make
government more efficient and effective in an administra-
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tive and structural sense.

He suggests that the real

benefit of the Bureau of Human Resources will come with
the receipt of Special Revenue Sharing funds.

When those

monies arrive, the Bureau will hopefully have finished
examining the city's social service needs and will.know
how best to meet them.

Scott counts this as a consider-

able accomplishment in itself and a very worthwhile
of revenue sharing money.

~se

He also suggests that a large

part of the midyear allocation should go to the Bureau
of Human Resources.

In sum, Scott says that the city's

whole planning and management program got a boost from
General Revenue Sharing money.16
Jim Setterberg is also with the Office of Management
Services and he feels that the fact that not much money
on the Portland Revenue Allocations sheet seems to have
gone to social services does not mean that those services have been ignored.

He joined with others inter-

viewed in believing the city is not now clear as to which
social services it should handle and which belong to other
levels of government.

Hence, he endorses the funding of

the Bureau of Human Resources that enables it to make studies to determine where the city's obligations are in this
area.

Also, he agrees with Scott and Kaeil that a large
l6Scott, Interview.
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portion of the midyear allotment will probably go to
social services as a result of federal cutbacks in that
17
area.
Those who mentioned it defended the early a110cation of the 1972 revenue sharing money on an "emergency
basis."

Mike Kaeil, for example, said that the money

went for expenses that were very necessary.

Certain

equipment and park needs had long been neglected and this
new source of revenue was wisely spent in helping out
those areas of need.

The 1972 General Revenue Sharing

money was the only General Revenue Sharing money allocated
by the Council as a separate block of money from the
General Fund.

In terms of the overall use of General

Revenue Sharing, Kaeil is certain that Portland would not
have been able to make any capital improvements or make
government more efficient through developing better
management techniques without the revenue sharing money.
He is satisfied with how the money was handled.
Mr. Kaeil has run into one aspect of General Revenue
Sharing that no one else in any of the cities studied
has confronted so far.

A team of advisors from the

Treasury Department have recently come to Portland and
questioned how cities are allocating their revenue sharing
l7Interview with Jim Setterberg, Office of Management Services, Portland, Oregon, 16 July 1973. '
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money.

They are especially careful to examine whether

the money seems to be being spent to the advantage of
one segment of the city as opposed to another.

The

team indicated to Kaeil that this would be a form of discrimination forbidden by the Act.

Also the team ques-

tions, as Kaeil has done himself, whether revenue sharing
money can legally be used for tax relief purposes.
Because the Act is so broad in its guidelines, the team
from

~ashington,

D.C. told Kaeil that much of what can

be allowed and what cannot will have to be decided in the
courts.

They indicated that several cases are now pend-

ing in the courts contesting whether some form of tax
relief is a legitimate use of General Revenue Sharing
funds.

But as we have seen, whereas revenue sharing

may have postponed the need for Portland to raise taxes
or impose new ones, there has been no intention to use
General Revenue Sharing money as an excuse to cut taxes.
Commissioner Ivancie is of the opinion that using
revenue sharing money to "free up" other monies to be
used to create new layers of city government was not a
wise use of the money.

He specifically points out the

creation of the Office of Community Development which
"is just more support services and coordinators."
18Kaeil, Interview.

The

18
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city needs to use all the money it can to better perform
its traditional services, he feels.

The revenue sharing

money has helped the city perform many of those basic
services better, especially in police, parks and fire,
but he considers it a waste simply to create more government with the money.

It is clear that Mr. Ivancie does

not agree with some of his colleagues on how the General
Revenue Sharing money was allocated.

19

Views of City Officials on the Portland General Revenue
Sharing Decision-Making Process
Because Portland integrated all but its 1973
General Revenue Sharing funds into its General Fund,
there was no specifically designed decision-making process for the allocation of General Revenue Sharing funds.
The revenue sharing decision-making process was the
decision-making process used in developing and finalizing
Portland's fiscal year budget.

Mike Kaei1 mentioned

that there are no plans whatsoever to allocate revenue
sharing funds separately from the General Fund and set
up a special citizen involvement mechanism for such a
""
k"lng process. 20
d eC1Sl0n-ma

Bill Scott reiterated this

point and said the reason no special mechanism has been
or will be set up for the allocation of revenue sharing

19 1 vancle,"
.
I
"
nt
erVlew.
20Kaei1, Interview.
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funds is because the city has for some time now been
developing a citizen involvement process to be part of
the regular budget decision-making process.
Scott explains that the city budget process has
been changing dramatically in recent years.

The effort

is to involve the public to a greater degree in that
process.

In the past, says Scott, the Council has been

bogged down in detail and has not had time to look at
the "macro" aspect of city problems.

Now the hope is

that the Council can make more decisions on the major
services the city should perform and how they should
be performed.

There has been a real effort, he adds,

to involve citizens in the budget process too, in terms
of reviewing budgets of bureaus and their programs and
solicitation of citizen's views of those programs.

"The

budget process has opened up."
This citizen involvement in the budget process is
tied to the neighborhood concept mentioned earlier in
this chapter.

Scott explains that the city is working

on a District Planning Organization process that recognizes representatives of certain neighborhoods for certain purposes.

The process is not worked out in detail

yet, he adds, but the city hopes to have the whole
process developed for next year's budget process.

As

we saw in the first part of this chapter, the Mayor did
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seek some citizen involvement in this year's budget process.

He asked citizens to help form task forces to work

with some bureaus and Scott believes they had real impact as they caused changes in some bureau proposals.
Exactly how representatives will be chosen in the future
is still uncertain in Scott's opinion.

So far it looks

as if several task forces will be created and involved
in the budget process and they will be made up of representatives from neighborhoods and some selected by the
Mayor and Commissioners to represent special interests
such as environmental groups, the League of Women Voters
and so forth.

"Minorities will certainly be involved.,,2l

For quite a period of time, Paul

~pker

was Techni-

cal Planner for the District Planning Organization Task
Force which was formally under the Portland Planning
Commission.

HQpker believes that so far there has been

only minimal citizen participation in the budget processes of the city.

A few citizens on the task forces,

a few on the budget committee and those representatives
of special interests who attend public hearings have so
far been the extent of public participation.

He believes,

however, that this is an important start and that Portland
is moving toward a viable citizen participation mechanism
2lScott, Interview.
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for all its city government.
much what has been done

50

He believes it is not so

far in the formal budget

process as it is the work to this point on the District
Planning Organization concept that foreshadows a citizen
involvement apparatus for Portland city government.
Hopker recounts that when

~odel

Cities function-

aries saw that federal money was going to be cut back or
eliminated, they began to view the Bureau of Human
Resources and the District Planning Organizations as
agencies through which they might get some new federal
funds in the form of revenue sharing.

In September,

1972, Hapker says that Mr. Charlie Jordan, then acting
head of the Bureau of Human Resources, saw that revenue
sharing was coming and made a strong bid to the City
Council to get them to involve the public, through community organizations, in budget matters.

Jordan found

others in City Hall agreed a start in this direction
should be made.

The Mayor was on record as believing

in such a concept.
Hapker would agree with Scott that the District
Planning Organizations:

concept is still in its formative

stages but he believes it should be operational by the
time the city has to decide how to allocate Special
Revenue Sharing funds or the next year's allocation of
General Revenue Sharing funds as part of the regular
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budget process.

Hopker said the proposed design of the

District Planning Organization is as follows:

At the

bottom·. are the neighborhood organizations, on the next
level up are the district organizations, and at the top
is the Bureau of Neighborhood Organizations.

This last

body is to be made up of representatives of the other
tiers and will advise the City Council on budget matters.
In the case of Special Revenue Sharing, for example, the
lower levels of the neighborhood organization would write
up proposals for Special Revenue Sharing money and these
would be scrutinized by the Bureau of Neighborhood

I~••

Organizations who would then make recommendations to the
City Council.

Many details have yet to be worked out;

in fact, the whole project may not become reality.

But

Mr. Hopker feels the District Planning Organizations concept is favored by many citizens groups and by many city
hall officials and should be finally realized.

Also, we

saw earlier in this chapter that General Revenue Sharing
has played a significant role in "freeing up" the money
to get the District Planning Organizations concept off the
ground.
Paul Hopker was definately of the opinion that
Model Cities and Office of Economic Opportunity groups
have had a strong impact in politicizing the citizens
affected by these programs. He points, also, to the
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presently organized task forces that worked on this year's
budget as being the result of the "Office of Economic
Opportunity era."

He feels that some neighborhoods are

clearly dominated by a few political professionals who
may only coincidentally represent their neighborhood's
citizens.

In both cases the leaders of these neighbor-

hoods have seen federal cutbacks as endangering either
their own jobs or the worthwhile accomplishments of the
federal programs, or both, and have sought city aid as
a replacement.

In his research in working on the

District Planning Organizations concept,

H~ker

found

that some Community Action Program neighborhoods are not
as aggressive as they once were.

They have become "fat"

with federal money and thus lackadaisical.

Threatened

cutbacks in federal funds have begun to reawaken these
neighborhoods such as the Corbett-Terwilliger neighborhood and the Northwest District Association area have
pulled themselves together without any Community Action
Program organization as predecessor.

The Corbett-

Terwilliger and Northwest areas are very aggressive in
city politics as Hepker sees it.

For the most part,

however, only a few political functionaries from city
neighborhoods lobby city hall, but

H~ker

firmly believes

that the social service organizations developed and/or
inspired by the War on Poverty programs have gone a long
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way toward involving more common citizens in city politics
and have created a new era where city government now '
assumes more citizen participation must take place in
22
public policy making.
Commissioner Ivancie agreed that the citizen task
force groups that worked in helping to develop the 1973-4
city budget were the result of citizen participation in
War on Poverty prganizations.

"Such participation in

government is now expected as a matter of course ••• ,,23
Mike Kaei1 commented on the Portland decisionmaking process in terms of his being glad the Council
adopted the Office of Management Services guidelines,
especially the suggestions of spreading the General
Revenue Sharing funds into the General Fund.

He also

agrees with his colleagues that the role of the citizen
in the decision-making process will be expanded next year.
If the District Planning Organizations concept is not
worked out completely by then, more citizens will probably
be used in the task force program developed for the

Kae~'1' s
.
curren t b u d ge t , ~n

..

op~n~on.

24

22Interview with Paul H~pker, Formerly Technical
Planner for the District Planning Organization Task Force,
Portland, Oregon, 18 July 1973.
23Ivancie, Interview.
24Kaei1, Interview.
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Views of City Officials on Federal Aid to Cities
Bill Scott of the Portland'Mayor's Office was philosophical in the categorical versus block grant system
of federal aid to cities.

He suggests that among Portland

city officials there is disagreement as to which form of
federal aid is best for the city.

Some feel that the city

is best able to determine policies for itself and others
believe policies should be largely directed by the federal
government.

Scott feels that Portland is very able to

compete successfully for categorical grants and has done
so in recent years.

His data tells him, too, that Port-

land will get less money under the two revenue sharing
acts than it is getting now under categorical grants, assuming that most, if not all, categorical grants will be
discontinued when Special Revenue Sharing becomes a reality.

He feels, however, that the leverage and discretion

given cities under the block grant system speaks in its
favor.

Categorical grant monies intended for a specific

purpose and modeled after the problems of one region of
the country are often not appropriate for attacking Portland's problems.

Scott seems to feel the discretion given

local policy makers with block grants is worth the loss in
funds that will result from losing categorical grants.
Mr. Scott believes that national priorities enforced by categorical grants with strings attached have
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been very useful on many occasions.

That is, the cities

and states have been very reluctant to move on some issues
and the federal push was what was necessary.
time, he says,

n •••

At the same

programs that are locally initiated and

led are much more successful than federal programs.

Fed-

eral programs create an endless hassle with guidelines and
restrictions that are serving some federal objective that
is not always clear or applicable to the local situation,
or it may be an objective local officials do not share."
The question is whether the additional expense and hassle
that is involved in alot of federal programs is worth the
benefits. 25 One gets the impression that Mr. Scott does
not feel categorical grants are worth the hassle.
Bill Scott's favoring of a block grant system is indicated in his enthusiasm for the governmental changes
revenue sharing has enabled Portland to initiate.

He says

that General Revenue Sharing has " ••• given the city a terrific opportunity to start new programs to effect institutional change in the city that will affect the way current city bureaucracy deals with problems.

It is best to

spend the money on more efficient and effective government.,,26
We saw in the cases of Seattle and Tacoma that
25scott, Interview
26 Ibid •
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there was little, if any, cooperation between those cities and their respective counties in planning for the use
of their revenue sharing funds.

Scott indicated that in

Portland this was also largely the case.

The receipt of

revenue sharing funds has had some effect, however, on
these two levels of government deciding which will have
responsibility for which programs dealing with the aged.
Although Portland and Multnomah County are working toward
eventual consolidation, there has been only talk and no
real action in coordinating their revenue sharing decisionmaking and allocations efforts.

As we shall see in the

Eugene case study, counties in Oregon have often assumed
many social service responsibilities that cities in the
State now also feel they must deal with because local service agencies are asking for their
cutbacks.

su~port

due to federal

Eugene and Lane County worked with this issue

together, but this was not the case with Portland and
Multnomah County.
~r.

Kaeil believes Portland will be better off if

block grants are used by the federal government in its aid
to cities than it is now with so many categorical grants.
He believes the flexibility of the block grants make them
more desirable.

He also believes the increased responsi-

bility given to cities is good for them.

Kaeil indicated

that Portland is well on its way in preparing for Special
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Revenue Sharing.

Not only is the Bureau of Human Develop-

ment assessing the city's social programs and needs, the
Portland Community Development Commission has been developing for some time now and has a budget of about $10 mi1lion.

This Commission will be largely responsible for the

community development money that would corne to Portland
under one of the Special Revenue 3haring categories.

A

central problem, says Kaeil, is that under the categorical grant that now largely funds the Commission, Portland
is getting about $8.9 million.

Under the proposed com-

munity development segment of Special Revenue Sharing,
the ?ortland grant would be reduced to $4.05 million.
This is a serious loss in funds and Kaeil goes on to point
out that this year, federal grants (excluding revenue sharing) account for about fifteen percent of the budget's
General Fund.

If the city loses that level of support and

it is replaced only with the lesser revenue sharing funds,
it will be "in serious trouble."

Yet Kaeil joins Scott

in preferring the increased leverage and policy making
power given to cities under block grants.
enue gives a city more responsibility.

He says: "Rev-

It will test 10-

cal government to see if it is capable of managing its
own resources well.

If not, we'll go back to more cen27
tralized gov(;!rnment and that would not be good."
27

.

Kae1l, Interview.
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Commissioner Ivancie was not at all equivocal as to
whether he preferred block or categorical grants from the
federal government.

He preferred block grants because

there has been too much of a tangle with categorical
grants.

He says that categorical grants are "a cumbers6me,

unproductive method of assistance.,,28
Portland city officials seem to prefer block grants
because of the flexibility they offer the local policy
maker in terms of reduced federal guidelines.

Even the

fact that federal aid may be cut in half seems to bother
them little if, in return, they get the autonomy block
grants are supposed to offer.
III.

PORTLAND: SUB-CONCLUSIONS

As we have seen, one of the goals of the New Federalism was to give more power and responsibilities to
localities by giving them federal aid with few restrictions.
ey.

The localities could decide how to spend the mon-

This responsibility would be another ingredient in

their increased power.

Do Portland city officials feel

they have more power as a result of General Revenue Sharing so far?

It would be going too far to say yes.

The

other sections of this study seem to indicate that Portland neeaed most of its 1972 General Revenue Sharing allo28

.
1 vanc1e, Interview.
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cation just to meet certain emergency needs.

The needs

dictated the use of the funds, so there was little latitude for deciding where the money should go.

we have seen

that Portland was committed to some form of citizen participation in its budget process beyond open hearings
even before revenue sharing money was received, but some
measure of power can be said to have been given city officials in the moving ahead on the District Planning Organization project that revenue sharing funds allowed.
Bill Scott, Mike Kaeil and Paul Hepker all were enthusiastic about the development of the neighborhood concept
and all agreed it would have been impossible to move effectively forward without the money freed up by revenue
sharing.

So far in this study we have defined power as

the command over the allocation of resources.

When trad-

itional urban responsibilities are unmet or underfunded
it is the requirement of meeting those responsibilities
that dictates the use of funds.

We see in Portland, as we

have seen in the other cities studied, that whatever new
power revenue sharing is supposed to give to these cities
is compromised by underfunded traditional city responsibilities, inflation and cutback federal programs.

The de-

mands for the money are so great and so obvious that real
flexibility in the use of the money may not exist.

The

fact that Portland included its General Revenue Sharing
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funds directly into the General Fund acknowledges that
fact.

The Office of Management Services was fearful that

if the bureaus and the Council saw this separate bundle
of money standing by itself they might be tempted to spend
it on "non-essential" projects.
be used as "mad

money.~'

~vhat

There was fear it would

power Portland can be said

to have gained from General Revenue Sharing is the little
extra money it did provide to get the Bureau of Human Resources off the ground and to spur the neighborhood concept.
The New Federalism was to enable cities to establish
their own priorities in social and community service areas
and determine the best means of meeting responsibilities
in those areas.

In assuming the responsibility for set-

ting those priorities, cities were to be developing a
measure of independence from federal control and the
American system was to be moved toward decentralization.
In the case of Portland we found that those interviewed
believed in this goal of the New Pederalism.

They felt

strongly that Portland was capable of establishing its own
priorities and determining the best ways of meeting its
social and community needs.

General Revenue Sharing, how-

ever, has not given them enough money to where they have
the flexibility to do so meaningfully.

Those interviewed

agreed that decentralization of American government may
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be a good idea but their fiscal needs are far greater
than the funds supplied by General Revenue Sharing so far.
The city is therefore no less dependent on the federal
government for aid than before.

Portland city officials

do not question the ability of the city to work out its
own problems with little or no federal guidance.

At the

same time they acknowledge that fiscal realities may not
allow them to do any more than meet basic urban needs.
It is not setting your own priorities simply to keep the
police, fire and park departments going.

More General

Revenue Sharing and Special Revenue Sharing funds uncompromised by federal categorical cutbacks and runaway inflation are necessary if decentralization of American
government is to be a reality.

Otherwise, there is no

independence in decision-making.
Portland is taking seriously another goal of the
New Federalism.

It will be remembered that Mr. Nathan, a

New Federalism architect of the Nixon Administration, suggested that cities have to work out programs in the social
and community service areas that best meet their own cities needs.

Portland seems to be moving in just this di-

rection through the work of its Bureau of Human Resources
and Community Development Commission.

Both of these or-

ganizations are assessing Portland's needs in their respective areas and will advise the Council on the allo-
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cation of General Revenue Sharing and Special Revenue
Sharing funds in these areas.

Portland, as the other cit-

ies studied, seems to be taking seriously the fact that
urban governments are going to have to begin to assume
more responsibility in the social and community services
than ever before.

At the same time, they are assuming

that the categorical grant money that used to support
these programs will be replaced with Special Revenue Sharing money.

If this is not done, there is no way the cit-

ies can assume their new responsibilities.

So far, the

outlook for Special Revenue Sharing is grim and the demand on Portland and other cities by social service agencies in their cities for funding is tremendous.

It is

the central paradox of revenue sharing today.
The danger of some programs being lost in the shuffle as we move from categorical grants to block grants to
aid cities is very great.

In Portland, there is a real

effort, however, to assess all the social and community
programs that have taken place in the city through federal funding and to determine which deserve continued
funding.

This, of course, gives a great deal of influence

to local elites and local government officials in determining which programs will be continued.

Their influence

may be balanced, however, if Portland slJbstantially develops its neighborhood concept and/or its task force
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concept before the allocation of either Special Revenue
Sharing

funds~or

next year's budget with its new allot-

ment of General Revenue Sharing funds.

In other words,

if Portland's average citizen plays a meaningful role in
determining city priorities, fewer social and community
programs developed for the poor and minorities may get
lost in the shuffle between federal aid programs.

Thus,

a fear of the New Federalism may be avoided.
General Revenue Sharing, as we have seen, has played
a role in bringing government closer to the people of
Portland.

The process of developing task forces composed

of average citizens and the Budget Review Hearing Committee are innovations developed and funded separately from
General Revenue Sharing.

Mayor 'Goldschmidt wanted citi-

zen involvement in the budget process, and, as Commissioner
Ivancie has said, such a development was inevitable due to
the politicization of citizens during the War on Poverty
and related programs of the late 1960's.

Those inter-

viewed, however, agreed it was General Revenue Sharing
funds which freed up money to further develop the District
Planning Organization concept.

~hereas

it might be ar-

gued that the use of citizens on the task forces and on
the Budget Review Hearing Committee went enough beyond
the regular open hearing procedure to say thAt Portland
is beinging government closer to the people, it is more

::
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convincing to suggest that the neighborhood concept development spurred by revenue sharing funds will probably do
a significant job of giving access to government to the
average individual citizens.

Perhaps the task forces and

Budget Review Hearing Committee can be said to be special
mechanisms to include the individual citizen in the budget
policy making process in Portland.
participate.

Now, very few citizens

The District Planning Organization concept,

on the other hand, will enable a very large segment of the
city's population to deliberate major policy questions in
their own neighborhoods.

Their representatives will then

let City Hall know what neighborhood citizens feel.

In

theory, such a mechanism should enable the individual to
have considerable input into City Hall.

This process is

not in force at the moment, but as we have seen, many of
those interviewed feel it is well on its way, thanks to
the political activism spurred by the War on Poverty programs of the late 1960's and the money freed up by General Revenue Sharing.

The mechanisms Portland has set up

to include citizens in the budget process so far are an
important step.

It is farther than Seattle, but not as

far as Tacoma has gone.

If the District Planning Organ-

ization program goes into effect, Portland will have gone
a long way toward establishing a process whereby the
individual citizen will feel he can be heard by govern-
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If this mechanism is established, i t will be import-

ant to study it carefully to see if it works equally well
in all parts of the city and whether the average citizen
is heard in his neighborhood and is not shut out by local
elites.
We have seen that it is essentially up to each individual city to define for its own situation how the New
Feueralism goal of returning funds, power and responsibility to "the people"

will manifest itself in that city.

In Portland i t appears that there is an effort to build
up an individual citizen participation program with the
help of General Revenue Sharing funds.

The Jeffersonian

ideal of individual participation still prevalent in
American thought combined with the participation of individuals in the war on Poverty have led to a realization
on the part of Portland officials that individuals want
to participate and must be allowed to do so.
The New Federalism has as a major goal the decentralization of the federal system.

A measure of "inde-

pendent" strength among the units of the federal system
should be developed so they can each work out for themselves areas of functional responsibility.

Has General

Revenue Sharing given such strength to Portland?

The

realities of Portland's fiscal situation dictate that the
revenue sharing funds received so far and those expected

r
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to arrive in the next three years are only enough to help
the city meet its most basic responsibilities and enable
it to start some new programs.

Mr. 3cott felt the General

Revenue Sharing money should go to better government administration rather than new programs at all.

He would

put development of the neighborhood concept into this category.

What this seems to mean is that Portland's receipt

of revenue sharing

fu~ds,

even if forecasted levels of

Special Revenue Sharing funds are included, is far too
small to enable the city to be a self-sufficient unit of
government whereby it could in any way be considered independent power-wise to either the State of Oregon or to
the federal government.

Even though Portland is the lar-

gest city in Oregon it is still the legal creature of the
State.

Although we have not seen in Oregon what we saw

in Washington State, that is, the State Legislature curtailing state aid to cities because the city's have received revenue sharing funds, the potential power of the
State of Oregon over the fiscal well-being of its cities
is always there.

A direct grant of federal aid to Port-

land in the form of revenue sharing would have to be in an
astronomical amount to offset the power the State could
exercise on the city's fiscal well-being.

In the case of

Portland, as in the other cities examined so far, it seems
to be unrealistic to suggest that a city could ever be an
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"independent power" vis-a-vis "higher" levels of government in the federal structure.

They simply do not have

the constitutional status to give them the independence
needed for such power.
A fear of those opposed to the New Federalism was
that citizens politicized under the War on Poverty programs might be shut out or lose their desire to participate with the demise of those programs.

In Portland, we

have found that minorities and the poor who were politicized during the late 1960's through the War on Poverty
programs and through Model Cities

~

very active in try-

ing to get the city to develop its neighborhood program
and in petitioning the City Council for revenue sharing
funds through appearance at various open hearings.
orities have also served on the budget task forces.

MinThe

federal cutbacks in categorical grants have activated the
newly politicized to seek revenue sharing funds from the
city.

Frustrated by the federal level they are going to

the city level for help.

This politicization is also a

goal of national elites as they worked to activate the
disadvantaged during the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations.
How successful the minorities and the poor will be
depends on how the $3 million midyear allocation is distributed by the City Council.

It also depends on how the
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District Planning Organizations work in representing their
interests.

To look merely at how revenue sharing monies

have so far been distributed in Portland, one would not
feel that social and community programs have benefitted
much.

Those interviewed said repeatedly, however, that

social and community programs are probably going to get
the bulk of the midyear allocation and these areas are the
specific funding responsibility of Special Revenue Sharing.

Portland city officials said that it is too early

to run head-long into funding social programs before the
Bureau of Human Resources completes its work to determine
which social programs deserve and really need city aid.
They implied that the city does not lack commitment to
social responsibilities but only funds and adequate knowledge about which programs are their responsibility and
which are most worthwhile.
It is difficult, therefore, to assess the status of
the recent national goal of giving aid to minorities and
the poor in the current revenue sharing situation.

It is

not fair to say that local interest groups have frustrated the national goal of recent years to provide services for the disadvantaged at the government level because city officials have a good point in moving slowly to
this responsibility.

It is too early to decide the city's

commitment to the disadvantaged in light of federal aid
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cutbacks to them.

Developing the Bureau of Human Re-

sources indicates a serious commitment to use some General Revenue Sharing funds and all of the Special Revenue
Sharing funds for social and community service programs.
Because the city is not used to dealing heavily in these
areas by itself in terms of administration, caution in
evaluating and developing programs is understandable.

By

the end of the five year General Revenue Sharing program,
however, if Portland has not clearly and dramatically
moved into the social service area, assuming federal categorical grants will continue to decline or end, then local
interests will clearly have been able to defeat the national priority of establishing government as the prime
vehicle in helping the disadvantaged.

A major fear of

New Federalism opponents will then have been realized.
Assuming that local special interests in Portland
have had some influence on the City Council in its decisions to use some of the revenue sharing money so far for
social services, and on the decision to allocate $3 million at midyear when the federal cutbacks can be better
measured, and in establishing the Bureau of Human Resources, it can be suggested that there may be a consensus in
Portland, and perhaps in most other cities, that there
should be collective action to solve social problems
through public resources.

Portland has not ignored the
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social service area, it has just moved cautiously in that
direction.

It does not seem that local interests are try-

ing to get the city to abandon its social responsibilities
to the disadvantaged, but a more meaningful answer to
whether national priorities in this area have taken hold
in Portland awaits the time when the city allocates
Special Revenue Sharing and its midyear budget fund.

It

would also be fair to say that if Special Revenue Sharing
does not become a reality or its funding level is very
low, if Portland does not allocate a fairly large amount
of its General Revenue Sharing funds to social programs
it would have to make a strong fiscal case for why it had
ignored the social service area.
So far, it does not appear that revenue sharing is
going to set back the progress made in recent years in
civil rights in terms of the Portland case study.

Indeed,

it appears that the federal government may be especially
wary of local government discriminating in the use of revenue sharing funds.

We saw that Mike Kaeil had talked

with Treasury Department officials who were checking to
see that Portland did not use its funds to the advantage
of one group and the neglect of others in the city.

In

The End of Liberalism, Lowi feared that lack of guidelines
in block grants might erase progress in this area made by
national elites.

So far it does not appear that those in
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positions of influence in Portland, at least in the opinions of City Hall officials, wish to erase or set back
what has been won for minorities in the civil rights
struggles of the 1950's and 1960's.

Really, there were

only two specific guidelines in the Revenue Sharing Act.
One insisted that the funds could not be used as federal
matching grant funds and the other said that funds could
not be used in a discriminatory fashion.

Lack of guide-

lines by the federal government invites local priority
setting, but in the case of civil rights it appears that
the Nixon Administration and the Congress want to maintain that national priority.

Again, the extent of fed-

eral enforcement of that guideline over time will be the
real test.

If federal enforcement is weak, we will be

able to see the extent to which local power groups are
committed to the civil rights cause in Portland and elsewhere.
There was no indication that those interviewed in
Portland felt more guidelines, to protect national priorities, would beneficially add to future revenue sharing
legislation.

In all cases they felt the city was best

able to deal with its own problems and establish its own
priorities and that federal

guidelin~s

contained in past

categorical grants were obstructionist in effect.

General

national rules that accompany so much categorical grant
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legislation has hampered efficient government, and that
is the perspective held by those interviewed.

They did

not seem concerned that Portland might retreat from social-governmental responsibilities in the social service
and civil rights areas.

They did not seem to have Lowils

perspective that the rule of law was endangered and that
justice was unlikely unless clear and specific direction
existed for the carrying out of federal legislation.

It

is perhaps to be expected that those wrapped up in the
affairs of a city would feel themselves capable of seeing
the need for justice and carrying it out in their own
town, and not see the dangers Lowi points out suggesting
that some cities and states might very well not be so
committed.
The cause of interest group politics was certainly
not set back by the way Portland dealt with its revenue
sharing funds.

Interest groups were able to petition the

Office of Management Services through lobbying the various city bureaus.

Interest groups were very evident in

the open hearings held.

Of course, General Revenue Shar-

ing was specifically supposed to be allocated the way local units of government wanted it allocated and interest
groups always play a role in the policy process.
ticular sort of

inte~est

A par-

group was strengthened by the

Portland experience: the neighborhood organization.

By
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freeing up funds for the further development of the District Planning Organizations, revenue sharing has strengthened the ability of each neighborhood to take its case
to City Hall.
Lowi would not object, of course, if such a block
grant system was intended to affect only those areas of
public policy where national rules had no place, but revenue sharing seems to be so broad in terms of the areas
it may finance and the policy areas it can touch that Lowi
would probably fear the latitude given local power groups.
He would probably see General Revenue Sharing and Special
Revenue Sharing as just further examples of the failure
of interest group liberalism to achieve justice for all
Americans.
Lowi especially feared the city as a political unit
because it only compounded the opportunity of interest
groups to compromise and bargain away whatever attempt
toward achieving justice and problem-solving national legislation might have had.

The "autonomous" city was seen

by Lowi as a further decentralization of this nation away
from its original federal design.

General Revenue Sharing

in Portland may not have done much to strengthen the city
at this point, but it certainly has not weakened the city
either.

If anything, those interviewed in Portland feel

that revenue sharing plays and, throughout the length of
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the program, will continue to play an important role in
maintaining the viability of the city to hold its own
financially and to move ahead in some areas.

Of course,

the stated purpose of General Revenue Sharing and Special
Revenue Sharing was to strengthen state and local governments and although Lowi would support the strengthening
of states he would be opposed to the strengthening of
Portland or any other city in terms of their remaining
important decision-making units of government.
The Portland revenue sharing experience is very
different from that of Eugene, Oregon.

We will now

turn to the Eugene experience and then to the concluding
chapter of this paper where the "Sub-Conclusion" sections
of the case studies will be brought together in the hope
of making some final conclusions.

CHAPTER VII
GSNERAL REVENUE SHARING IN EUGENE
I. CITY FINANCES AND REVENUE SHA.RING
dHAT EUGENE HAS DONE
Eugene, Oregon, lies deep in the Willamette Valley
and is the home of light industry, farming, and the
state's largest university, the University of Oregon.
It is by far the smallest city in this study, with a
population in 1970 of 78,389 persons.
as a case study

beca~se

l

Eugene is useful

the size of its population con-

trasts to the other cities studied and because it lies at
the foot of the Seattle to Eugene "development belt."
In its revenue sharing deliberations, Eugene has
used its regular city budget process.

The city Budget

Committee, made up of the entire City Council plus eight
laymen (the Council has eight members as well) first debates the budget issues and then makes its recommendations
to the City Council itself.
get Committee are

appc~nted

The eight laymen on the Uudby the Council members on the

Committee, each Council member making one appointment.
l'Tlh
... e 1972/Jorld ;"'lmanac an'; Book of Fa::ts,
(New York: IJewspFlper Enterprise :',ssociation, Inc., 1972),
p. 193.
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As we shall see, the regular budget process was the main
decision-making process used in Eugene, but other groups
augmented this process because of the complexities and
opportunities offered by the General Revenue Sharing funds.
The laws of the State of Oregon forbid any city
within the state from going outside the six percent property tax limitation in a year's budget.

However, if a

city feels it cannot stay within these fiscal limits it
can go to its voters and ask them to approve a higher budget.

In the past five years, Eugene has found its tax

base to be inadequate, not only because of increased demands for services, but also because of inflation.

Con-

sequently, the city has sometimes had to go to the voters
to ask them to approve a city budget in excess of the six
percent limitation.

In 1972 and 1973, the Eugene elec-

torate defeated the budgets put to them by the City Council.

Cn each occasion, the Budget Committee and the :ity

Council had to make some changes and resubmit the budget
to the voters.

On the day most of this writer's inter-

views were conducted in Eugene, the voters had just the
day before, by 150 votes, approved a budget for the city.
Several weeks before, the voters had turned down a budget,
but they approved a revised version.
proval of Eugene's budget by the

The battle over ap-

vot~rs

is instructive in

that it demonstrates something of the fiscal condition of
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the city and it also shows the philosophical differences
that exist on the Budget Committee and the City Council
that highlight the

~ugene

experience with General Revenue

Sharing.
Tom

~illiams

is a member of the Eugene City Council

and is President of the

~illiarns

Bread Company, a major

baking concern in Oregon that is based in Eugene.

When

asked what he thought of Eugene's overall financial situation, f"ir.

.~illiams

said he was of the opinion that the

city had more money that it knew how to spend intelligently.

He went on to say: "One's opinion of whether

Eugene is adequately supplied with revenue is probably a
function of one's view of what activities are appropriate
for city government."

~illiams

felt that if one views the

protection of people and property, the traditional roles
of city government

t~at

would include funding parks,

street maintenance, police and fire as what the city
should be doing, then the city is not short of money.

If

one feels, however, that the purpose of the city is to be
one of the vehicles to be used in altering the social income structure of America, " ••• t_hen Eugene would not be
seen as adequately funded because Lugene does not do as
l.- •
fel '1. t ougll
\- t
many of those t Illngs
as sOrTIe peOr) 1 e e

t o. ,,2

21nterview with 'lorn,Hllidffls, Member of Eugene Cit.y
CounCil, Lugen~, 0regon, 20 July lY73.
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Mr.

~illiams

considered himself a conservative on most

political, social and economic issues.

He contributed to

the recent defeat of the Eugene budget by Eugene voters
because he felt the Council had allocated some money unwisely, especially on unnecessary social programs.

He

also felt there was no reason for an increase in the tax
levy beyond the six percent limitation since the city had
enough money with revenue sharing to carry out its essential and proper functions.

Williams wrote an open letter

to the citizens of Eugene making this point, which very
likely had an effect on them.
turned down the budget request.

At any rate, the voters
~illiams

goes on to say

that when the budget was referred back to the Budget Committee, compromises between the liberal majority on the
City Council and the conservative minority were made that
were satisfactory enough to Ailliams and those who support
his position that there was no active, organized, opposition to the most recent budget proposal put before the
voters.
hr.

It thus passed, if only barely.
~illiams'

rather traditional viewpoint about

the fiscal needs and responsibilities of Eugene is not
shared by the City Manager, Hugh McKinley.

McKinley be-

lieves the city must do more to help those who are disadvantaged and

re~rets

the city had not gotten farther into

the social services area before the

~Jar

on

~overty

got
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started.

But now, he feels, more and more citizens and

government officials at the local level are coming to feel
that collective action for social good is a city responsibility.

Although

~ugene

has outgrown its tax base, says

the City Manager, and the property tax load is quite high,
with federal aid, especially revenue sharing, the city
should be able to go beyond minimum services and provide
for some of the needs of its disadvantaged citizens.

He

points out that revenue sharing in fiscal 1973 makes up
about twenty percent of Eugene's general fund.

The city

has experienced inflation at about a ten percent rate and
hence the benefits of revenue sharing have already been
compromised in terms of it being a real fiscal dividend.
~cKin1ey

fears that unless there is an increase in tradi-

tional revenue sources that in the next two years revenue
sharing will be eaten up even if it is only spent on traditional services, but the Council has decided to do new
things with the money, too.

The financial crunch of the

city is such that the City Manager indicated that some
revenue sharing money has had to go for projects such as
the building of a new fire station that will require more
money as revenue sharing receipts decrease or end in the
future.

His staff wanted the General rlevenue Sharing

funds to go for nonrecurring expenditures, but the city
needed the fire station and the revenue sharing money was
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all there was to build it with.

Eugene will have to fig-

ure out how to maintain the station as time goes on. 3
Assuming Eugene plans to spend money for more than
minimal services, it seems the city's property tax base is
inadequate to support the additional services.

Thus,

there is the need to ask the voters frequently for permission to go beyond the six percent limitation, and to
continue to hope for increased traditional revenues and
continued revenue sharing.

It is in this fiscal climate

that Eugene has allocated its General Revenue Sharing money received to date.
As we have seen, Eugene voters are not automatic in
their approval of budgets going beyond the six percent
limitation.

In 1972, the voters turned down such a re-

quest from the Council.

The city government then found

itself in a financial bind, especially in funds for the
police department and for parks.

These two areas had

been particularly suffering in recent years due to budget
defeats.

Jith the receipt of 1972 General Revenue Sharing

funds, the city decided to develop a Supplemental Budget
for fiscal year 1972-73.

The Supplemental Budget was de-

bated and passed by the Budget Committee and the City
Council.

Most of the money in this budget was revenue

sharing money, but not all of it.

The money went for reg-

3Interview with Hugh McKinley, City Manager of
Eugene, Euqenp., Oregon, 20 July 1973.
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ular operating budget programs.

Since an "emergency" was

felt to exist, the money could not be spent on new programs.

An accounting of General Revenue Sharing funds in

the Eugene Supplemental Budget of 1972-73 is contained in
Table VII.
TABLE VII
ACCOUNTING OF GENERAL REVENUE SHARING FUNDS
EUGENE SUPPLEMENT.':'.L BUDGET OF 1972-73
Department Funded
Ci ty l'-1anager
Personnel
Data Processing
Planning
Library
Airport
Fire
Finance
Police
Parks and Recreation
Public Works
General Overhead
Equipment Service
Capital Frojects
TOTAL GSN~Rr..L HEVENUE SHARING FUNDS
FIN ALLY APP =-.OP.RIi"\.TED
TOTAL 1972

G~NERAL

$

$

Amount
14,280
11,568
51,452
58,949
26,794
12,730
40,099
26,282
110,859
38,479
14,704
79,200
71,700
196,100
669,861

REVENUE SHARING FUNDS $ 1,807,617

SOURCE: "Supplemental Budget Report, 1972-73, City of
Eugene," Eugene, Oregon, 1973. Data cOlT,pi led from pp. 1-73.
Although several social agencies asked for part of this
money, little went to them.
funds held by

~ugene

The General Revenue Sharing

but not allocated in th0 .jupplemen-

tal Budget went into the 1973-74 General !{evenue .jharing
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In February of 1973 the Budget Committee first met
to decide how to allocate Eugene's $4.3 million in revenue sharing monies now allotted for the 1973-74 fiscal
year.

The money was dealt with as a block sum by itself

and no special decision-making body was organized to deal
with this money, just the regular Budget Committee.

As

we shall see, a special liaison joint committee with
Lane County, however, was established to deal with General Revenue Sharing funds to be spent on social services.
At the outset, the staff working in the Eugene City
Manager's Office asked the city's department heads to make
recommendations as to how their departments would prefer
to use General Revenue Sharing funds.

With this input,

the city staff put together a list of programs it felt the
Budget Committee and the City Council should consider as
priority items for which to allocate General Revenue Sharing monies.

The staff recommended that some monies go for

new programs that might continue operation for some time,
but for the most part they encouraged the Budget Committee
to spend the money on one-time only programs and capital
projects.

The staff proposed the largest amount of rev-

enue sharing money be spent on parks and recreation, the
4"supp1emental Budget Report, 1972-73, City of
Eugene," Eugene, Oregon, 1973, pp. 1-73.
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needs of the fire department, the creation of a new planning division for the city, the police department in terms
of new personnel and a public housing complex for persons
in low to moderate income categories.

The specific staff

proposals are located in Appendix C and entitled "Eugene
City Staff Proposals for Revenue Sharing."

At this early

stage, the public was not consulted or asked to make recommendations as to how Eugene might appropriate its revenue sharing money.

Also, as this early stage, it is im-

portant to note that a major issue of debate in Budget
Committee meetings was how much money should go for property tax relief, if any, and how much for social programs.
So~e

General Revenue Sharing money did go for tax

relief in Eugene.

The staff recommended to the Budget

Committee, and the Committee accepted, a recommendation
to fund certain existing programs with General

~evenue

Sharing funds so there would not have to be an increase in
the city's property tax rate to fund them.
Stubbert, Budget Officer in

~ugene's

As Loren

Finance Department

explains, a "spread sheet", which delineates programs in
the general fund that were transferred to General Revenue
Sharing funding to prevent a tax hike, was prepared •
••• (T)he "spread sheet" of departmental general
fund priorities ••• are all existing programs within
the city's operations which were "put on the block"
in an effort to prevent a substantial increase in
the city's property tax rate. Those items that
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were cut from this "spread sheet" were shifted
into the revenue sharing fund. The reasoning
behind this shift of existing programs into revenue sharing support is that the Budget Committee felt obligated, with the existence of revenue
sharing, to keep any tax rate increase to a minimum, yet they also feltsthat existing services
should not be curtailed.
The amount of revenue sharing money spent on these
programs, that is, spent for property tax relief, was
$929,499.

That expenditure, plus all the rest of Eugene's

revenue sharing allocations can be seen in Appendix C in
a document entitled "Eugene Summary of General Revenue
Sharing Allocations

JV:ay 25, 1973."

As can be seen from

that document, of the $4.3 million in total revenue sharing resources held by Eugene, $2.9 million had been allocated by September, 1973.

The remaining revenue sharing

money will either be allocated in some sort of a supplemental budget this year or will revert to the next fiscal year.

It is very likely Eugene will adopt a program

such as Portland's where part of every year's revenue
sharing allotment will be carried over to the next year
because both cities are on fiscal years and the revenue
sharing checks arrive on a calendar year basis.
the revenue sharing monies not to decrease

So, for

over the five

fiscal years the cities would receive the money, it is
necessary to carryover sor;,e funds.
5Loren L. 3tubbert, Budget Office, Eugene Finance
IJepartment, letter expl"'lining the "spread sheet", received
at IV1cji.innville, CJregon, 13 :jeptember 1973, p. 1.
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The "Summary" sheet indicating how Eugene has so far
allocated its revenue sharing funds indicates that the suggestions of the City Manager's staff were largely followed.
It is significant to note that the two largest allocations
were for social services ($200,000) and for a low-moderate
income housing project.

The only allocation that was lar-

ger was the approximately $900,000 used to prevent a property tax increase ("Spread Sheet" priorities).

As we

shall see in the next section of this chapter, all three
of these allocations were hotly debated on the Budget
Committee, especially the funding for the public housing
project.
The "Summary" sheet indicates that Eugene allocated
$200,000 for social services.

The document in Appendix C

entitled "Joint Committee Recommendations" shows exactly
what social services were funded.

A look at that docu-

ment shows that it was $275,000 that was allocated for social services.

The added $75,000 came from Lane County

from part of its General Revenue Sharing funds.

The co-

operation between the City of Eugene and Lane County in
allocating General Revenue Sharing funds for social services is the major

diffe~ence

in the Eugene revenue shar-

ing experience from the other cities studied in this paper.
Fairly early in its deliberations, the Eugene Budget
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Committee decided to work with Lane County in deciding
what social services in the area should be funded with
General Revenue Sharing and in what amounts.

The Budget

Committee decided to work with the county because the county had been in the social service business for some time
and also, the city did not want to overlap its social service programs with those of the county.

Those interviewed

in Eugene frankly admitted they were at a loss as to how
best to decide which social programs of all those applying for funds should be

fu~ded.

They sought the exper-

ienced cooperation of the county and hence the Joint City
of Eugene-Lane County Budget Committee was formed.
This Committee pooled the social service requests
that had been

s~bmitted

to them separately and processed

over forty applications representing over $500,000 in applied-for funds.

Together, the city and the county had

decided to allocate, as we have seen, $275,000 for social
services and so several applicants were to be disappointed.
This Joint Committee decided to form a subcommittee to
look over the applications and make recommendations to it.
This was the Joint City/County Social Service Review Committee.

This Committee decided to enlist the help of yet

another group, the Lane County Organization of Governments.
That group was asked for advisory help because they had a
staff of experts in social service matters that might
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advise the city/county committees on which social functions are the responsibilities of which levels of government.

They were also asked to prioritize which social pro-

grams deserved funding and at what level.
The Lane County Organization of Governments gave its
report and it carried some weight with both the joint committees and the Eugene Budget Committee.

The "Joint Bud-

get Committee Recommendations" document in Appendix C
largely follows the recommendations of that report regarding which social services should be funded and at what
levels.

It

~

very significant that the report suggested

that public housing was the responsibility of the state
and federal governments and not of the county or the city.
None of the joint county/city social service monies went
for public housing, but a majority of the Eugene Budget
Committee and City Council felt strongly enough about the
city responsibility in the public housing area that they
went ahead and allocated, as we have seen, $150,000 for
public housing in Eugene.

This was the biggest area of

disagreement between the Lane County Organization of Governments report and the final judgment of the Eugene Budget Committee and the City Council.
In its final report, the Joint City/County Social
Service Review Committee suggested that the cooperation
between the city and county on revenue sharing should
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continue in the evaluation of programs funded and in other
areas of joint city/county concern.

The cooperation be-

tween these governments indicated to them that working
together in the delivery and coordination of social service programs is beneficial to both levels of government
and the citizens they serve. 6
In terms of citizen involvement in the decisionmaking process, the city did hold open public hearings on
the fund allocations and lay people do sit on the Eugene
Budget Committee.

Also, the Joint City/County Social

Service Review Committee consisted of staff people from
both governments and two lay representatives.
Committee did hold public hearings as well.

The Joint
Several so-

cial agencies applied for funds and were heard, but no
special effort was made to involve the public beyond the
regular budget process of open meetings and public hearings.

An exception to this might be the lay people on the

Joint Committee.
II.

THE POLITICS OF REVENUE SHARING IN EUGENE
HOW CITY OFFICIALS VISW REVENUE SHARING

In this section of each case study we look at the
opinions of City Hall officials on how they interpret the
6"Report to the Joint City of Eugene-Lane County
Budget Committees from the Joint City/County Social Service Review Committee," Eugene, Oregon, 30 May 1973, p. 5.
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original intention of federal revenue sharing, how they
feel about how their city has dealt with its General Revenue Sharing money, what their feelings are about their
city's decision-making process on the revenue sharing question, and how they feel about the entire question of the
various forms of federal aid to cities.

This chapter

will be concluded, as have the other case studies, by examining the data from Eugene on the basis of the goals
and fears of the New Federalism.
Views of City Officials on the Original Intention
of Federal Revenue Sharing
All of those interviewed in Eugene agreed that the
Administration and Congress intended General Revenue Sharing funds to be used by each political unit of government
in accord with its most basic needs.

If certain services

had not been provided in the past or certain departments
of government underfunded, then the "new" money should go
for those purposes.

Hugh McKinley is Eugene City Manager.

He is active in the International City Manager Association
which is closely associated with the National League of
Cities.

This affiliation has enabled him to keep close

watch on revenue sharing proposals and legislation and he
has gone to Congress to testify in support of revenue
sharing on several occasions.

The day before McKinley's

interview for this study he had returned from testifying
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before a Congressional Committee on Special Revenue Sharing.
From this experience, McKinley was of the firm opinion that neither the Congress nor the Administration intended General Revenue Sharing to be used necessarily for
property tax relief.

He also felt General Revenue Shar-

ing funds were not to be a substitute for existing federal
programs supported by categorical grants.

As he saw it,

the intent of General Revenue Sharing was to use the federal tax collecting ability to gather funds that could be
returned to the local jurisdictions and used by them as
they saw fit with no restrictions except that the money
is not to be used for education or matching funds for federal grants.

He felt Eugene was under no real obligation

or directives from anyone in washington, D.C., with regard
to how to use the money.
From his vantage point as City Manager, McKinley
has had the opportunity to observe the City Council for
some time.

He felt the Council in many ways reflected

the philosophical differences that exist in the United
States Congress.

There is a wide disparity of views con-

cerning how to spend the revenue sharing money.

From his

own administrative point of view, however, McKinley felt
that each city receiving revenue sharing should look at
its own needs and determine where its most pressing needs

.

..
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lie.

It should examine the need for new services as well

as the need to perform old duties better.

He argues that

the results may be different everywhere, but once needs
are recognized then revenue sharing money should go to
meet them.

He strongly opposes those in the federal gov-

ernment and those in the Oregon Legislature that say "you
have revenue sharing money and therefore you ought to be
picking up this or that program."
not the intent of the legislation.

Such restrictions were
It is up to each unit

of government to decide independently how to spend the
money. 7

For the most part, those interviewed on the

Eugene City Council would agree with their City Manager.
Mrs. Campbell is a member of the Eugene City Council
who would go along with Mr. McKinley's interpretation of
the original intent of revenue sharing, but she would
emphasize that the revenue sharing money was "new money"
that should largely be used for new programs.

She was

strongly opposed to using General Revenue Sharing for
property tax relief alone.
for social programs as well.

She felt the money should go
It will be remembered from

Part I of this chapter that the major debate among members
of the Council was whether the General Revenue Sharing
funds should go for tax relief or social programs.
Campbell fought hard for social
7McKinley, Interview.

progr~ms.

Mrs.

She inter-

317
preted the Revenue Sharing Act guidelines very broadly and
was reaffirmed in that interpretation as the result of a
meeting in Washington, D.C., she and other Council members had recently attended in the Office of Revenue Shar.
8
l.ng.
Neal Murry is another Eugene Council member and he
shares Mrs. Campbell's opinions on revenue sharing.

In

a way he was more outspoken than Krs. Campbell in that
he felt revenue sharing money should not go at all for
property tax relief.

He saw the needs of the city as too

great not to examine city service needs and then spend the
General Revenue Sharing funds on them.

Murry felt that no

matter how nontraditional the needed service might be in
terms of usual city responsibilities, the city should get
into that area if the need is real.

As did I1cKin1ey,

Mr. Murry opposed the theory that revenue sharing money,
at least General Revenue Sharing, was intended by Congress
to be used in place of categorical grants.
n •••

He said,

it is not fair that the Administration shou+d cut

those grants just when cities are deciding what to do with
General Revenue Sharing.
ball."

It puts them behing the eight-

He believed in the services provided by categor-

ica1 grants, but he feels they should continue to be fund8Interview with Mrs. Campbell, Member, Eugene City
Council, Eugene, Oregon, 20 July 1973.
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ed by the federal government, not local government with
General Revenue Sharing funds. 9
Another member of the City Counci+, Tom ':v'illiams,
agreed with the City Manager's interpretation of revenue
sharing as a vehicle through which local government might
gain the benefit of the efficient federal tax collecting
system.

The money redistributed back to the states and

localities, he felt, could be used as the local unit of
government wanted, but he felt a very justified use of
General Revenue Sharing funds was for tax relief.

Mr.

Williams was a White House Fellow for one year during the
Nixon Administration, working most closely with Secretary
of Commerce Stans.

Although he did not take part in rev-

enue sharing deliberations,

~illiams

observed and formu-

lated his opinions on revenue sharing, he says, during
his time in Jashington.

He feels, therefore, that the

Nixon Administration did not want to make suggestions to
the states and localities as to how to spend revenue sharing money in their own areas.

"That was the whole intent

of the General Revenue Sharing program. "

He felt, there-

fore, it becomes a matter of local needs and local poli10
tics as to how the money is allocated.
9Interview with Neal Murry, Member, Eugene City
Council, Eugene, Oregon, 20 July 1973.
10Williams, Interview.
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A man who would agree that it is largely a matter
of politics as to how revenue sharing money is distributed
is Louis Peters, City Minority Affairs Representative for
Eugene.

A few years ago, Eugene created the position

Peters now holds as a special effort to give representation to the city's minorities, who comprise about three
percent of Eugene's population.

Although Peters is Black,

he sees his job as not just to represent the interests of
Blacks in the community, but all minorities, Native
Americans, Chicanos and Orientals as well.

In this posi-

tion, it is not surprising that Peters believes the revenue sharing money so far received by Eugene should go
for social services for the city's minorities and disadvantaged.

He felt that the minorities of America were

led to believe that the purpose of revenue sharing was to
take over for categorical grants and since the " ••• whole
social structure of many Black communities in America is
based on programs frorr: categorical grants, when they
heard of revenue sharing, they assumed it was going to
replace categorical grants."

Peters fel t this irnpression

was reinforced by the cutbacks in categorical grants by
the Nixon Administration, but he feels the reality of the
situation, that is, that revenue sharing money need not
necessarily go to replace cutback categorical grants, shows
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that "Blacks were either mistaken or mis1ed.,,11
Views of City Officials on How Eugene Allocated
its Revenue Sharing Funds
Mrs. Campbell and Mr. Murry are part of the liberal
majority on the Eugene Budget Committee and City Council.
As such, it would be expected that they would generally
agree with the way those two bodies allocated revenue
sharing monies, and they do.

r"irs. Campbell first of all

agreed with the allocation of the 1972 funds in the "emergency" Supplemental Budget.

The fiscal needs of the po-

lice and parks were acute due to recent budget defeats and
the revenue sharing money was a blessing for taking up the
slack.

She also agrees with the approximately $1 million

allocation that went for property tax relief, although the
allocation "looks blatantly political."

She was, however,

particularly enthusiastic with the allocations for social
programs, especially the money pooled with the county for
social service programs and the money that went for public
housing in E:ugene.

She remarked, hO'wever, that the al1o-

cation was only about one-half of what the majority of the
Council wanted, but they had to compromise with the conservatives.
Mrs. Campbell remarked that the city had been in the
llInterview with Louis Peters, Eugene City Minority
Affairs Representative, Eugene, Oregon, 20 July 1973.
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social service business to a degree before.

It had

financed a detoxification center, a drug clinic and a
senior citizen's center.

The pressure to increase its

social service obligations has increased dramatically,
she said, due to recent federal cutbacks in social
service aid.

She thought it was important to note that

even though the city is spending General Revenue Sharing
funds for new social services, the city itself is not
really getting into the social service business on a
large new scale.

The county is in the process of

setting up a special new Social Services Department and
the city will contract for these social services through
the county and will pay for the services through its
$200,000 from General Revenue Sharing alotted for that
purpose.

She added that, "The city's General Revenue

Sharing funds are going for social services but not
its time or administration -- there would be too much
duplication between city and

~ounty

otherwise; hopefully

other cities in Lane County will do the same but so far
. . 1 ar ac t'lone ,,12
th ey h ave t a k en no Slml

Councilman Murry agrees with Mrs. Campbell's
positions on how Eugene allocated its General Kevenuc
Shdring funds.

He emphasizes that he feels the money

l2r_dmpDE:
'11 , Interview.
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should have gone to previously unmet city needs, especially high on such a list would be the needs of its
senior citizens.

Therefore, he was particularly grati-

fied that as much money as was allocated for them,
especially the public housing, was allocated.

He wished

that more of the revenue sharing money could have gone
for programs such as juvenile crime prevention and the
many other programs that need funding if the city is
really to address its problems.

He felt that the city

must now see it as its responsibility to deal with social
ills on a major scale because, obviously the federal
government was drawing back from its commitment.

Murry

regretted, however, being pushed into specific social
service programs because of the federal withdrawal from
them.

He believed that certain social programs that the

federal government has been funding for some time should
continue to be funded, but he agreed that it is the duty
of the city to take up the slack until Special Revenue
Sharing or some other funding source comes along, if one
does.

Er. Kurry is cognizant of the many innovative

.

ideas that have emerged in recent years as to how a city
might deal with its social responsibilities and he sees
revenue sharing as "opportunity dollars" for the city
to experiment with new programs.

Therefore, he is very

disappointed that the revenue sharing money is so small
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and the federal categorical cutbacks are so large as to
compromise the essence of the revenue sharing opportunity.
He feels Eugene has taken only a small step so far in
its social service responsibilities and it must go further.

13
Although Mrs. Campbell and Mr. Murry were quite

pleased with the social service programs allocated with
General Revenue Sharing, but wished it could have been
more, Louis Peters, in his position as Minority Affairs
Representative, felt the General Revenue Sharing allocations were completely inadequate in terms of the needs
of Eugene's minorities.

He was upset that the programs

he specifically recommended for funding were turned down
by the City Council and the Budget Committee.

Peters

wanted some of the General Revenue Sharing funds to go
for the establishment of a Chicano, Native American
Affairs Center.

He wanted also to see funded an Afro-

American Institute.

These were to be community centers

for these minority populations to enable them to get
together and study their heritage and reinforce their
senses of identity.

He was pleased, however, that the

Affirmative Action procedures he advocated were adopted
promising the employment of minorities in social service
13Murry, Interview.

324

agencies contracted with General Revenue Sharing funds and
the fact that all groups would have equal access to the
funded social services.
Although Peters felt that minorities hoped General
Revenue Sharing money would go for social programs to a
large extent, in reality he saw the money going mostly
for public safety, public works and property tax relief.
He added, " ••• this again is a situation where the middle
class is bettered at the expense of the lower class."
Peters did believe, however, that the Mayor of Eugene
and the City Manager do have the interests of the city's
minorities in mind and what progress has been made in
their behalf, those men have had a great deal to do
Wl-th •

14
Hugh McKinley does seem to have the interests of

the city's minorities at heart, he nevertheless defended
the Council decision not to fund the two community
centers Peters wanted.

He felt the money for these pro-

jects would be money for a special interest block; a
request by one segment of the community to enhance their
own community only.

He, and the Council, saw the purpose

of the centers as to develop the identities of these
minority people, which was not seen by the city decisionl4peters, Interview.
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making units, or the Joint Committee, as a regular request.
It was seen as being too particularized and too partisan.
McKinley felt that giving money to Peters' projects
"would have been giving money to an agency that would not
be making its services available to the whole community
and that would be wrong."
The City Manager also remarked that he was glad the
city did not succumb to pressures from the State Legislature to assume Day Care Center responsibilities with city
revenue sharing money.

The state feels the city is "fat"

now with its General Revenue Sharing money and has been
pressuring the city to take over such programs, but
McKinley feels Day Care Centers should continue as a
state responsibility.

He also had hoped it would not be

necessary to spend revenue sharing money on projects
like a new fire station and fire trucks because with the
future drawback of General Revenue Sharing funds, a
possibility exists that the further support of such
capital projects will be difficult.

But the fire equip-

ment was necessary, and the General Revenue Sharing funds
were all that was available to fund themo l5
Tom Williams considered himself the conservative
voice of the Eugene City Council and as such endorsed the
15McKinley, Interview.
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staff recommendations as to how the General Revenue
Sharing funds should be allocated.

Those recommendations

were that the money should go primarily for the police
department and the general administrative functions of
the city and less money for social services and parks
and recreation.

He does not go along with the Budget

Committee and City Council revenue sharing allocation
decisions.

Williams feels "the first responsibility

of the city is to adequately serve the function of protection of people and property and as those needs become
reasonably well satisfied, then, if the city has funds
left over, it can spend them in the social service area."
Especially, he agrees with the Lane County Organization
of Government's recommendation that public housing responsibilities rest with the state and federal governments and not the city.

He was flatly against spending

General Revenue Sharing funds on public housing for the
elderly.

16

Views of City Officials on the Eugene General Revenue
Sharing Decision-Making Process
In the opinion of the City Manager, Eugene's revenue
sharing sharing decision-making process was an open one.
It was open in the sense that persons or groups could make
l6williams, Interview.
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requests to the city staff on General Revenue Sharing
funds and could attend the hearings of the Budget Committee, the City Council and/or the Joint Committee.

Also,

r/icKinley feels the City Council membership is broadly representative of the various interests in Eugene.

He did

not regret that no special machinery for citizen participation was set up as he interpreted the Act as saying that
General Revenue Sharing funds are to be allocated according to regular budget processes.

It should be remembered,

however, that half the Eugene Budget Committee is made up
of lay people, so the public has long been involved in the
budget process.

~cKinley

does feel, however, that minor-

ities were not represented in the Lane County Organization
of Governments deliberations and that that was a serious
oversight.

As he put it, "At the county level, no one

constantly goes to bat for minorities and so they are left
out sometimes."

McKinley endorses the Budget Committee

decision not to fund the minority centers requested by
Peters because they were going to serve only a part of the
community.

McKinley points out that the decision was not

taken lightly and many representatives of minority groups
carne to hearings asking for the centers, which supplemented Peters' own appeal.
~r.

McKinley feels that the Community Action Program

in Eugene has had some effect in politicizing the city's
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minorities, but not much.

In his opinion, the program in

Eugene has been chiefly a failure due to mismanagement.
Now, most of the Community Action Program responsibilities
have been taken over by the county, but McKinley feels the
real fault may lie with local government.

He maintains

that cities and counties should have taken up social service responisbilities long ago before the War on Poverty,
but they did not, so private groups had to fill the vacuum.

He said he felt guilty for not responding long ago

to the needy in his area.

Now, however, revenue sharing

has offered the city and county the financial ability to
take up some social responsibilities and he is glad of it.
McKinley has watched as the Council and Budget Committee
have dealt with the General Revenue Sharing funds and he
feels they were not sure what to do with so much money at
first because they were used to having barely enough money
to meet basic city needs.

The idea of getting together

with the county and the Lane County Organization of Governments resulted from their earlier difficulties in deI
ciding how to deal with General Revenue Sharing funds. ?
Neal

~urry

and Mrs. Campbell both mentioned a short-

coming in the decision-making process in Eugene that goes
beyond the revenue sharing deliberations themselves.

Both

mentioned that the position of City Councilman in Eugene
l7McKinley, Interview.
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is a nonpaying, volunteer position.

As such, it precludes

moderate and low income people from either having the money to run for office or taking the time from work during
the week to meet City Hall demands.

Murry estimated he

spent about twenty hours per week doing city work apart
from his administrative position with the University of
bregon.

So the Council itself may not be as broadly rep-

resentative of Eugene as it should be because of the volunteer nature of the position.
Mrs Murry also pointed out that it has been a long-

standing problem in Eugene that Budget Committee hearings
are lightly attended and sometimes not attended at all by
townspeople.

In part, he feels, it is because of the com-

plexity of the issues.
of budgetary specifics.

Regular citizens lack a knowledge
He added, " ••• it might be wise

to try to find some creative ways to get citizens' participation."

Murry was concerned that the opinions of

Eugene's small minority population were not adequately
heard in the General Revenue Sharing decision-making process.

Because they make up only three percent of the pop-

ulation, some members of the Council feel the city really
has no problem in the area of minority affairs.

Mr. Murry

is not one of those people.
Murry pointed to one aspect of the Eugene political
scene that is having increasing significance in terms of
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representing people in city government.

Many of Eugene's

neighborhoods are developing neighborhood councils that
send representatives to hearings.

The whole city is not

organized along these lines yet and all organization that
exists so far has been done by the neighborhoods themselves
and not at the initiative of city government.

Some rev-

enue sharing funds, however, have gone to help these councils with clerical needs.

Murry and

~rs.

Campbell felt,

however, that members on the City Council quite adequately represent the city's neighborhoods, partly because
. 18
th ey are e 1 ec t e d on a war d b as~s.
Two of those interviewed in Eugene were less happy
with the representation given all groups in the city in
the revenue sharing decision-making process.

As we have

seen, no one has been wholely satisfied, but Tom Williams
and Louis Peters seemed most critical.

Mr. Williams felt

that the Council and Budget Committee processes were not
particularly open "as they never are in the governing
process."

He felt that the input from the community was

not particularly representative of the community.

He

specifically pointed out that the only people who appeared
at hearings in any numbers were not those who want and
need city services, but those who want to provide them.
He was clearly talking about social service agency activ18Murry, Interview.
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ist administrators who were worried about losing their
jobs due to federal funding cutbacks.

Further, Williams

felt the minority populations of the city are not well
represented.

Mr. Peters, as minority affairs representa-

tive, "is supposed to represent all city minorities but
he tends to represent mainly Blacks." "However ,It he adds,
"minorities are not a major problem in the community.,,19
Louis Peters felt he was largely excluded from the
General Revenue Sharing decision-making process.

As

~i-

nority Affairs Representative for the City of Eugene he
does not have a vote on either the City Councilor the
Budget Committee and so his input could only be in an advisory capacity.

When he heard that General Revenue Shar-

ing was coming to Eugene, he went to the various minority
communities in the city and advised people there to go to
public hearings on revenue sharing and push for the programs they wanted.
While organizing the city's minorities to petition
for revenue sharing funds, Peters also told the City Manager and his assistant what the minority communities were
asking.

They wanted, as we have seen, an Afro-American

Institute and a Chicano, Native Americans' Affairs Center.
About seventy-five minorities came to the Budget Committee
hearings and spoke for these projects.
19williams, Interview.

The Committee
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listened and then reviewed the Joint Committee findings
and decided not to fund the programs.

Upon the advice of

the city's Human Rights Commission, Peters went back to
the Budget Committee and tried again, this time also asking for an Affirmative Action plan for equal treatment
for minorities with revenue sharing funds be adopted.

The

Committee decided in favor of the Affirmative Action plan
but still turned down the other proposals.

Hugh McKinley,

earlier in this chapter, gave the city's reasoning for
turning the programs down.
Although discouraged by not getting what he wanted
from the Council, Peters is still pleased about one thing.
He believed that the city's minorities are now more activistic due to the revenue sharing struggle.

Now they have

formed a new organization, the Lane County Non-White TaxPayers Association.

It is an effort to solidify Eugene's

minorities for political purposes, says Peters.

This new

organization is also the outgrowth of the performance of
the local Community Action Program.

In his opinion, the

local Community Action Program does not have the support
of Blacks and other minorities in Eugene.

He maintains

that it has never been representative of the needs of the
city's minorities.

Peters has gotten minorities hired in

the Community Action Program organization but they have
all shortly quit because of the "institutionalized racism
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that permeates the institution."

He believes this is so

partly because the chairman of the local organization is
an unsympathetic white and partly because the program is
so disorganized.

A further reason, however, that local

minorities were turned off to the organization to begin
with was because it replaced an organization called Lane
Human Resources.

That organization was primarily staffed

with minorities and when it became a Community

Action

Program they were replaced with nonminorities.

Later,

when Peters thought he could place some minorities in Community Action Program positions he had little luck because it was being led by whites living in rural Lane
County, who have a long history of being anti-Black.

So,

Peters saw that the Community Action Program was not a
group that could lobby for minorities and hence his new
organization was created, the Lane County Non-white Taxpayers Association.
Peters joins McKinley in lamenting the lack of minority representation on the Lane County Organization of
Governments staff.

In Peters' opinion, its recommenda-

tions clearly showed they did not have much minority input.
Mr. Peters, however, has great hope for the future success
of his new interest group and thanks revenue sharing for
indirectly helping it to get off the ground.

He also be-

lieves the City Manager and the Mayor truly care about the
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city's minorities.

It is rural Lane County that seems

least sympathetic to minority needs and that is a serious
20
problem.
In three areas, revenue sharing seems to have developed better communication and representation between
units of government and citizens of the Eugene/Lane
County area.

First, there is the new minorities organ-

ization mentioned above.

Second, there is the help rev-

enue sharing funds are giving to the further development
of the neighborhood concept in Eugene.

Neal Murry ex-

plains that the neighborhood organizations so far are
developed in a wide range of neighborhoods in terms of
socioeconomic levels.

Each neighborhood organization is

working to develop plans for its community in the context
of the 1990 Comprehensive Plan already worked out for
Eugene, which is a land use plan.

The revenue sharing

funds going to provide city staff help for the neighborhood organizations should help to spur the neighborhood's
work and bring them closer to city government, in Murry's
opinion.

Third, revenue sharing has definitely encour-

aged city/county cooperation in the area of social services.

As the Joint City of Eugene-Lane County Social

Service Review Committee said in its report:
20peters, Interview.
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Revenue Sharing presents a unique opportunity
to promote coordination, cooperation, communication and continuity of care and services within
our rather complex and confusing delivery system. 21
Through Joint City/County efforts, it is hoped
that overall community priorities can be established prior to the in~~iation of the review process next fiscal year.
Views of City Officials on Federal Aid to Cities
If General Revenue Sharing has had a beneficial
effect in the greater Eugene area in terms of representation and communication, i t has also been received enthusiastically by all but one of those interviewed as a
very desirable form of federal aid.
Mrs. Campbell and Mr. McKinley were specific in
pointing out their belief that cities are very able to
determine their most pressing needs and the flexibility
and latitude given cities such as Eugene in block grant
programs is thus seen as very desirable.

I"lcKinley went

on to say that block grants recognize the superior taxing
ability of the federal government and at the same time the
superior knowledge of local problems by local government.
He strongly endorses this type of aid but feels cities
should have to make application for Special Revenue Sharing.

He argued that a city should have a community devel-

opment plan that is submitted to the federal government
2lReport to the Budget Committee, p. 5.
22 Ibid ., p. 7.

336
that indicates in detail that the city is ready for its
block grant and knows what i t is going to do with it.
Only then should the block grant be forthcoming.

Such

a process, he said, is "better that a shotgun block grant."
He feared, however, after his recent trip to Washington
that Special Revenue Sharing was in deep trouble and
would not come out of Congress for some time. 23
Mrs. Campbell added that categorical grants tend to
make the cities apply for them whether the city needs that
specific form of federal aid very badly or not.

This is

wasteful of tax money and also the time and energies of
local government as it tries to decide what to do with inappropriate categorical grant money.

She preferred block

grants for the same reasons stated by the City t.IJanager and
she echoed the Tacoma City I'lanager' s hopes that the cities
perform well with General Revenue Sharing so that Congress
will continue it indefinitely.24
As Minority Affairs Representative, Louis Peters
said he would not be opposed to a block grant like revenue
sharing if the money would go to the minorities and other
disadvantaged in the community in the amounts they really
need.

He felt minorities were tricked into believing the

General Revenue Sharing money would go into social pro-

23~cKinley, Interview.
24

Campbell, Interview.
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grams.

In reality, not enough is, and under the guide-

lines of the Act, as he reads it, no revenue sharing
money need necessarily go to replace cutback social service categorical grants.

He feels minorities are in-

creasingly alienated as a result of this.

The specific

guidelines of categorical grants are all that can insure
the disadvantaged will get any federal aid, felt Peters.
So far, he said, General Revenue Sharing has demonstrated
the "typical neglect of the minorities by the white
.

. t y. ,,25

maJor~

III. EUGENE: SUB-CONCLUSIONS
If the New Federalism is working, it means that
power, funds and responsibility are flowing from Washington, D.C., to the states, localities and the people, in
part, through General Revenue Sharing.

The liberal major-

ity on the Eugene City Council seem to have taken the
funds that have flowed to them and exerted considerable
independent judgment and responsibility in deciding where
the General Revenue Sharing funds should go.

In spending

as much as was spent on social services, and especially
the funding of a public housing project, the increased responsibility of the Council over the restrictions of categorical grants was evidenced.
25

Peters, Interview.

To say that Eugene has
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more power due to General Revenue Sharing is also possible.

Certainly, Eugene faces the same categorical grant

cutbacks, the same inflation and an increase,jn the demand
for services that the other cities studied faced.

And,

although these were certainly compromising factors in the
overall power increase gained by the city from General
Revenue Sharing, the Council still dared to allocate
heavily for other than traditional city service needs.
Again, the public housing allotment and the relatively
large amount spent on social services witness this fact.
The amount of power gained by the city cannot be measured
in any absolute sense, but an assessment of its General
Revenue Sharing activities indicates a command over the
allocation of resources was exercised by the City Council
that it had been financially unable, together with being,
perhaps, philosophically unwilling, to exercise before
General Revenue Sharing.
Eugene took unusual initiative in trying to assess
its own social service needs through its cooperative program with Lane County in that area.

The New Federalism

argues that it is desirable for cities to establish their
own priorities in the community and social service areas
and determine the best methods for meeting their needs.
This is part of the decentralization aspect of the New
Federalism.

Although there was certainly considerable
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debate in the Budget Committee and on the City Council on
priorities and methods for realizing them, the city took
the responsibility seriously and the availability of General Revenue Sharing funds made the whole thing possible.
It would be going too far to suggest that the Eugene experience itself has measurably decentralized American government, but the interest and initiative shown by that
city in independent priority setting and determining its
own means to fulfill those priorities show that a measure
of decentralization may be possible if not compromised by
other fiscal constraints and interference by "higher" levels of government that could infringe on local affairs.
Eugene has taken seriously Hr. Nathan's categories
for local decision-making under the New Federalism, namely,
human and community service programs.

Again, some on the

Council and the Lane County Organization of Governments
report may not agree with the majority on the Council that
some of these functions are properly assumed by the city,
but the majority has ruled that the city's responsibilities are quite broad in these areas.

It must be pointed

out, however, that although the City Manager and some on
the Council feel the city should take up responsibilities
in these areas, it is the reality of federal cutbacks in
categorical grants in the human and community service
areas that has also driven the city to assume some respon-
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sibility in those areas.

But one gets the impression

that Eugene knows now that it will have to move increasingly in the human and social service areas and programs
such as city/county cooperation in the social services
indicate that commitment.
Mr. McKinley was careful to point out that the
city and the county are in the process of evaluating
social programs that have gone on in both units of government in an effort to see to it that worthwhile programs
are continued to be funded and not lost in the shuffle
from categorical grant funding to revenue sharing funding.
Actually this process has gone on since the Lane County
Organization of Governments' study was started.

It

appears that as long as the current administration and
the current majority on the City Council exist in
Eugene, their appraisal of which programs should be con.tinued will likely be sympathetic to the city's disadvantaged and its minorities.

Mr. Peters might want the

city to go further but he too agreed that the city of
Eugene is the only hope for minorities in the area.

Lane

County government, in his opinion, is quite hostile to
their interests.
Has General Revenue Sharing brought the government
closer to the people of Eugene?

As we have seen, the

Eugene Budget Committee has laymen equal in number to
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Council members serving on it; thus the individual citizen
has a voice on budget matters over and above the open
hearing process.

The regular budget decision-making

process has already been designed to include "the people."
Also, the Joint Committee making social service recommendations had individual citizens serving on it as well.

But

revenue sharing had an effect in bringing the government
of Eugene closer to the people, in individual and small
group forms, at least potentially, in two areas.

First,

some revenue sharing money went to aid the development
of Eugene's neighborhoods as effective representation
units for their citizens at City Hall.

Also the new

minority interest group, the Lane County Non-White Tax
Payers Association was formed to lobby for revenue sharing money because the town's minorities saw the local
Community Action Program as not really representative of
their interests.

In these two ways the access of indiv-

iduals and small divergent groups to the halls of government seems to have been given impetus by General Revenue
Sharing.

But the importance of the individual and his

need to have access to government

se~ms

already to have

been recognized in the previously established decisionmaking procedures for budgetary matters in Eugene.

It

is fair to say that the decision-making process for
revenue sharing in Eugene was fairly open.

Mr. Peters
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and others argued, however, that the average citizen and
particularly the average minority,did not have the representation they should have had.

And it is true that the

city did not go out of its way to create a special citizen
inclusion apparatus for deciding revenue sharing allocations, with the possible exception of the citizens on the
Joint Committee.

How "open" a decision-making process

is is a relative question.

Relative to the other cities

in this study, Eugene is perhaps less open than Tacoma
in making General Revenue Sharing decisions, but more open
than either Portland or Seattle.

The individual citizen

was deliberately included in the decision-making process
in Eugene and that leads to an "individualistic" interpretation of the New Federalism in terms of how the city
defined the Nixon Administration's goal of returning power
to the people.
A goal of the New Federalism was that various levels
of government should play certain functional roles in
providing services.

As we have seen, in Eugene there was

a willingness expressed by most of those interviewed to
assume human and social service responsibilities at the
city level.

The main point being that if there is not

enough money available, local government will not be able
to do the job adequately.
The New Federalism also has as its goal that the
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federal system should be decentralized.

It was argued

earlier that Eugene has gained a measure of power from
General Revenue Sharing, but it would be going too far
to suggest this small city has become so strengthened
as to be very "independent" from either the State of
Oregon or the federal government.

Eugene is financially

and constitutionally incapable of functioning as substantially detached from either of those two units of
government, with or without General Revenue Sharing.
In Eugene we see a very special effort by the city's
minorities to seek help from the city where help has been
denied them from the Federal and State and even county
governments.

The Lane County Non-White Tax Payers Associ-

ation is an effort to petition City Hall for money and
programs to address the needs of the town's minorities
and the disadvantaged in the light of federal aid cutbacks and the failure of the local Community Action
Program to represent those groups.

General Revenue Shar-

ing indirectly lea to the formation of this group because
the town's minorities pulled together to lobby for
General Revenue Sharing funds and then formed the new
interest group having found a sense of group identity
and a measure of effectiveness.

Those fearful of the

New Federalism worry about minorities not finding a hearing at the local level with General Revenue Sharing, fear
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a loss of politicization of the poor and minorities.
In Eugene those disappointed by the cutback in federal
grants for social programs are definitely seeking to
open Eugene government to their requests for help.

But

these people are asking the city for help, less because
they were politicized during the War on Poverty program
period than because of Mr. Peters' current efforts.

In

fact, the minorities seem to be more active in spite of
the Community Action Program in the area than because
of its success.
To a significant degree Eugene and Lane County are
working to continue to fund social programs that existed
during the

~ar

on Poverty and are now threatened with

financial cutbacks from the federal government.

True,

many of the social programs funded by the $275,000 for
this purpose were not specifically War on Poverty programs, as Mr. McKinley reported, many of those programs
folded long ago.

But Head Start and other programs con-

sidered useful to the needy are going to continue to be
evaluated by both the city and the county and if not
funded, will be considered for funding at the midyear
allocation period.

There is no evidence the Council

majority wants to abandon the recent national priority
of helping the disadvantaged as much as limited funding
will allow.

The Council majority stated more specifically
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that was the case in any other city studied, that they
felt the community had a responsibility to solve social
problems through the use of public resources.
McKinley wished the city had started long ago.

Mr.
Mr.

Williams represented the voice of the t0wn's conservative
business community, but that group is in the minority
on the Council and the Budget Committee.
that as of now, there is no;

Thus it seems

danger the local special

interests will be able to set priorities different from
recent national goals in terms of responsibility of the
collectivity to help the needy with public funds.

But

politics is fluid and the balance on the Council could
change, and if a Williams majority ever takes power,
then such national priorities as discussed here would
be in danger in Eugene.
There is no evidence those interviewed in Euqene
believe General Revenue Sharing should come to them with
strict guidelines from

~ashington,

D.C., in order to

protect national priorities and effect justice and the
rule of law in America.

They seem to feel law and

justice are not jeopardized by locals making decisions
that affect the whole community.

It is not that the

problems addressed by the possible use of revenue sharing
monies are not problems that the federal government once
would let locals deal with only under the direction of
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of federal guidelines, bec8U.se the General Revenue Sharing
funds used to

car~y

on categorical grants are funds being

used for programs carefully regulated from Washington,
D.C.

It is simply that the New Federalism does not lay

strict guidelines in its block grants and very area of
society is potentially affected.

The possibility that

local interests could erase the progress made in this
county in civil rights and other areas there, but in
Eugene the Council majority seems to agree with the
goals of national interests and Lowi, that justice for
all citizens equally should be a local goal as well as
a national one.

In the brief time Eugene has had General

Revenue Sharing, there is nothing to indicate the cause
of civil rights or of minority interests are not also
the cause of the majority who make the decisions in City
Hall at this time.
Interest group liberalism would have to be seen as
being a considerable boost in Eugene as a result of General Revenue Sharing.

The new minority organization that

has already been active in seeking General Revenue Sharing
money and the new neighborhood groups are indirectly
the product of General Revenue Sharing and its surrounding
politics.

Many interest groups petitioned for General

Revenue Sharing funds and were dealt with either by City
Hall or by the Joint City/County

committe~s.

General
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Revenue Sharing did nothing to weaken interest group
liberalism in Eugene, it strengthened it.

As to whether

this will further frustrate the cause of justice in
American remains to be seen.

But Lowi would agree, that

because General Revenue Sharing had so few guidelines in
the first place, the bargaining at the state and local
level as to what will be done with the funds is the
inevitable result.

Lowi would be upset over the wide

range of areas touched by General Revenue Sharing with
no firm guidelines from Washington protecting the rule
of law and the cause of justice, but such is the design
and intent of General Revenue Sharing.
Lowi was particularly worried about the further
decentralization of the American system that results from
strong and "autonomous" cities.

As a result of General

Revenue Sharing, Eugene may be a measure stronger, but
it is in no way autonomous.

Again, the goal of the New

Federalism was to strengthen the concurrent regimes below
the national governmental level in our compound republic.
It is clearly a philosophy of decentralization that is
contrary to what Lowi advocates for the promotion of
justice in this country.

Lowi did want the states

strengthened, but the cities eliminated as separate
decision-making units of government.

General Revenue

Sharing may be helping the states, but it is also helping
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the cities financially.

But it is always important to

remember that the strength of every level of government
touched by General Revenue Sharing may be, and in many
cases is, compromised by fiscal

incun~erances

that may

be no net gain for the city or state if Special Revenue
Sharing and other forms of federal aid are not forthcoming.
In terms of Lowi, however, General Revenue Sharing by
itself is doing nothing to lessen whatever autonomy the
cit~has.

~
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CHAPTER VIII
GENERAL REVENUE SHARING AND THE NEW FEDERALISM:
SOME EARLY CONCLUSIONS ON THE URBAN EXPERIENCE
In this final chapter we will pull together and
analyze the information contained in the "Sub-Conclusions"
sections of the case studies of Seattle, Tacoma, Portland
and Eugene.

We will make a further effort to compare and

explain the General Revenue Sharing experiences of these
cities in terms of the goals and fears of the New Federalism outlined in detail in Chapter III.

Each of the goals

and each of the fears will be specified.

Under each head-

ing, a final evaluation of General Revenue Sharing and the
New Federalism will be made in terms of that specific
goal or fear.
I. GOALS OF THE NEW FEDERALISM
1. Seeing to it that Power, Funds and Responsibility Flow
from Washington, D.C., to the States, Localities and the
People.
Throughout this study, we have defined power as the
command over the allocation of resources.

Each city could

be assumed to have increased its power if, due to receiving General Revenue Sharing funds, it had a greater control over its fiscal situation than it did before receiv-
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ing the revenue sharing funds.

In each case, we have

found that, although the city officials welcomed the General Revenue Sharing funds, and especially the fact that
it came with so few federal guidelines, they found the
money did not give them much new power.

Inflation, rising

labor costs, cutback federal categorical grants and increasing demands for traditional city services have all
combined to negate whatever control over the allocation of
resources revenue sharing funds might have given the cities.

We saw that in Portland, traditional urban responsi-

bilities were unmet or underfunded.

With this being the

case, the city had to spend its General Revenue Sharing
funds on meeting the city's most basic needs.

In the case

of both Seattle and Tacoma, we found that the Washington
State Legislature is further insuring that the cities do
not gain any real power from General Revenue Sharing.

The

Legislature seems to feel that the cities are now wealthy
with their new General Revenue Sharing funds and thus can
absorb cutbacks in state aid.

Those interviewed in Seat-

tle and Tacoma could not agree less with the Legislature.
In Eugene, the situation seemed to be a bit different.

In that small city the City Council allocated con-

siderable General Revenue Sharing funds to public housing
and other social programs that were not at all traditional
city responsibilities.

l

The Council allocated funds in new

r
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areas and thus demonstrated considerable power, new power,
to do things they were financially unable to do without
revenue sharing.

It can perhaps be explained that being

a smaller city, Eugene had fewer demands on its financial
resources and thus ·could afford to spend the money in new
areas that larger cities could not afford to do.
probably the case, at least in part.

This is

In a larger sense,

however, where the money goes is a function"of the priorities of the City Council majority.

In Eugene, the

major~

ity wanted large parts of the General Revenue Sharing
funds to go for nontraditional purposes.
We saw the same thing in Seattle.

The Council ma-

jority there wanted a large part of the General Revenue
Sharing funds to go for housing rehabilitation, the renovation of historical sights and other purposes.
not usually funded with city monies.

These are

Certainly, Seattle

is a large city with tremendous demands for the allocation
of its funds.
The reality, then, of the fiscal crunch shared by
all cities is a constraint upon how much power has been
gained through General Revenue Sharing.

However, the city

may venture forth into new areas with the General Revenue
Sharing money if the City Council majority so authorizes.
Doing so, of course, means that something else is not being funded.

One thing that everyone interviewed seemed to

r
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agree on is that the General Revenue Sharing allocation to
their city was not very much money.

Especially consider-

ing the fact that Special Revenue Sharing has not passed
Congress, the General Revenue Sharing funds were being demanded by social service agencies that should have been
funded by categorical grants or Special Revenue Sharing.
So the amount of power gained by each city was compromised
by the fact that the actual amount of General Revenue
Sharing that the city received was not as great as it
might be if it was really to be the "new money" promised
by the Administration.

If the amount of General Revenue

Sharing had in fact been greater it could have been the
"new money" that could provide the opportunity for each
city to undertake new programs without ignoring or underfunding traditional services.

But the demands on the Gen-

eral Revenue Sharing funds were too great for the money
to be "new money."

Where General Revenue Sharing allowed

new programs to develop it was less because of the financial opportunity offered by revenue sharing than because
of the political muscle used by council majorities.
Pursuant to the goals of the Revenue Sharing Act,
funds did flow from Washington, D.C., to Seattle, Tacoma,
Portland and Eugene.

Little power accompanied those funds

because of fiscal constraints.

In every city, however,

the increased responsibility given the city through the

353

General Revenue Sharing block grant was definitely felt.
Each city realized it had to decide how to allocate General Revenue Sharing funds and where to allocate them.
The Revenue Sharing Act itself only gave the broadest
guidelines as to how and where to allocate.
took this new responsibility very seriously.
procedure, however, they varied.

Each city
In terms of

They varied principally

in deciding who should participate in the revenue sharing
decision-making process.

This will be eEamined in some

detail later.
The cities were remarkably consistent in recognizing
the need to set up some sort of bureau to help decide how
to allocate and how to administer revenue sharing funds
for human and community services.

Each city had some vari-

ation of a human services bureau established.

They seemed

to recognize clearly one hard fact about the New Federalism, that being that local government is going to have to
take over deciding about and administering human and community service programs.

The federal government will only

supply the money.
The severity of political conflict in Seattle over
the allocation of General Revenue Sharing funds attested
to this new responsibility.

Some councilmen refused to

believe or agree that human and community services were
municipal responsibilities, regardless of the New Federal-
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ism.
ment.

Councilman Williams in Eugene

hel~.

a similar senti-

Yet the Council majority in each city seemed to .

recognize the new responsibilities of revenue sharing and
tried to organize for them.

All that was missing was

enough General Revenue Sharing (and Special Revenue Sharing?) money to handle to new responsibilities properly.
Later in this chapter, we will examine whether the
power, funds and responsibility flowing from Washington,
D.C., to the cities has reached "the people."
2. Making Government, at All Levels, More Responsive.
This Can Be Done by Making Specific Layers (National,
State, Local) of Government Responsible for SpecifiC
Programs So It Will Be Easier for the People to Know
Which Layer of Government to Hold Accountable for Which
Programs. A Goal Is the Decentralization of American
Government in Terms of Certain Functions being Assumed
by Certain Levels of Government. For Example, Human
and Community Services Would be Functional Areas of
Concern to State and Local Governments, Not the National Government.
This goal of the New Federalism suggests the_ Administration sees American federalism in terms of the layer
cake theory.

The top "layer" in Washington, D.C., should

be responsible for some governmental responsibilities and
the "lower" layer should have separate responsibilities.
In seeking to so divide and separate governmental responsibilities, the Nixon Administration appears to want to
get away from the shared responsibility for most governmental functions that has typified American federalism
through history.

This New Federalism goal wants to elimi-
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nate the shared responsibilities and decisions expressed
in the "marble cake" theory of federalism.
This goal of the New Federalism is difficult to assess in terms of the cities studied because of the newness
of General Revenue Sharing and the nonexistence of Special
Revenue Sharing.

As we have seen, although every city

studied has taken very seriously the fact that they are
expected under the New Federalism to take as their functional concern human and community services, they have not
received adequate federal funding to do the job.

This is

because General Revenue Sharing is inadequate and Special
Revenue Sharing has been held up in Congress.

The basic

decentralization goal of the New Federalism simply cannot
be accomplished unless Special Revenue Sharing becomes a
reality and General Revenue Sharing is extended indefinitely.
The latter is the case because the cities studied
are reluctant to fund anything but temporary or short-term
programs with General Revenue Sharing because they do not
want to get into an expensive long-term program and then
find General Revenue Sharing ended, thus cuttingcrf their
financial support of these programs.

In every city the

sentiment was shared that they were reluctant to undertake
the long-term types of programs that the city must undertake if it is to get into the human and community services
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business permanently.

They feared Congress would not re-

new the program when General Revenue Sharing expires.

The

human services bureaus set up in every city were a tentative step toward recognizing the city's new responsibilities, but they were modest undertakings considering the
bureaucratic undertaking each city will have to commit itself to once it is assured revenue sharing is a permanent
thing.

Before cities can do that, Congress will have to

establish a permenent revenue sharing program that can
withstand the partisan

poli~ies

tions and congresses.

As of this writing there seems very

of various administra-

little chance of Congress making such a commitment.

Due

to Watergate, the Nixon Administration appears to be substantially weakened in its ability to get legislation
through Congress and this, too, lessens considerably the
chance that revenue sharing will become the established
national policy it must become if the cities are to commit themselves to decentralization.
Because the decentralization aspect of the New Federalism is so incomplete it is not possible for local
citizens to hold their local governments responsible for
human and community services in place of the national government.

Thus, it is not possible to evaluate whether

citizens at the local level feel their city governments
are more responsive to them in these functional areas.
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A feeling of some sort of "independence" from the
state and national government that would accompany genuine
decentralization of American government has not been felt
in the cities studied.

City officials still consider

themselves the creatures of their states and greatly dependent on the state and federal governments for financial
aid.

Of course, the New Federalism did not suggest that

the decentralization it seeks would ever have as a component part the financial independence of local government.
The goal was that local government should decide how to
spend federal monies at the local level on human and community service programs.

Yet even in this sense, the of-

ficials interviewed felt the limited amount of revenue
sharing funds they were getting, together with the great
demand for funds, limited considerably whatever "independence" they might exercise in allocating the funds.
That is, demands were so strong from areas traditionally
funded by the city that it was difficult to fund reduced
federal programs, much less any new or innovative ones.
Yet we did see Council majorities in Eugene and Seattle
exercising some independence in allocating General Revenue
Sharing funds for nontraditional purposes.

But, as stated

earlier, this exercise of "independence" seems less an opportunity given by the receiving of General Revenue Sharing funds than the successful exercise of political power

I

t
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by one group of Councilmembers.
Cities became dependent on the federal government
because they needed money to carry out basic services, to
keep up with inflation and to meet increasing labor costs.
For cities to develop any independence from the federal
government in determining priorities in human and community service areas, that is, for decentralization to bee
come a reality, the federal government must give considerably more money in the form of revenue sharing to the
cities and must guarantee it indefinitely.

Otherwise, the

cities will not be able to make either the financial or
psychological Gommi tment necessary to iir.·.fact assume responsibility for human and community services.

That com-

mitment is necessary to make decentralization a reality.
3. Involving the Average Citizen in Local DecisionMaking Processes on Public Policy Matters. The Goal Is
to Bring Government Closer to the People. Thus the Citizen Will be Able to Evaluate Both Programs and Officials
and Will Seek to Retain Those That Are Useful and Dispose of the Rest. Citizens and State and Local Officials Are to Work Together in Establishing Ptiorities
and Policies Based Upon Local Characteristics and Needs.
We saw in Chapter III that the New Federalism goal
of returning government "to the
but important goal.

people~I'

is an ambiguous

Because the State and Local Fiscal

Assistance Act of 1972 did not specify how "the people"
were to be involved in the revenue sharing decision-making
process, it was left to each city to decide how, and to

.L
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what extent, "the people" in their community were to participate in the General Revenue Sharing experience.

We

have seen in the case studies that a wide variety of procedures were adopted for deciding how to allocate General
Revenue Sharing funds.

There was also variety in terms of

how broad a cross section of citizens in the municipal
area received benefits from the allocation of General Revenue Sharing funds.
In the January/February, 1974, issue of Society, ..
Gregg Beyer examined the role of the individual citizen
in the revenue sharing decision-making process.

He said

that, " ••• the trend toward greater citizen participation
in the decision-making process seems irreversible.

There

is, after all, no power greater than an idea whose time
has come."l There is no question but that this central
fact of political life was recognized by those interviewed
for this study.

Nevertheless, the four cities did vary in

how they addressed the current trend toward citizen participation in this country.
Tacomaa

In Tacoma, we found a Mayor who was sup-

ported by an administrative staff and a majority of the
City Council who felt that citizen participation in government decision-making was a good idea.

Tacoma, under

IGregg Beyer, "Revenue Sharing and the New Federalism," Society, January/February, 1974, p. 61.
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the Mayor's leadership, went out of its way to set up a
very elaborate decision-making apparatus that included
many citizens from all walks of life in various stages of
the project evaluation and fund allocation of Tacoma's
General Revenue Sharing monies.

The ultimate decision on

allocation rests with the Tacoma City Council, but there
is no question but that the average Tacoma citizen had a
representative in the pre-City Council decision-making
activities.

In Tacoma, "returning government to the peo-

ple" has meant returning government not just to city government institutions, but to individual citizens as well.
There was an important element of Jeffersonian individualism in the Tacoma experience.

Jefferson said that

citizens in a local community should determine local priorities and make policy decisions.

In Tacoma, the average

citizen could not participate in a direct democracy process such as that advocated by Jefferson, but a large number of average citizens who would ordinarily not be included in local public policy-making were given the opportunity to participate.

Other citizens could partici-

pate in the regular manner, through their elected representatives on the City Councilor through interest groups
who petitioned the Council for part of the General Revenue
Sharing funds.

All in all, Tacoma went a long way toward

recognizing the fact that today citizens want to partici-
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pate (at least some of them do) and that suitable mechanisms need to be established so they can participate, regardless of their socioeconomic group, race or sex.

The

only explanation for the Tacoma experience being so different from the other cities studied has to be the determination of the Mayor and his staff to make citizen participation a reality.

In the other cities there was not

the same commitment to such participation, or if there was,
it did not manifest itself in their revenue sharing experience.
Tacoma made the individual matter in an age when we
are continually told that the average citizen's policymaking role is over.

Mayor Johnston of Tacoma believed

in the citizen participation aspects of Model Cities and
War on Poverty programs that had taken place in his city
and wanted to continue citizen involvement in a meaningful
way.

It did not appear to be a political ploy, he sin-

cerely believed the average citizen has something to contribute.
Eugene.
Eugene as well.

There was some citizen participation in
Tacoma is unique among the cities studied

in that it set up a citizen participation process especially for the purpose of deciding on revenue sharing allocations.

The process worked so well there were plans to use

the evaluation process for all budget matters in the fu-

362

ture.

In Eugene we found a degree of citizen partici-

pation already established as part of the city's regular
budget process.

In Eugene, the Budget Committee is made

up one-half by City Councilmembers and one-half by regular
citizens.

Because the Eugene City Council decided to use

the regular budget process for deciding how to allocate
revenue sharing funds, citizens on the Budget Committee
did playa role.

Also, in the city's effort to develop

the best process for deciding how to allocate revenue
sharing funds to particular social programs, it worked
with Lane County in a joint effort.

The decision-making

mechanism established for that purpose also contained
average citizens.
In Eugene, it would be hard to say that General Revenue Sharing and the New Federalism brought government
closer to the individual citizen.

Some degree of citizen

participation was used as a matter of course in the city's
decision-making activities on budget matters.
course, is to Eugene's credit.

This, of

For some time the city has

seemed to realize that citizen participation is indeed an
idea whose time has come.

But, we saw that Mr. Peters,

Eugene's Minority Affairs Representative, did not believe
the minorities of the city were effectively represented
in the General Revenue Sharing decision-making process.
It is also true that Mr. Peters and others interviewed in
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the city felt Eugene had had a bad experience with the
War on Poverty and its citizen participation aspects.
Considering the small poor and minority population
in Eugene, the pressures for broad citizen participation
beyond the process already established were not very great.
It would be going too far to say that Jeffersonian individualism or the individualism of the War on Poverty was
strengthened in the Eugene revenue sharing experience.
It is true, however, that a new grass roots interest group
made up of the city's minorities has emerged under Peters'
di.'rection as a result of their feeling left out of the
revenue sharing process.

In this reverse sense, perhaps

revenue sharing has helped activate same citizens in
Eugene and maybe the result will be government brought
closer to them.

One gains the impression, however, that

in Eugene, the Budget Committee, the City Council and the
joint city-county committees did a good job in representing the majority of citizens in the revenue sharing decision-making process.
Portland.

In

Portla~a,

the short-run influence of

revenue sharing in bringing government closer to the people of the city seems to be minimal.

There are a few in-

dividual citizens who advise the city bureaus on budget
matters.

As a matter of course, citizens,can petition the

City Council on budget matters.

They can also petition
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the Office of Management Services.

But in the long run,

the Portland situation may be very different and largely
due to revenue sharing.

Portland is moving toward the es-

tablishment of a neighborhood participation concept that
seeks to involve individuals in policy-making matters that
affect their neighborhoods.

Representatives from the

neighborhoods would be in contact with City Hall and thus
represent their neighborhood needs to city officials.
Those interviewed in Portland indicate that final
realization of this citizen participation mechanism is not
imminent, but they also indicate that General Revenue Sharing funds "freed up" monies to get the program off the
groupd.

This plan was in the works before revenue shar-

ing, but it appears that General Revenue Sharing may be
responsible for its final realization.

Such a neighbor-

hood concept would go a long way toward establishing the
individual Portland citizen as a more integral part of the
city public policy-making process.

As Commissioner

Iavncie said, citizen participation is now a fact of life.
It would be going too far to suggest that citizens in Portland are now working with local officials to determine local priorities and allocate revenue sharing funds accordingly, pursuant to the New Federalism goal, but when the
neighborhood concept develops, assuming that revenues and
politics will allow it to develop, citizen involvement
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may become a reality in Portland.
Seattle.

In Seattle, there was the least amount of

citizen participation in the General Revenue Sharing decision-making process of any city studied.

Councilman

Miller said the Seattle 2000 project had worn citizens out
and there was little use in trying to get their help in
deciding the allocation of General Revenue Sharing funds.
Perhaps this was true.

Nevertheless, nothing was tried in

terms of including individual citizens in the General Revenue Sharing decision-making process in Seattle.

Citizens

could petition the Office of Management and Budget or the
City Council, but no specific citizen participation mechanism was set up or suggested for the future.

Only

t~e

Human Rights Commission hoped to include citizens in Some
of their future work, which mayor may not include revenue
sharing allocations.

It will if Special Revenue Sharing

becomes a reality.
General Revenue Sharing definitely did not bring
government closer to the individual citizen in Seattle.
In no way did the Jeffersonian model or the city's War on
Poverty or Model Cities experience translate itself into
a citizen involvement program from General Revenue Sharing
allocations.

At best, the Madisonian group competition

model was active in Seattle.

In the case of Seattle, then,

"returning government to the people" meant not the indivi-
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dual, but the city government was beneficiary, along with
the local special interests who have a regular hearing at
City Hall.
4. Participation Versus Benefits

"Returning government to the people" can be evaluated in one other dimension.

In addition to seeing who

participated in the General Revenue Sharing decision-making process, we can see who benefitted from revenue sharing allocations.
In Eugene and Seattle, a rather broad cross section
of the city's population would appear to benefit if funds
are actually spent for the purposes indicated by city
staff.

In both these cities, large amounts of General Rev-

enue Sharing funds went for housing.

In Seattle, the

money was for housing rehabilitation, while in Eugene it
was for building public housing for the city's aged and
poor.

An Asian and Indian Cultural Center in Seattle also

shows that some General Revenue Sharing funds were going
for the distinct interests of minority citizens.

In

Eugene a large amount of revenue sharing money was allocated for social services in cooperation with Lane County.
In Seattle, however, the tentative nature of the allocation in the "reserved" category must be kept in mind, but
if those monies are approved, Seattle will have gone a
long way toward including a large cross section of the
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city in General Revenue Sharing benefits in terms of allocations.
In Tacoma, the City Council has yet tm finally approve General Revenue Sharing allocations.

The Council

has said that it will fund programs that have been evaluated in the top fifty rankings on a "first ready" basis.
It is ironic that in Tacoma, the city with the widest citizen participation in the General Revenue Sharing allocation process, that the possibility exists that not much
General Revenue Sharing money will be spent to benefit the
city's poor and minorities.

Most of the human and commu-

nity service programs are ranked in the last ten or fifteen places among the top fifty programs.

Yet, if the

Council does fund on a "first ready" basis, human and community service programs may be able to prepare themselves
for final approval as quickly as any other program.

What

is clear from this &udy, however, is that as long as the
City Council is the body with the final decision-making
capability, it is ultimately dependent on the political
and social disposition of the Council whether a broad
cross section of the city's population will benefit from
General Revenue Sharing funds.

The citizen participation

elements in the Tacoma experience are significant, but
because the evaluation teams did not rank human and community service programs very high, it will be up to the
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Council to see to it that those programs are funded if it
is interested in spreading the benefits of General Revenue
Sharing throughout the city.
Because Portland did not allocate its General Revenue
Sharing funds separately from other general fund monies,
it is hard to assess who in the city benefitted from revenue sharing.

The city did draw up a list of programs for

the purpose of satisfying u.S. Treasury requirements, that
can be considered General Revenue Sharing funded, which
were programs funded out of the general fund, which included General Revenue Sharing monies.

In examining these

programs, it appears that human and community service programs did not receive a great deal of attention.
money did go to the new Bureau of Human Resources.

Some
Large

amounts of money went to parks and recreation, and it can
be assumed that the poor and minorities enjoy these facilities if they are near them.
In Portland, the sentiment was strongly felt that
the city was hard pressed to meet the financial demands
for traditional city services and that, even with General
Revenue Sharing, there was not much money for social service programs.

It would be up to Special Revenue Sharing

to supply money for these programs.

The emphasis in Port-

land, according to Mr. Scott, was to spend General Revenue
Sharing funds to develop the neighborhood program and to

369
increase the efficiency of city government.

This sort of

allocation would ultimately bring the most benefit to all
of Portland's citizens.
As was the case in other cities, Portland was reluctant to spend General Revenue Sharing funds on major programs because of the danger the revenue sharing funding
may be withdrawn in a few years.
pay for the programs?

Then how would the city

City officials in Portland cited

this as a major reason why more money was not spent on new
innovative human and community service programs.
It must be emphasized that in everyone of the cities studied, those interviewed said they would spend money
for a wider range of human and community service programs
if they had adequate funds to do so.

It is only fair to

remember all the financial constraints faced by city government mentioned many times in this study.

It should also

be remembered that human and community service programs
are new areas of concern for most cities.

Consequently,

they are not well organized nor do they have the expertise
they feel they need to move boldly into these areas at
this time.

In every instance, however, these cities were

preparing to move into these areas of concern with the
development of Bureaus of Human Resources.
In every city studied, a very large percentage of
General Revenue Sharing money went for capital expenses.
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Also, a great deal of money went for labor costs.

In each

city there was also the hope that General Revenue Sharing
funds would hold down the need for the city to tax its
citizens further, at least in the short run.

These sorts

of allocations benefit the whole community.

We have paid

particular attention to allocations specifically for the
poor and the minorities because the goal of the New Federalism was not just to bring government closer to the
people but to

eng~ge

the city in human and community ser-

vice responsibilities.

Therefore, it is important to see

the extent to which these four cities have done so, even
without the help of Special Revenue Sharing.

It is also

interesting to note that so far it appears that there is
not necessarily a correlation between degree of citizen
participation and benefits going to those citizens in the
famof General Revenue Sharing allocations.

Tacoma, for

example, had a sophisticated participation process yet
there is still a chance the City Council will not substantially fund programs beneficial to those who participated
in the evaluation process.
In sum, it can be said that in Seattle and Eugene,
allocations of General Revenue Sharing funds specifically
for the poor and minorities were significant.

In Portland

and Tacoma, the allocations were, in the former case, not
significant, and in the latter area incomplete.

In terms
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of this aspect of bringing government closer to the people,
the political and social disposition of the Councils combined with brutal fiscal reality have brought General Revenue Sharing benefits to a wide cross section of citizens
in two cities and maybe three, but not in Portland.
II. FEARS OF THE NEW FEDERALISM
1. That the Decentralization of Government Cited as a
Goal of the New Federalism May Bring Forth an Abandonment of Programs on Behalf of the Poor and Minorities.

We saw in the previous section that it would be an
exaggeration to suggest that the decentralization

of,'~Amer

ican government sought through the New Federalism had been
accomplished.

The New Federalism is too new and all its

programs have yet to be enacted.

Yet General Revenue

Sharing is a first step and it is possible to come to some
preliminary conclusions as to its effect on previously
established national programs for the poor and minorities.
General Revenue Sharing has given an opportunity for
the major interest groups and the city governments of the
cities examined in this study to reinforce or move away
from nationally established programs to benefit the poor
and minorities.

Because the General Revenue Sharing leg-

islation sets few guidelines, it is possible for a city
to establish priorities and policies for the allocation of
General Revenue Sharing funds that might ignore War on
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Poverty and Model Cities programs established in the late
1960's.

In Tacoma, Seattle and Eugene the author got the

distinct impression that city officials had no intention
of abandoning the poor and minorities in their cities.
Because these groups are, after all, a minority in the
city, it is understandable that they did not receive as
much money from General Revenue Sharing as did the programs designed to benefit the whole community.

But the

officials in these cities seemed genuinely to want to keep
the good programs of the War on Poverty and Model Cities.
They seemed to recognize that this nation had started
something and now it had a commitment to continue to help
the poor, the aged and racial and ethnic minorities.
Those interviewed who had this sentiment were in the majority on the city councils of their cities.

They did not

speak for the entire council nor for the entire community.
They spoke only for themselves and others who voted with
them on these matters on the City Council.
Mr. Williams in Eugene and Mr. Cooley in Seattle
would disagree that the funding of programs for the poor
and minorities should be a major priority in their cities.
They feel that tradition services (fire, police, etc.) are
underfunded and human and social programs should be funded
only when traditional programs are adequately funded.

Yet

in these cities we saw that activity on behalf of the poor
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and minorities had not been abandoned with the advent of
General Revenue Sharing.

Unless Special Revenue Sharing

comes along soon or cutback categorical grants are reinstated, the chances that those who want to continue to
help the poor and minorities in these cities will be able
to continue to do so are remote.

Without adequate funds,

the liberal tendencies of city officials will be frustrated.
In Portland, the activity that is taking place as
a result of General Revenue Sharing to help the poor and
minorities is less obvious.

Among those interviewed,

there seemed to be less commitment to national programs
to help the city's disadvantaged.

The development of the

Department of Human Resources is an indication, however,
that Portland intends to maintain programs for the disadvantaged when there is adequate funding.
be seen how extensive that commitment is

It remains to
in~terms

expended and programs developed and preserved.

of funds

In sum, it

does not appear that the slight degree of decentralization
so far accomplished by the New Federalism has caused 10cal government to abandon the poor and minorities.
2. That Decentralization Will Strengthen Local Special
Interests at the Expense of the Disadvantaged.
In Chapter II, we saw a wide range of opinion that
feared that local special interests would not allow local
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governments to spend revenue sharing money on the poor and
minorities in their communities.

The lack of guidelines

accompanying the Revenue Sharing Act provides an opportunity for +ocal government to allocate General Revenue Sharing funds in such a way that the poor and minorities of
their communities are left out.

With the reduction and/or

elimination of many categorical grant programs by the
Nixon Administration, further funding of programs to aid
the poor and minorities must come from state, county or
local funds.
The fears of those who felt local government combined with local special interests would not spend the
General Revenue Sharing funds on the poor and minorities
at the local level have not been confirmed by this study.
All of the cities have allocated some funds for human and
community services and Eugene and Seattle have allocated
(in Seattle, "reserved") a great deal.

It seems that it

is the overall fiscal crunch that is prohibiting further
allocations for these purposes, not lack of commitment to
the needs of the disadvantaged.

Unless General Revenue

Sharing funding is substantially expanded and/or Special
Revenue Sharing becomes a reality, local governments will
have no choice but to underfund programs for the city's
disadvantaged.

In other words, in a very real sense, it

is still up to national interests and the national gov-
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ernment to see to it that something is done for minorities
and the poor.
vide the money.

It is up to the national government to proThe results of this study indicate that

local government will spend a fair amount of it for the
poor and minorities.

It must be noted, however, that in

every city those advocating this active role for local
government in the social service area were a narrow majori ty.

Political trends could erase them.

Local special interests hostile to funding programs for the disadvantaged were represented among
interviewed for this study.

tho~e

In the future, they could

drastically cut aid for the disadvantaged if they get the
political upper hand.

So far, however, the fear of local

elites forcing local government to abandon the less fortunate has not materialized.
3. Decentralization Will Exclude the Disadvantaged
from Local Decision-Making.
The City Hall officials interviewed in three of the
four cities studied felt that those citizens politicized
during the War on Poverty and Model Cities programs had
been very active in petitioning for General Revenue Sharing funds.

In Seattle, officials felt that Model Cities

had done a particularly effective job in politicizing residents in the Model Cities communities.

Recognizing that

the Nixon Administration intends to cut back on Model
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Cities and categorical grant programs for the poor, those
affected by such cutbacks have appealed to the City Council
and Department of Human Resources for help.
In Portland and Tacoma, the situation was much the
same.

In those cities, however, the War on Poverty pro-

grams seemed to have as much effect as Model Cities in politicizing the poor and minorities.

Mayor Johnson of

Tacoma went out of his way to see to it that citizens activated by the federal programs of the late 1960's were
included in the evaluation process for General Revenue
Sharing.

He wanted to see to it that already established

business elites in Tacoma would be balanced in their influence by those politicized by the War on Poverty.

In

Portland, the politicization of the poor in recent years
has had influence in the decision to create the neighborhood organization concept.

It has also had a bearing on

the increasing effort to include average citizens as advisors in city bureaus as they draw up their budget proposals.
The Eugene situation was somewhat ironic.

Mr. Peters

suggested that the disadvantaged in Eugene were "turned
off" by the Community Action Programs developed under the
War on Poverty.

Peters said the Community Action Program-

was dominated by white citizens from rural Lane County
who did not allow much minority representation in the pro-

I

I

\

l
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gram.

As a reaction to that organization and in an ef-

fort to petition for General Revenue Sharing and later
Special Revenue Sharing funds, Peters has founded the Lane
County Non-White Taxpayers Association.

He hopes the or-

ganization will politicize the city poor and its minorities so that they will have a permanent hearing at City
Hall.

So far he has met with some success as members of

this organization have been active in City Hall hearings.
At this stage, therefore, there is no basis to substantiate the fear that citizens politicized during the
War on Poverty and Model Cities programs will be shut out
of participating in General Revenue Sharing decisions at
the local level.

The extent to which these citizens are

actually,heard, however, is dependent on the extent they
are actually included in the formal procedures of decisionmaking.

If the poor are only allowed to participate at

hearings and through sending program requests to bureaucratic departments, there is some question as to what
real input they can make.

If, however, they are included

in the "machinery" of decision-making, such as was the
case in the Tacoma evaluation process, then the poor and
minorities are more likely to be actually represented and
heard.

In his article in Society on "Revenue Sharing and

the New Federalism", Gregg Beyer suggests that citizen participation in the revenue sharing process would be a good,
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idea.

"(G)reater research and experimentation, as well as

careful analysis of past citizen-community action and model cities programs are needed before the model for most
effective citizen participation can be outlined. n2 He recognizes the need to include all citizensi from all walks
of life, in the revenue sharing process.
pation cannot be left to chance.

Their partici-

Simply allowing them to

petition government or come to hearings is not insuring
representation. "(C)itizen-consumer participation within
the New Federalism is an important hedge against corruption and abuse of authority • .,3
Beyer does not specifically say that the federal
government should include guidelines with the revenue
sharing legislation that might be forthcoming requiring
that all segments of the community be included in local
revenue sharing decision-making procedures.

He seems only

to suggest that local government should look closely at
the establishment of such a policy.

This, of course, fits

the goal of the New Federalism that seeks to give more responsibility to local government in making decisions in
the human and community service areas.

In all the cities

examined in this study except Seattle, there seemed to be
an understanding of the issue and some positive action
2Beyer, "Revenue Sharing," p. 61.
3 Ibid •
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taken to address it.
4. That General Revenue Sharing Will Strengthen Interest
Group Liberalism at the City Level and Further Frustrate
the Cause of Justice in America.

Theodore Lowi in The End of Liberalism argued that
the constant bargaining and compromise that takes place
among competing interest groups in America after legislation has been passed by Congress has frustrated the
cause of justice in this country.

The good intentions of

liberal legislators have been bargained away in the administration and implementation of laws as bureaucrats
engage in brokerage politics with interest groups.

Gen-

eral Revenue Sharing has done nothing to abate the development of interest group liberalism in America.

If any-

thing, the Revenue Sharing Act deliberately encouraged
interest group competition at the local level after the
Act was passed.

Because the Act seeks to involve local

citizens and interest groups in a process to determine
local priorities and policies it encourages brokerage
politics.
In every city studied for this paper it was found
that there was intense interest group lobbying for General Revenue Sharing funds.

But the General Revenue Shar-

ing Act did not contain the guidelines Lowi was worried
about compromising in the brokerage politics process.
letter of the legislation did not seek to further the

The
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cause of justice and the rule of law in America.

It ab-

dicated that responsibility to state and local government
as they dealt with revenue sharing funds.

Even though

the programs for social justice that Lowi wanted to preserve were not the goals of General Revenue Sharing, the
fact that i t encouraged interest group competition is significant.

Such encouragement increases the chances these

groups will seek to

eng~ge

in bargaining with local ad-

ministrators when other legislation come from Washington
that seeks to provide social justice for all Americans.
The chances, therefore, of such legislation being successful is thus diminished.
The data from this study indicates that the disadvantaged recognize that they must form interest groups
to be heard.

They seem to recognize Lowi's fear that in

spite of the good intentions of national legislators, justice may not be provided at the local level.

They seem to

also agree with Lowi's critics that to expect the courts
to force the legislative branch to employ strict guidelines is not realistic.

Because they see interest groups

organized that seem unsympathetic with their needs, local
poor and minorities feel the need to form their own interest groups to compete for their interests.

The new

Lane County Non-White Taxpayers Association is just such
an interest group.

It is somewhat ironic that the exis-
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tence of interest group liberalism which Lowi feels impedes the progress of justice in America has only created
more interest groups fighting for their interests.

Wfueh

General Revenue Sharing, the poor and minorities see even
less federal commitment to their needs and thus it is understandable that they would form groups to represent
their interests.

Lowi specifically pointed out the need

to insure the basic civil rights of citizens in federal
legislation.

He would be distressed at the discretion

given to local political forces under the New Federalism
in the civil rights area.

The Act prohibits discrimina-

tion in the use of revenue sharing funds but that is all.
Under the New Federalism it is up to local minority groups
and the local poor to organize to try to protect their
interests.
5. That General Revenue Sharing Will Only Strengthen
the "Autonomous City'.'''and Frustrate Justice.
Using "lay.er cake" theory terminology, Theodore Lowi
argues that the city is developing powers and responsibilities that make it a third layer of government in the federal system.

This additional unit of federalism is ano-

ther place where interest group liberalism can thrive and
thus compromise chances for attaining the rule of law in
America.

Mr. Lowi would be upset with what the New Fed-

eralism has set as its goal, the strengthening of the city
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as a decision-making unit in matters dealing with human
and community services.

We have seen in this study that

this goal of the New Federalism has not been fully accomplished.

The city is still highly dependent on the

state and national governments and will be for the forseeable future.

The New Federalism does not seek to cre-

ate a truly "autonomous city" at all.

It does seek to

strengthen the ability of cities to deal with human and
community services as free from the controls of Washington
as possible.

Of course, the city is to rely on the feder-

al government for funding of human and community service
programs.

Nevertheless, the New Federalism has done no-

thing to weaken cities as decision-making units and breeding places for interest group liberalism.
Mr. Lowi might be encouraged by the fact that the
New Federalism also seeks to strengthen states as units
of administration and decision-making in the federal system.

But because the Nixon policy is also to strengthen

cities, the gain in strengthening the states would be negated.

It will be remembered that Lowi felt states should

be substantially strengthened through federal aid and by
giving them discretion to deal with many matters within
their sovereignty.

The goal of the New Federalism, how-

ever, is to strengthen all levels of government below the
national government, not just the states.

Thus, Lowi's
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fear of strong cities is not lessened by the development
of revenue sharing and the New Federalism.
6. Decentr~lization Will Jeopardize Civil Rights and
Set Back Justice.
In The End of Liberalism, Lowi argued that block
grants with few

str~ngs

attached might be a useful form of

federal aid to states for certain purposes.

He believed,

however, that strings should be attached when necessary
to provide for social justice of all citizens and insure
the rule of law in America.

He specifically pointed out

that in the area of civil rights there might be enough of
a national consensus as to the need to maintain those
rights for all citizens.
government need

That being the case, the federal

not worry as much as it once did about

attaching strings to legislation to preserve those rights.
We saw in Chapter III, however, that many participants at the New Federalism Conference sponsored by the
Woodrow Wilson Foundation disagreed.

Their principal fear

was that there was no national consensus on the need for
basic civil rights for all Americans and that the increased discretionary power given local government with
the New Federalism might be used to deny civil rights to
some citizens.

As we have seen, the guidelines to the

State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972 are very
broad.

The only civil rights provision is that the funds
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not be spent in such a way as to discriminate against individuals.

As critics of the New Federalism have argued,

the funds could be spent on capital and physical projects
and not for the poor or minorities directly and still be
within the guidelines of the Act.

They fear that the pro-

grams developed under the War on Poverty and Model Cities
and the spirit of the Civil Rights Acts are in danger when
the federal government loosens its control over how federal funds are spent.
The data from this study indicates that it is up to
those in city government who share the interests of national groups that have fought for civil rights acts and programs for the poor to work for those programs at the local
level if they are to be maintained.

This study indicates

that there are considerable numbers of persons in local
government who have just such an interest.

As long as

these persons maintain their activism and political power
the spirit of national priorities that sought to bring
collective action on behalf of the poor and minorities
will be maintained.

It is true that a lack of federal con-

trol or incentive to maintain public policy for the disadvantaged puts a big burden on local groups and individuals who want to help the poor and minorities.

Although

observers of the American system from James Madison to the
present fear the lack of tolerance for minorities at the
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local level, this study indicates that it is a major goal
of many local leaders to see to it that the disadvantaged
in their communities are treated fairly.

If one sympa-

thizes with this position it can only be hoped that those
people remain in positions of power.

As the national gov-

ernment moves away from these concerns the protection of
basic rights for all Americans becomes more and more the
concern of local politics.
Based upon these conclusions, has the New Federalism
hastened the "end of liberalism"?

Lowi feared that Amer-

ican liberalism was unable to realize its goals because of
interest group brokerage politics that compromised the
"spirit" of liberal legislation when that legislation was
being carried out.

There is nothing in the New Federalism

as viewed through General Revenue Sharing that seems to
abate this feature of liberalism.
ful the

Of course, it is doubt-

President wants to further the cause of liberal-

ism if it must be done through a large national government
looking out for the economic and social well-being of all
citizens in terms of enabling all an equal opportunity to
compete for the accouterments of the good life.

Lowi saw

the national government playing an important role in such
an effort, perhaps in cooperation with state governments.
But the Nixon Administration has decided to let all levels
of government below the national level decide their own
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priorities and policies on public policy regarding human
and community service programs.

Abdication of national

direction in these matters does threaten liberal accomplishments that have been made in recent years.

Although

we have found in the cities studied here that local City
Council majorities seem to want to retain the progress
made in human and community services in recent years,
their holding onto power in determining local policy is
tenuous.

Thus, the social goals of liberalism are in

danger of abandonment in every state and town in America.
The New Federalism does nothing to lessen the chances of
an end to liberalism in terms of Lowi's thesis.
President Nixon's goal of decentralizing the American federal system is a significant one.

The importance

and magnitude of such a task is evidenced in the goals
and fears held by the proponents and opponents of the New
Federalism.
It has been the purpose of this study to assess the
success of the New Federalism/General Revenue Sharing effort in terms of the experiences of four cities.

It can

be concluded that although all four cities were well aware
of the fact that decentralization through revenue sharing
was being tried by the Nixon Administration, they were experiencing few of the goals of decentralization.
of the matter is still money.

The heart

The four cities studied
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were not getting enough money to carry out traditional
functions and also adopt the human and community service
programs the New Federalism wants them to take over.

They

are not getting enough money because General Revenue Sharing grants are not large enough to make up for the nonexistence of Special Revenue Sharing, cutback categorical
grants, inflation, increasing labor costs and increasing
demand for all services.

The financial crunch is such

that although most of those interviewed agreed with many
of the goals of the New Federalism, they found themselves
unable to do what the program indicates for lack of adequate funds.

Therefore, for the New Federalism to ac-

complish its goals, it must increase its General Revenue
Sharing funding considerably, extend the program indefinitely, and enact an ambitious Special Revenue Sharing
program quickly.

Only in this way will the American fed-

eral system move toward some degree of decentralization.
This study has concerned itself with federalism and
also with individualism.

Is there a role for the individ-

ual citizen who wants to participate in making local public policy under the New Federalism?

Our findings demon-

strate that citizen participation is a function of whether
and to what extent local officials will permit local participation beyond the regular budget process.

There is a

role for the individual and all interest groups, the sys-
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tern is open, when local government specifically designs
an open system.

In this study, Tacoma is the best exam-

ple of such an effort.
The goals of the New Federalism are dramatic and it
will take many years of revenue sharing and enactment of
other components of the program before any definitive notion of whether it has succeeded or failed can be made.
At this point, it appears that the revenue sharing element
of the program lacks the substantial funding needed to
make it an effective vehicle of decentralization.

Until

that situation is remedied, the New Federalism will remain more rhetoric than sUbstance.
It was stated in Chapter I of this study that the
author had one overriding bias.

That bias was concern

for the future of America's disadvantaged under a New
Federalism.

That concern seems justified.

Although the

results of this study are encouraging on this matter, the
lack of national guidance to insure a place in society
for the poor and minorities places these citizens in real
danger of again becoming "outsiders."
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APPENDIX A
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS FOR
TACOMA, WASHINGTON

-r

~
Raw Score a
NA

Converted Scoreb

1
2

-3
-2

Low or Poor

Program doesn't appear to
meet the particular policy or evaluation criteria
or meets it poorly.

Average or Fair

Program appears to satisfactorily meet the particular policy or evaluation criteria.

High or
Very High

Program appears to meet
the particular policy or
evaluation criteria very
well.

0

3

-1

4
5

0

+1

6
7

+2
+3

weight C

EXElanation
Not Applicable

A policy or evaluation
criteria statement is not
applicable to this program.

Fiqure 4. Scoring Process for Revenue Sharing Proposal Evaluations.
SOURCE: Staff of the Program Management System, "Scoring Process for
Revenue Sharing Proposal Evaluations," Tacoma, Washington, 1973, p.l.
aRating codes used by policy evaluators for both policy and evaluation
criteria statements.
b This is the assigned value for each corresponding raw score.
for use by the PMS staff only.

This is

c This is a pre-determined number assigned to each rated policy and evaluation criteria statement. These numbers are not used by technical team
evaluators. These numbers are used in score calculation by the PMS staff.

w

~

-...J
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Formula for Policy Evaluation Score:

x

=

EWX
n

x

= weighted

W

= weight

n

=

average or mean

sum of weights

Formula for Proposal Score:

R.S.

=

c.S. (W)

R.S.

=
=
=
=
=

Raw Score

C.S.
W

X
EX

=

x

Converted Score
weight
statement value
Proposal Score

Figure 5. Formulae for Proposal and Policy Evaluation Scores. SOURCE: Staff of the Program Management
System, "Scoring Process for Revenue Sharing Proposal Evaluations," Tacoma, Washington, 1973, p. 1.

' 1
Figure 6. General Revenue Sharing Program Proposal Evaluation Form.
SOURCE: Staff of the Program Management System, Tacoma, Washington, 1973.
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TABLE VIII
REVENUE SHARING ENTITLEMENT PERIOD 3 & 4
RECOMMENDED BUDGET PACKAGE
JUNE 15, 1973
Prog. Prog.
Rank
No.
1

18

2

11

3

60

4

34

Applicant/
Requested ComRecom.
Title
Fundin~ ___mentsa Funding
Police Dept.-To modify City $ 50,000
$
50,000
Jail so negotiation for
jail consolidation with
Pierce County Sheriff's
Dept. may continue.
City of Tacoma (interde200,000
200,000
partmental)- Acquire, install and operate improved
radio communication system
City Clerk/Dept. of Gener500
500
al Services-Provide money
necessary to publish, advertise, etc., General
Revenue Sharing money.
DeLong Recreational Devel20,500
20,500
opment Committee-Building
a playground and nature facility adjacent to DeLong
Elementary School

Evaluation
Score
1,363.14

1,355.89

1,195.25

1,174.50

INTRODUCTORY NOTE: This report was transmitted first to the City Manager for
his perusal and then to the City Council for final action.
aComments will be listed in footnote form at the bottom of each page.
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Prog. Prog.
Rank No.
5
1

6

15

7

36

8

25

9

61

10

73

11

37

Applicant/
Requested ComTitle
Funding
ments
Personnel Dept.-Employment $ 138,506
training program to increase
the proportion of minority
and disadvantaged personnel
in government service.
Finance Dept.-Implement a
19,000
cost allocation program as
required by federal guidelines ref:BOB cir. A-87.
40,000
Public Works Dept.-Provide
funding for seal coating
program.
Public Works Dept.-Provide
500,000
money to continue LID program.
b
City Clerk/Dept. of General
280,000
Services-Establish a self
insurance fund through a risk
management program.
Public Utilities (Water Div252,000
ision}-Install quick connecting couplings for hydrants.
Public Works Dept.-Supp1e205,181
ment Equipment Rental "B"
fund to provide for equipment replacement.

bA1right if legal.

Reduced due to cost revision.

Recom.
Fundinq
$ 138,506

Evaluation
Score
1,168.14

19,000

1,111.57

40,000

1,110.00

500,000

1,093.50

250,000

1,068.07

252,000

1,063.18

205,181

1,030.57

~

o

V1

~Y~
Prog. Prog.
Rank No.
12
69

13

26

14

5

15

47

16

13

Applicarit/
Requested ComTitle
Funding
ments
c
Eastside Health Clinic
$
20,107
Association-Provide Medical
supplies, etc. for Eastside
Health Clinic
d
Public Works Dept.-Acquire
1,120,954
land and provide for construction of consolidated
Maintenance Center.
e
Bicycle Committee (Moun15,000
taineers) Provide funds for
bicycle path construction.
Finance Dept. (City Treas.
64,250
Office}-Increase return capabilities of city money by
developing a cash management
system.
f
Planning Dept.-Request fund50,000
ing for acquisition of open
space and/or waterfront prop.

Recom.
Funding
$

Evaluation
Score
20,107 998.32

1,120,954

984.82

15,000

984.50

64,250

984.25

50,000

951.79

CAttach to Health Department.
dAlright, but hold in abeyance pending additional legislative encumbrances
of next State legislative session. (Sept.)
eCoordinate with City's Bicycle Committee.
flnitial priority on Waterfront acquisition.

,.
~

r

1
Prog. Prog.
Rank No.
17

10

18

54

19

35

20

55

21

22

22

2

23

9

App1icant/
Title

Requested
Funding

Personnel Dept.-Retain cer- $
tain critical positions now
filled by temporary PEP
personnel permanently.
Planning Dept.-Establish a
Recreational Pilot Program.

339,046

Fire Dept.-Purchase detrimental capital outlay equip.
Planning Dept.-Establish an
Environmental Section.

156,736

Metropolitan Park Dist.-Extend the summer supervised
activities two weeks.
Data Processing Divsion-Improve operations of Data Processing Division bi software
purchase, research and development, etc.
Mary Bridge Hosp.-Expand prenatal and infant-nutri-prog.

Comments
g

Recom.
Fundinq

Evaluation
Score

278,000

926.46

-0-

922.18

124,000

918.43

29,140

882.79

22,780

22,780

869.06

55,967

55,967

866.61

42,973

858.01

15,270

49,140

42,973

h
i
j

k

$

g1973-32 positions, 1974 (1st half - 22 positions).
hResponsibility placed in Program No. 56.
iDelete non-essential equipment.
jReduced $20,000-consultant fee to be supplied as needed from contingency.

~

o

~

kSubject to PCHC letters of conditions and administered by Health Dept.

r

1
Prog. Prog.
Rank No.
24
62

25

6

26

56

27

44

28

42

29
30

19
24

Applicant/
Requested ComTi tIe
Fundin~__
ments
Tacoma Comm. College-To pro-$ 134,712
vide and improve emergency
medical services.
Tacoma Pub. Library-Purchase
of certain major pieces of
equipment listed as critical
needs.
Planning Dept.-Establish an
Urban Design Section.
Finance Dept.-Increase Financial and Accounting Staff
by four.
Mary Bridge Hosp.-Expand
Poison Information Center
Police Dept.-Increase Patrol
Division Manpower by 10
Metropolitan Park Dist.-Improve existing facilities of
McKinley Park

57,352

32,225

1

m

20,700

40,999
150,000
34,500

n

Recom.
Evaluation
Fundinq
Score
$ 134,712
842.06

29,788

839.34

32,225

816.50

20,700

811.25

40,999

809.56

150,000
34,500

804.32
795.86

1voluntarily reduced to account for a change in telephone services. Passenger car and pickup removed and rental charges added for equipment rental from
City fund.
mASsume responsibility for program No. 54.
nAlright-subject to Pierce County participation.
~

o

(X)

,

1
Prog. Prog.
Rank No.

Applicant/
Title

Requested ComFunding __ ments_
$

31

3

Tacoma-Pierce County YMCAEstablish recreation program for trainable mentally
retarded.

32

59

Urban Renewal Dept.-Supplement existing Neighborhood
Development Prog, Wash A-3.

33

67

Human Development Dept.-Pro·vide funds for Senior Citi~
zens Program.

34

32

35

68

Metropolitan Park Dist.-Animal acquisition for Northwest
Trek.
Tacoma-Pierce County Health
Dept.-Provide funds for Homemaker- Home Health Aide Proj.

36

12

6,000

o

70,000

p

239,123

q

Recom.
Funding
$

Big Brothers of Tacoma-Pierce 17,815
Co.-Provide guidance and comEanionshiE to fatherless bo~s.

r

s

6,000

773.01

-0-

751.57

239,123

737.68

9,000

732.43

37,612

711.72

17,815

707.04

9,000

75,224

Evaluation
Score

°Contingent on Program receiving other specified funding.
PDoes not appear to be a priority item.
qAssume duplicated services from program No. 31.
rReduced ~ reflecting City's part of Tacoma-Pierce County Health Dept. participation.

::.
o

sAdministratively overseen by Human Development Department.

\0

,
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Prog. Prog.
Rank No.
37

74

38

23

39

7

40

31

41

81

42

38

Applicant/
Funding ---ComTitle
Request~q_ments
Public Utilities (Water
$
126,000
t
Division}-Construct 16" main
on Alexander Ave.
u
Central City Learning Cen34,209
ter-Provide supplemental
funds to operate center.
v
Tacoma Public Library-Re74,576
quest to continue special
service to senior citizens.
w
Amer. Red Cross-Establish
93,290
Senior citizens Outreach services in Wrights Park area.
x
262,000
Tacoma School Disto#lO-Covered stands at Lincoln Bowl.
25,000
Tacoma-Pierce County Health
Dept.-Provide for additional
Vector Control Staff.

Recom.
. _F!!l1.ding
$
-0-

Evaluation
Score
707.04

34,209

704.06

56,343

695.31

60,000

660.62

-0-

658.96

25,000

651.75

tChanges precedent for routine process which other funds can provide.
UAdministrative1y overseen by Human Development Department.
vFunding for 1974 (1st half) ~ salaries & supplies, all of capital equip.
WProgram will work jointly with Human Development Dept.
by negotiation because of duplicated services.

Was reduced

xDesirab1e program. Possible future bond or other funding source.
,j::a

....o

,

1
Prog. Prog.
Rank No.
43
20
44

28

45

8

46

40

47

48

App1icant/
Requested 'Com~
Funding
ments
Title
y
Planning Dept.-To purchase $ 270,000
land for future Civ. Center.
Z
Pierce County Council on Al25,554
colholism-Employee Counseling
and AssistanceProgram for
Alcoholism.
aa
Finance Dept. (Contract Com31,534
pliance div.)-To continue and
upgrade discrimination control in contract compliance.
bb
Tacoma Housing Authority22,848
Building community neighborhood center in Salishan area.
cc
Coalition of Child-Care Agen8,972
cies/United Way- Provide cooperative child care staff training to increase treatment effectiveness, etc.

Recom.
Funding
$

-0-

Evaluation
Score
641.25

-0-

609.14

31,534

558.29

12,000

546.06

8,972

538.16

YDesirable program. Possible future bond or other funding source.
ZReceiving other City funding.
a~unding Jan. to June, 1974, Use PEP in interim period.

bbpartial funding-possible other funding available.
CCAdministratively overseen by Human Development Department.
~
~
,.....

~

1
Prog. Prog.
Rank No.
48
39

49

21

50

45

51

27

52

4

53

51

54

63

Applicant/
Requested
Title
Funding
Tacoma-Pierce Co. Arts Com.-$
87,015
Expand present cult, and environmental enrichment prog.
National Alliance of Busi18,749
nessmen-Provide Youth Employment Service.
Human Develop. Dept.-Provide
50,000
Services for Handicapped.
Public Works Dept.-Correct
500,000
drainage problems in the Fleet
Creek drainage basin.
Tacoma Area Urban Coalition185,222
Establish Youth Services Bureau
to provide services, develop
Mgmt. information system.
Tacoma Urban League-Continue
152,462
Adult Offender Outreach Prog.
26,793
Human Relations Comm.-Estab1ish a Women's Riqhts Div.

Comments
dd
ee

ff

gg

hh

Recom.
Evaluation
Fundinq
Score
$
25,000
532.87

10,000

513.83

50,000

494.64

-0-

482.71

150,000

479.30

120,000

472.61

26,793

451.79

ddDe1ete part for legal reasons.
eeFor qualified city recipients~ Get county participation. VISTA director.:
ffSeek other funding.
ggReduction agreed to by applicant staff.
hhReduce staff.

Possible duplication.

Seek special revenue sharing.

~

I-'
I\J

Prog-. Prog.
Rank No.
55

58

56

33

57

41

58

80

59

57

60

17

ApplTcant/
Requested
Title
Fundin~
Tacoma Comm. College(Office $
16,500
of Veteran Affairs)-Provide
loan assistance for vets.
Bates Voc. Tech.-Establish
102,639
laboratory training and
Child Care Center.
Catholic Children's Service66,786
Provide Group Shelter Care
facilities for runaways.

Com-

Tacoma Ambulatory Care Center5,000
To provide a family clinic.
Tacoma Public Library-Estab100,157
lish Tacoma Mall branch lib.
Finance Dept. (Purchasing
12,742
Div. )-Hire a'·buyer for the Purchasing Division due to increased demand for services.

11

Recom.
Funding

men~s

ii

jj

kk

mm

$

-0-

Evaluation
Score
445.86

-0-

423.49

35,000

411.63

-0-

383.83

-0-

374.90

12,742

334.57

iiOelete for legal reasons, duplications with program No. 52.
jjQuestionable need.

State legal restrictions.

Use bond sources.

kkWork with Human Development Dept. to prevent duplication with program
No.4.
110ther funds available.
mmArea already served by South Tacoma Branch.

Need not readily apparent.

~
~

w

•1

•r
Prog. Prog.
RankD No.
61

29

62

77

63

52

Applicantl
Requested
ComTitle
Funding___TIlem ts
nn
Boy Scouts-Hire reception- $
7,287
ist coordinator for Hilltop
area.
00
Metropolitan Deveopment Coun37,880
cil-Provide funds for expansion of prenatal and infant
nutrition program.
pp
Tacoma Urban League-Provide
139,310
Assistance for a Veterans
Action Center.
TOTAL FOR PROGRAMS 1-40 ------TOTAL FOR PROGRAMS 41-63 -----Total Funding Recommended -----

Recom.
Funding
$

-0-

Evaluation
Score
315.56

-0-

313.97

127,000

293.46

$4,401,884
634,041
$5,035,925

SOURCE: Staff of the Program Management Team, "Revenue Sharing Entitlement
period 3 & 4, Recommended Budget Package," Tacoma, Washington, 15 June 1973.
nnAppears to be OK using volunteers.
oOWorked out with program No.9.
PPStaff reductions.

Use 10% indirect cost factor instead of 15%.

~
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APPENDIX B
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS FOR
PORTLAND, OREGON
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TABLE IX
REVISED EXPENDITURE SCHEDULE FOR REVENUE SHARING
PORTLAND, OREGON
1972-3 - 1977-8
Fiscal
Year

Cash Received

Cash from
Prior Years

Interest:

Total Cash
Available

Suggested Expenditure Schedule

$

-0-

$ 50,000

$10,559,000

$

72-3

$10,509,000

73-4

9,517,000

8,259,000

550,000

18,326,000

9,650,000 a

74-5

9,778,000

8,676,000

575,000

19,029,000

9,350,000

75-6

10,016,000

9,679,000

600,000

20,295,000

9,425,000

76-7

7,795,000

10,870,000

500,000

19,165,000

9,525,000

77-8
TOTALS

-0-

9,640,000

-0-

9,640,000

9,640,000

$47,615,000

$2,275,000

2~300,000

$ 49,890,000

SOURCE: Office of Management Services, Portland, Oregon, 1973.
alnc1udes $1,769,000 left over from FY 1972-3.

~

~
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TABLE X
REVENUE SHARING ALLOCATIONS
PORTLAND, OREGON
FY 1973-4
DEPARTMENT, BUREAU OR OFFICE

FY 1973-4 AMOUNT

Department of Finance and Administration
Bureau of Police
Convert to Civilian Dispatchers
Equipment (Other Than for Federal
Grant Projects)
Civil Service Board
Remodel and Equip City-County Civil
Service Office
Bureau of Buildings
Equipment (Other Than for Federal
Grant Projects)
Bureau of Planning
Arterial Study
Bureau of Management & Budget
Financial Management System
Maintenance Facilities Study
Bureau of Traffic Engineering
Modernization of Signals
Parking Meters - Contractual Obligation
Equipment (Other That for Federal
Grant Projects)
Special Appropriations
Assessments for Improvements

Department of Public Affairs

$

796,600

$

182,000
125,800
11,700
9,600
50,000
140,000
50,000
88,800
85,900
20,700
32,100

$ 1,007,000

Bureau of Human Resources
Coordination of Social Service Programs
Indian Study
Special Appropriations
City-County Detoxification Center
Multnomah County Health Program
(Contractual Obligation)
Senior Citizens Programs
(continued)

110,000
a
7,500
36,500
753,000
100,000

a Includes amount rebudgeted from 1972-3.
SOURCE: Jim Setterberg, Office of Finances, City of
Portland, Oregon, 1973.

418
DEPARTMENT, BUREAU OR OFFICE
Department of Public Safety

F~

1973-4 AMOUNT
$ 4,006,100

Bureau of Fire
Fire Apparatus
Delta Park Fire Station
Overhaul Fireboat
Additional Personnel
Equipment
Fire Prevention Responsibility Unit
Fire Alarm System Responsibility Unit
Fire Alarm Telegraph Dispatch Responsibility Unit
Bureau of Parks
Community Centers Improvements
Playground Equipment
Wading Pools
Ballfield Lighting
Tennis Court Lighting
Modifications for Handicapped
Columbia Pool Enclosure
Recreation - Part-time
Street Tree Program
Stadium Tartan Turf - Contractual Obligation
Woodlawn Park Summer Program
Saturday & Sunday Community Centers
Saturday and Sunday High School Gyms
Columbia Swim Additional Service
Summer Band Concerts
Columbia Park Irrigation
Pittock Mansion Sanitary Facilities
Goldenball Basketball
Portable Boxing Ring
Construct Greenhouse
Equipment (Other Than for Federal
Grant Projects
Special Appropriations
Zoological Society - Contractual Obligation

b

430,000b
250,000
250,000
lll,OOOb
114,700
548,200
226,300
240,400
b

99,700 b
22,600b
31,500
3l7,700b
35,500b
b
45,000b
207,000
275,000
166,800
54,900
22,700
22,300
38,000
30,200
10,000
39,600
7,000
9,500
4,100
4,900
41,500
350,000

Department of Public Utilities

$

559,400

Bureau of Building Maintenance
City Hall Improvements
(continued)

$

46,900

bIncludes amount rebudgeted from 1972-3.

419
DEPARTMENT, BUREAU OR OFFICE

FY 1973-4 AMOUNT

Department of Public Utilities (cont.)
Bureau of Communications & Electronic
Communications Building Fire Safety System $
Fire Inspectors Communications System
Council Crest Communications Building·.
Equipment (Other Than for Federal
Grant Projects)
Bureau of Shops
Fleet Management Information System
Special Appropriations
Replacement Autos

Department of Public Works

$

Bureau of Maintenance
Traffic Signals
Downtown Trash Pick-up
Street Oiling Program
Showers - Kerby Yard
Lighting - Equipment Yard
Equipment (Other Than for Federal
Grant Projects)
Bureau of Sidewalks & Structural Engineering
Sidewalks for Schools
Pedestrian Overpass - Beach School
Neighborhood Street Construction
S.E. 92nd Widening
Curbs and Ramps for Handicapped

25,000b
25,000
109,000c
89,500
14,000
250,000

1,506,200
361,200
134,000c
71,000
21,200
6,600
219,800
25,000c
100,200
440,000c
105,200
22,000c

SUMMARY
FINANCE & ADMINISTRATION
PUBLIC AFFAIRS
PUBLIC. SAFETY
PUBLIC UTILITIES
PUBLIC WORKS
GENERAL OPERATING CONTINGENCIES OF GENERAL
FUND - MIDYEAR REVIEW
TOTAL GENERAL REVENUE SHARING ALLOCATION
REBUDGETED FROM 1972-3
NEW ALLOCATIONS FOR 1973-4

$

$
$

Clncludes amount rebudgeted fromm1972-3.
dTo be allocated at midyear.

796,600
1,007,000
4,006,100
559,400
1,506,200
1,893,700d
9,769,000
1,769,000
8,000,000

APPENDIX C
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS FOR
EUGENE, OREGON

~

r
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TABLE XI
EUGENE CITY STAFF PROPOSALS FOR REVENUE SHARING
EUGENE, OREGON
1973-5
PROJECT
A. PARKS AND RECREATION. Operational and maintenance
costs for new community centers: Amazon Community Center
($59,452), Kaufman Senior Center ($27,712). Improved
swimming pool maintenance (new Foreman position) and
incidental equipment for relocating planning and development division.
$

1973-4

1974-5

113,641

B. PUBLIC WORKS. Rorganize Building Divison to improve
public contact and keep up with increased construction
activity (6 positions).

74,223

C. DATA PROCESSING. Continue development of financial
informations system (payroll, fringe benefits distribution, program budget, cost accounting) commenced under
1972-73 Supplemental Budget.

80,615

$

a

113,200

78,700

a

85,500

D. GENERAL CAPITAL PROJECTS. Purchase park warehouse facility at 301 N. Lincoln ($50,000). Remodel south wing
of City Hall to accomodate shift in office space.

100,000

-0-

E. GENERAL CAPITAL PROJECTS. Construct new facility for
Parks and Recreation to provide additional office space
at City Hall.

110,000

-0-

F. GENERAL CAPITAL PROJECTS. Construction Fire Station
#9 in the vicinity of Delta and Belt Line Hiqhwa~.__~___

125,000

164,600

SOURCE: Hugh McKinley, City Manager, Eugene, Oregon, 1973.
~his may be reduced by $37,000 if fee increase proposed in General Fund
Priority 7 is adopted.
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PROJECT
1973-4
G. MUNICIPAL COURT. Hire another "full-time" judge to
handle the increase in trials and the mounting backlog
of cases on the docket. This includes necessary staff
support, prosecution expense and indigent counsel plus
b
related equipment.
$
45,567
H. PUBLIC WORKS. Create a new planning division charged
with transportation planning and environmental impact
studies. Division would be responsible for updating
of ESTATS study (3 new positions).
156,087
I. PERSONNEL. Continue clerk-typist position approved in
the 1972-73 Supplemental Budget. Position to handle incceased work flow resulting from Affirmative Action and
OSHA requirements.
9,995
J. PARKS AND RECREATION. New maintenance position for
Laure1wood Community facility ($9,720). Two foreman positions, one for Mall maintenance required by expansion of
the Mall and the other for general park operations maintenance.
49,936
K. POLICE. Use Revenue Sharing funds to pay for two PEP
positions: Assistant lab technician and a Community Service officer (CSO), in the Community and Internal Affairs Division.
17,559
L. FINANCE. Accountant I position to assist Auditor in internal and external auditing duties. Two clerk-typists to
handle increased work load. (Auditor and one clerk-typist
financed in 1972-73 Supplemental Budget)&
26,525
M. EXECUTIVE. Clerk-typist to assist City Council in handling complaints and general staff support.
9,177

1974-5

b
$

48,300

159,500

10,600

52,900

18,700

28,100
9,700
~

bRevenues should more than offset cost.
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PROJECT
N. PERSONNEL. New personnel specialist position to assist in increased workload resulting from Affirmative
Action, OSHA, labor/management problems and citywide
training demands.

1973-4

$

12,815

1974-5

$

13,600

O. POLICE~ One detective position to assist in areawide narcotics investigations.

14,811

15,700

P. EXECUTIVE. New position requested by Human Rights
Commission to assist in handling discrimination complaints and Affirmative Action efforts within the community.

15,066

16,000

7,399

7,800

~PUBLIC WORKS. City Hall maintenance. (Custodian position in 1972-73 Supplementary Budget)

R. GENERAL CAPITAL PROJECTS. Remodel City Council chamber to provide handicapped and covered access, City
Council offices and revised dais.
S. POLICE. Major crime team (9 positions and arson investigator.)
NON-DEPARTMENTAL. Create an assessment deferral fund
to assist the aged or low-income in deferring payment on
assessments until they dispose of their property. This
would begin a five-year program of setting aside $100,000
per year to establish an adequate fund to be used within
guidelines established by the Council.
U. PUBLIC WORKS. Create 3 new positions: A Traffic engineering technician to work with neighborhood groups and
handle increasing citizen requests, a public information
officer to assist the Public Works Department in handling
public requests, a draftsman to assist in designing projects financed by the November Streets and Storm Sewer
Bond Issue.

30,000

-0-

182,395

193,300

100,000

100,000

~.

~

23,207

24,700

I\J
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PROJECT
1973-4
V. GENERAL CAPITAL PROJECTS. Remodel and Equip Fire Station #5 to house a new ladder company.
$ 175,000
W. PARKS AND RECREATION. Community School Program. Expansion of City share as proposed in General Fund.
18,836
X. EXECUTIVE. Legal fees for updating and revising
City Charter.

10,000

1974-5
$

161,000
20,000
-0-

SUB-TOTAL $1,507,994

$1,321,900

Y. POLICE. Junior High school liaison youth program.
Police officer to be placed in each of the junior high
schools in the community to work with school counselors
and juvenile court personnel in identifying and correcting behavior which leads to criminal conduct. (6 positions) 90,224
z. FIRE. Acquire ladder truck for Station #9
125,000
AA. FIRE. Reorganization of the department as recom58,410
mended by ISO. Create two battalion chiefs per shift.
BB. PLANNING. Expand duties of hearings official and
16,107
add staff support to handle the work.

95,600
159,000

CC. FINANCE. Increase business license enforcement activity. Program should develop revenue to offset costs.
(2 positions)
DD. EXECUTIVE. Continue funding of second Community Relations position as approved in 1972-3 Supplemental Budget.
EE. PARKS AND RECREATION. Provide extra help for Parks
administration. Introduce mobile playground equipment
and staff in neighborhoods lacking playground facilities
and enrich existing recreational programs.

18,333

61,900
17,100

-0-

14,796

15,700

15,862

16,800

~
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PROJECT
1973-4
FF. PARKS AND RECREATION. Expand Mall maintenance and
Park maintenance ($30,966). Expand recreational programs
for low-income, special recreation, summer and outdoor
activities plus miscellaneous administrative costs.
$
42,708
GG. LIBRARY. Modify every circulating volume in Library
in preparation for using new photographic check-out
equipment.
63,522
HH. GENERAL CAPITAL PROJECTS. Danebo Park improvements
($50,000), improve irrigation systems in various parks
because of high maintenance on existing systems ($20,000)
Washington-Jefferson Bridge Park improvements ($35,000)
acquire storage area in Mall ($6,000).
111,000
II. POLICE. Noise abatement team to be used in developing a rea1istice approach to controlling noise within
the community. (4 positions).
57,738
JJ. PLANNING. Expand comprehensive planning effort with
five neighborhood groups (50 percent of the cost for positions within the planning department, the other 50 percent for other departments).
50,907
KK. NON-DEPARTMENTAL. Low-moderate income housing program.
Construction of 20-30 units using no-interest financing.
275,000
LL. FIRE. Institute an on-shift inspector program which
provides each shift with its own investigator and supervisor for the shift inspection activity.
40,705
MM. PUBLIC WORKS. Supervising civil engineer for Maintenance Division. If revenue sharing funds are not used to
finance the position, it may be financed from other
funds such as the Sewer Utility fund.
17,753

1974-5

$

45,300

-0-

-061,200

54,000
-0-

43,100

18,800

~
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PROJECT
1973-4
NN. PUBLIC WORKS. Utility worker position for f1ushersweeper operation. This position was kept vacant following reduction in assessed value in 1972-73 budget, then
reauthorized as a result of Supplemental BUdget.
$
9,591
00. FIRE. Alarm systems improvement and construction of
storage room at Substation 4 to house air tank storage
and radio repeater station. Include some miscellaneous
training costs.
14,570
PP. POLICE. Acquire new microfilm equipment and replace
Lektriever (the electronic file card storage machine).
13,890
QQ. PAR~S AND RECREATION. Extra help for maintaining
ballfields and community centers ($8,553) plus miscellaneous supplies and transportation for recreation pro12,439
grams.
TOTAL
$ 2,556,549

1974-5

10,200

-0-0-

13,200
$1,933,800

~
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TABLE XII
SUMMARY OF GENERAL REVENUE SHARING ALLOCATIONS
EUGENE, OREGON
MAY 25, 1973
APPROVED EXPENDITURE
AMOUNT AVAILABLE for expenditures (revenue sharing)

A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
I.
J.
L.
M.
P.
R.
S.
T.
V.
W.
X.
EE.

AMOUNT AUTHORIZED
$ 2,759,449

$
Spread Sheet Priorities
Reserve for Social Services
Parks and Recreation-Amazon and Kaufman Centers
Public Works-Building Division Reorganization
Data Processing-Financial Information System
General Capital Projects-Park Warehouse, City Hall Remodel
General Capital Projects-New Park and Recreation Facility
General Capital Projects-Fire Station #9
Municipal Court-Second full-time judge
Public Works-Create New Planning Division
Personne1-C1erk-typist
Parks and Recreation-Year-round operation of Jefferson pool
Parks and Recreation-Maintenance at Laure1wood
Finance-Accountant and two clerks
Executive-C1erk-typist for City Council
Executive-New Position for Affirmative Action, etc.
General Capital Projects-Council offices, ramp for handicap.
Major crime team
Non-Departmental-Assessment deferral fund
General Capital Projects-Remodel and Equip Fire Station #5
Parks and Recreation-Community School Program
Executive-Legal Fees for Charter Revision
Parks and Recreation-Mobile Playground Equipment and
Administration and Recreation

929,499
200,000
87,164
74,223
80,615
100,000
110,000
125,000
45,567
131,087
9,995
57,547
9,720
26,525
9,177
15,066
17,000
85,000
100,000
175,000
18,836
10,000
15,862

~
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APPROVED EXPENDITURE
FF. Parks and Recreation-Maintenance and Some
Recreation programs
GG. Library-Cataloging backload and retooling
HH. General Capital Projects-Danebo, Irrigation,
Washington, Jefferson and Mall Storage
JJ. Planning-Comprehensive planning in neighborhoods
KK. Non-Departmental-Low-moderate income housing
(4) Community Service Officers.
SUB-TOTAL
less revenue from court (Item G)
NET TOTAL
encumbrance from unexpended Supplemental Budget

AMOUNT AUTHORIZED
$

42,708
63,522

72,500
50,907
150,000
36 1 980
$ 2,849,500
45 1 567
$ 2,803,933
161 1 500

1973-4 TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS

$

2 1 965 1 433

TOTAL REVENUE SHARING
RESOURCES- 1973-4

$

4.380.743

SOURCE: Hugh McKinley, City Manager, Euoene, Oregon, 1973.
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TABLE XIII
JOINT BUDGET COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS
FUNDING OF SOCIAL PROGRAMS
EUGENE, OREGON
JUNE 28, 1973
The Joint Budget Committee met on June 28, 1973 and
approved and recommended for adoption the following expenditures for the $275,000 designated for social services:
Total Agency Recommendations as listed
Total contingency/agency
Monitoring, evaluation and development

$189,971
56,029
29,000
$275,000

A fund of $29,000 is recommended for the monitoring
of contracts, the development of next year's process and
assistance to the approved agencies.
Of the original $275,000 designated for social seris recommended to be held as a contingency
for certain agencies if expected state funds are not
available. If these state funds become available, it is
recommended that the $56,029 be expended according to the
recommended priority numbers 24-31 of this document.
The Joint Budget Committee recommended that the
Civil Rights provisions in the fee-for-service contracts
to be signed include a clause requiring each agency to
develop within the contract period an Affirmative Action
Plan which covers all persons of minority status, i.e.
persons of minority races, women and the aged.
The Affirmative Action Plan should include the
following elements:

vices,.~$59,029

1. The extent of increased client services received
by persons of minority status.
2. The inclusion of persons of minority status on
the organizations admioistering board.
3. The recruitment and use of volunteers who are
persons of minority status.
4. The inclusion of persons of minority status on
the staff of the agency.
5. The education of the organization's staff and
administering board in the areas of special problems and needs of persons of minority status.
(data on specific programs begins on next page)
SOURCE: Joint Budget Committee, City of Eugene,
Oregon, 28 June 1973.
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SERVICES BY PRIORITY

AMOUNT RECOMMENDED
a
1. Buckley House(FUll 36,957, Minimum 3l,SOO)
$ 3l,S50
Detoxification of alcoholics provided through
a live-in treatment facility.
2. White Bird (Crisis and Counseling) (Full
l5,000a
56,092, Minimum 37,S62) 1. Crisis intervention
unit-24hrs/7 days per week, emergency situations ranging from drug overdose, suicides,
family crises, depressions and first aid.
2. Counseling Department: Individual or group
counseling for drugs, family, personal and
communications problems.
3. Pearl Buck (Full 2,256, Minimum NL) Develop2,256 a
ment of market outlets, and contracts for
products produced by the mentally retarded and
multiple handicapped children through a rehabilitation program of adult-sheltered employment
and work adjustment training center.
4. Legal Aid (Full 67,649, Minimum 41,366) Free
25,000
civil, legal services for low-income residents.
5. Halfway House (Full 5,000, Minimum NL) Shel5,000
tered, short term transitional living facilities
for persons returning to the community from
agencies or institutions which treat the emotionally disturbed.
6. Harmony House Friendship (Pull, 7,6S0, Mini1,500
mum 1,128) A drop-in recreation center for
lonely, isolated adults, most of whom have a
history of psychiatric illness for the purpose
of assisting clients in making a transition to
wider social and community involvement.
7. Carlton House (Full 6,992, Minimum NL) Lane
1,792
County Council on Alcoholism. Rehabilitation
of male alcoholics provided through a live-in
facility which includes a counseling and therapy
program.
S. Behanna House (Full 10,569, Minimum NL) Rehab- 7,000a
i1itative services for female alcoholics provided
through a live-in facility which includes therapy
and counseling.

aAgencies designated for possible contingency funds.
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SERVICES BY PRIORITY

AMOUNT RECOMMENDED

9. White Bird (Medical and Detox, see
above) 1. Drug Detoxification Clinic: Live-in
drug detoxification facility for persons voluntarily requesting assistance, services include counseling, referrals to other services
and medical supervision or treatment. 2. Medical clinics: VD, pediatrics, women, general
medical, clinical lab, medical counsel and referrals for indigent persons.
10. Family Shelter House (Full 7,500, Minimum
NL) Emergency shelter and board for homeless
families with children (the aged and pregnant
women are also assisted), and the provision of
supportive services, through referrals to social service agencies and the location of permanent housing which assist the families to
regain their self-sufficiency.

$ 15,000

7,500

11. Volunteer Action Center (Full 10,280, Mini5,000
mum NL) The coordination of the local volunteer
work force with the appropriate agencies in need
of volunteer staff, including the education and
training of agencies to fully utilize volunteer
services.
12. Family Counseling Services of Lane County
3,750b
(Full 3,750, Minimum NL) Marital and family counseling and related services which are utilized
primarily by metro residents and an extension of
the "Family Life Education Series," a preventative program, to the outlying communities.
13. Looking Glass Family Crisis Intervention Cen- 5,400
ter, Inc. (Full 16,800, Minimum NL) Family counseling for children 12-18, and their parents during crisis situations. Includes crisis center
services, shelter care facilities, counseling program, jobs and school placement, foster home
placement program, recreation program and community preventative education program.
14. Planned Parenthood (Full 11,000, Minimum 6,000)
Education, information, referral and counseling
3,500
services in the area of family planning to the
residents of Lane County.

bAgencies designated for possible contingency funds.

4~

SERVICES BY PRIORITY

AMOUNT RECOMMENDED

15. Lane County American Red Cross-Meals on
$
Wheels (Pull 12,328, Minimum NL) Home delivery meals to persons aged 60 or over who are
physically unable to prepare their own meals
on a short-term or permanent basis. Noon meals
are delivered 5 days/week. Other social services, including health and welfare counseling,
transportation and escort services, shopping
assistance and nutritional education are also
provided.
16. Retired Senior Volunteer Program (RSVP)
(Full 7,QOO"Minimum 7,000) Placement of Senior
Citizen Volunteers in local community agencies
with meal and transportation reimbursement.
17. Senior Opportunities and Services (Full 3,500,
Minimum NL) Outreach information and referral,
food stamp assistance, shopping assistance, visitation, social and recreational activities and
friendly visiting services to low income senior
citizens aged 55 or over.
18. Information and Referral Service (Pull 4,950,
Minimum NL) Telephone Assurance Program-Routine
friendly calls to isolated elderly to assure
that their safety and vital needs are being met.
19. Help Elderly Locate Positions (HELP) (Full
5,000, Minimum NL) Assistance to senior citizens
in finding part-time jobs to supplement their
retirement incomes.
20. Drug Information Center (Full 5,070, Minimum
3,627) Free information on drugs and drug-related
topics upon request by persons of the general
public, free and anonymous analysis of street
drugs, publication of a weekly drug information
bulletin, the conduct of a University class, Psycoactive drugs, which is open to the public, and
maintains the largest drug information library in
the Northwest.
21. Mental Health Center (Full 3,687, Minimum NL)
A coordinating unit for Lane County Mental Health
Clinic, the Sacred Heart Johnson Unit, related
mental health facilities, organizations and programs. Also, the center serves as a base for mental health citizen advisory committees.

7,500

1,000

1,000

1,000

1,000

3,627

3,687
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SERVICES BY PRIORITY

AMOUNT RECOMMENDED

22. Mental Health for Children (Full 28,465,
$ 28,465
Minimum 12,128) To be provided by the Lane
Co. Dept. of Health and Social Services. Provides evaluation and referral services to 650
children, treats 400 moderately disturbed children, serves children between the ages of 4-19.
23. Dental Health Program (Full 17,640, Mini13,144
mum NL) To be provided by the Lane Co. Dept. of
Health and Social Services. Provides dental
health education, dental hygiene focusing on
early detection, prevention and treatment of
dental defects, develop community awareness of
dental health problems.
TOTAL
$189,971
Agencies designated for possible contingency funds:
Contingency Reserve:
$ 31,850
Buckley House
White Bird
11,072
Pearl Buck
5,485
Behanna House
6,796
826
Mental Health Center
$ 56,029
Recommendations for the Expenditures of Possible Unexpended Contingency Funds ($56,029):
24. Dental Health (see No.23)
$ 4,496
25. Child Center (Full 5,000, Minimum NL)
5,080
(Amended Request: Full 7,580, Minimum 5,080)
Provides supportive therapeutic learning environment for severely disturbed children ages
3-12, including home visits, parent training
and family counseling.
26. S~~ech "and Hearing Center (Full 15,000,
5,000
Minimum NL) Provides treatment for low income
clients with speech, language or hearing disorders on a fee-for-service basis.
27. Home Makers Service (Full 19,416, Minimum
10,000
16,716) To be provided by Family Counseling Inc.
Provides home based assistance during health related crisis in the areas of personal care for sick
adults, care for children of incapacitated parents,
general home management/maintenance services.
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SERVICES BY PRIORITY

AMOUNT RECOMMENDED

28. Looking Glass (Pull 16,800, Minimum NL)
Provides family counseling for children 12-18,
and their parents during crisis situations.

$

2,500

29. Respite (Pull 11,000, Minimum 3,940) Provides emergency and short term live-in and day
care of mentally retarded and physically handicapped children.

3,940

30. Legal Aid - See No.4.
31. Planned Parenthood - See No. 14
32. CARES (Full 44,154, Minimum 22,097) The
Joint Budget Committee recommended that $10,000
be used in conjunction with the monitoring and
development fund ($30,000) for the development
of the CARES program, i.e. an information and
referral service for all areas of human service
needs utilizing a computer information and data
retrieval system.

12,000
2,500
10,513

APPENDIX

D

QUESTIONNAIRE
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QUESTIONNAIRE USED IN INTERVIEWING CITY OFFICIALS
1. Did the city feel it was necessary to make any
preparations when it knew that General Revenue Sharing
was to become a reality?
2. At the outset, what kinds of uses did the city
feel General Revenue Sharing funds would be used for~
3. In view of the fact that Special Revenue Sharing
monies were never reported out of the Committee in
Washington, D~C., does the city perceive a need now to
use General Revenue Sharing monies for social programs
such as those previously funded by OEO grants?
4. How accurate in the past do you feel have been
the federal perceptions of the needs of cities?
5. President Nixon has
than the federal government,
priorities and programs upon
Do you agree? Please give an
6.
your tax

suggested that cities, rather
are best able to decide the
which money should be spent.
example.

Have your overall city expenses outstripped
potential~

7. Given the inflation of the past 3 to 5 years,
will General Revenue Sharing furds help the city's financial base significantly?
8. Did the city anticipate various interest groups
throughout the city would lobby for chunks of the General
Revenue Sharing monies? Which groups seem to be lobbying the most?
9. Does the city anticipate an ability to meet the
expenditure gap between the federal funds that were used
for OEO programs and what is available in city funds with
revenue sharing'2
10. Did the city see any advantages to federal money going directly to CAP's during the War on Poverty?
11. Who participated in making the decisions on how
General Revenue Sharing funds should be spent in the city?
12. Were these decisions largely "in house" decisions
made among elected and staff personnel of the city.
13. What effort, if any, was made to include the
general public in the decision-making process?
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14. Was there a special effort to include representatives from various "publics" within the city who were
not formally elected city officials in the decisionmaking process'?
15. Were representatives from CAP's sought out'?
16. Were representatives from other district and
neighborhood organizations sought out to participate in
the decision-making process'?
17. Was a special effort made to include racial
minorities in the decision-making process'?
18. What kind of formal processes were establis~ed,
if any, t,o include the public in the decision-making process'? Special General Revenue Sharing hearings'? Published city council meetings that were to specifically
deal with the dissemination of General Revenue Sharing
funds at that meeting'? Special ad hoc committees formed
from among city staff and officials and nonelected representatives of the community to participate in decisionmaking (or recommend to the city council how General Revenue Sharing funds should be spent),?
19. What effect has the counties' activities dealing
with revenue sharing had on the cities~ activities on
General Revenue Sharing'?
20. What effect has the state's activities dealing
with revenue sharing had on the cities' activities on
General Revenue Sharing'?
21. Have city officials perceived the Local Fiscal
Assistance Act of 1972 as encouraging or requiring them
to being citizens into the decision-making process over
local disbursement of General Revenue Sharing funds?

